By night about 6,000 troops were on shore. Gen. Lawton was ordered to push down a strong force to seize and hold Siboney.
On the 23d the disembarkation was continued and about 6,000 more men landed. Early on this date Gen. Lawton’s advance reached Siboney, the Spanish garrison of about 600 men retiring as he came up, and offering no opposition except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of the Cuban troops pursued the retreating Spaniards and skirmished with them. During the afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent’s Division was commenced at Siboney, which enabled me to establish a base eight miles nearer Santiago and to continue the unloading of troops and supplies at both points.
The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the 23d and 24th, and by the evening of the 24th the disembarkation of my command was practically completed.
PREPARING FOR THE ADVANCE.
The orders for June 24th contemplated Gen. Lawton’s Division taking a strong defensive position a short distance from Siboney, on the road to Santiago; Kent’s Division was to be held near Santiago, where he disembarked; Bates’ Brigade was to take position in support of Lawton, while Wheeler’s Division was to be somewhat to the rear on the road from Siboney to Baiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situation until the troops and transportation were disembarked and a reasonable quantity of necessary supplies landed. Gen. Young’s Brigade, however, passed beyond Lawton on the night of the 23d-24th, thus taking the advance, and on the morning of the latter date became engaged with a Spanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guasima, a point on the Santiago road about three miles from Siboney. Gen. Young’s force consisted of one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, one of the 10th Cavalry, and two of the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry; in all, 964 officers and men.
The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field with considerable loss. Our own loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, 6 officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiring effect upon our men and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under a heavy fire delivered from intrenchments. Gen. Wheeler, division commander, was present during the engagement and reports that our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. His report is attached, marked “A.” This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front on which to encamp our troops.
My efforts to unload transportation and subsistence stores, so that we might have several days’ rations on shore, were continued during the remainder of the month. In this work I was ably seconded by Lieut.-Col. Charles F. Humphrey, deputy Q. M. G., U. S. A., chief quartermaster, and Col. John F. Weston, A. O. G. S., chief commissary; hut, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, it was difficult to land supplies in excess of those required daily to feed the men and animals, and the loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken away during the voyage, as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent by Quartermaster’s Department was greatly felt. Indeed, the lack of steam launches, lighters, scows, and wharves can only be appreciated by those who were on the ground directing the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on shore three days’ supplies In excess of those required for the daily consumption.
After the engagement at La Guasima, and before the end of the month, the army, including Gen. Garcia’s command, which had been brought on transports to Siboney from Aserraderos, was mostly concentrated at Sevilla, with the exception of the necessary detachments at Baiquiri and Siboney.
On June 30th I reconnoitered the country about Santiago and made my plan of attack. From a high hill, from which the city was in plain view, I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than bridle-paths until the San Juan River and El Caney were reached.
The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to assail the right flank of any force operating against San Juan Hill.