England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

A second attempt, on the part of the provisional government at Brussels to persuade Louis Philippe to accept the crown for his son, was made in December 1830. On that occasion M. Van de Weyer carried the proposal to Paris. British hostility was to be overcome by the marriage of Nemours, the young prince whom it was proposed to elevate to the throne, to an English princess, and by the conversion of Antwerp into a free port and by the destruction of its fortifications.[68] Louis Philippe declined the offer, but the already-mentioned instructions sent to Talleyrand to ascertain the views of the British government upon the subject were probably a consequence of Van de Weyer’s mission. Bresson, however, soon after he had received Sébastiani’s despatch, informing him of the King’s determination to refuse the crown for his son, expressed great fear lest Leuchtenberg should be selected. His candidature was, he reported, the result of a Bonapartist intrigue organized in Paris, but the Belgians were tired of their unsettled condition and were anxious that a ruler of some kind should be chosen.[69] Some ten days later he forwarded intelligence of a more precise and of a yet more disquieting nature. The French party, led by M. Gendebien, in consequence of the refusal of Nemours, had now definitely adopted Leuchtenberg as their candidate. Moreover, three notorious Bonapartist generals, Excelmans, Lallemand and Fabvier, were reported to have arrived at Namur and Liège. This news was followed the next day by a despatch in which he complained of Ponsonby’s activity on behalf of the Prince of Orange and, at the same time, accused him of being favourable to the election of Leuchtenberg.[70]

Louis Philippe was genuinely disquieted by Bresson’s news. He was resolved, he told Lord Granville, who, early in January, had replaced Lord Stuart de Rothesay at the British embassy, to send the Comte de Flahaut to London to impress upon the government the keen anxiety with which he regarded the march of events at Brussels. By existing treaties, he reminded him, no member of the Bonaparte family was allowed to live in Belgium, and, in the course of conversation, he hinted that a Neapolitan prince would be the best king for the new State.[71] Flahaut was a distinguished general officer of the empire and was, besides, the admitted father of that half-brother of Louis Napoleon, who was to acquire celebrity under the name of the Duc de Morny. During the greater part of the Restoration period Flahaut had lived in London, where his attractive manners and charm of conversation had made him a popular member of society. Moreover, during his residence in England, he had married Miss Mercer Elphinstone, a great heiress of her day.[72] The mission, upon which he was now despatched to London, was not confined merely to the communication to the British government of Louis Philippe’s fears respecting a Bonapartist candidate for the Belgian throne. But, as his instructions are not to be found among the diplomatic papers of the period, the exact nature of the proposals he was empowered to make can only be conjectured. In a private letter to Granville, on February 8, Palmerston speaks of a suggested offensive and defensive alliance between France and Great Britain “which was to be kept an entire secret from all the world,” to which proposal he had replied, “that these alliances are not popular in England, but that if France were attacked unjustly, England would be found upon her side.”[73] From the despatches of Granville and of Talleyrand it may be inferred with certainty that some scheme was on foot whereby France was to acquire a part of Belgium and, in return for her consent to this plan, England was to have the right of garrisoning Antwerp, which was to be declared a free port.[74] Talleyrand, whilst favourable to the idea of converting Antwerp into a Hanseatic town, was very much opposed to the notion of assisting England to regain a footing upon the continent. It would be too high a price to pay, he contended, even for so popular a measure as the extension of the French frontiers into Belgium.[75]

Whilst Flahaut was thus engaged in London, Colonel the Marquis de Lawoëstine, a former aide-de-camp of Sébastiani and a Belgian of good family, had been despatched to Brussels. In his case also the precise object of his errand can only be surmised. It is clear, however, that M. Juste[76] is mistaken in supposing that he was sent to urge the national congress to elect the Duc de Nemours. “In general,”wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, when announcing the despatch of Lawoëstine, “you must say as little as possible about his mission, but you need make no mystery about it to Lord Ponsonby,”[77] a sentence which precludes the possibility that his journey to Brussels can have been connected with the election of a son of Louis Philippe. Without doubt Lawoëstine was primarily charged to combat the candidature of Leuchtenberg, but it would seem that he was directed quietly to oppose Prince Charles of Naples to him. “It will be difficult,” answered Bresson upon receipt of Sébastiani’s despatch, “to keep secret the object of Lawoëstine’s mission. The candidature of Prince Charles of Naples has been talked about and the factions in Paris are working against him. Even M. de Mérode[78] is threatening to abandon Prince Charles and to vote in favour of the Duc de Leuchtenberg.”[79]

Lawoëstine, after “seeing all the chief people,”appears to have returned to Paris to lay before the King the urgency of the situation, whilst the tone of Bresson’s despatches, during the next few days, became yet more alarming. The bust of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, he reported, had been crowned at the theatre amidst cries of “Vive August 1^er, Roi des Belges.” Only, he considered, by the nomination of the Duc de Nemours could Leuchtenberg be combated effectually.[80] Bresson himself, probably on either January 25 or 26, seems to have paid a hurried visit to Paris. On February 1 the national congress was to proceed to elect a King for Belgium, and, presumably, he wished to obtain fuller instructions as to the attitude he was to adopt in the different eventualities which might arise. By this time the 11th protocol of the London conference, that of January 20, 1831, defining the boundaries of Holland and Belgium, had been received by Lord Ponsonby and himself for communication to the provisional government. The conditions of separation, as laid down in that document, fell far short of the hopes of the Belgians. They claimed the districts of Luxemburg and Limburg, but the Powers assigned these provinces to Holland. The King of the Netherlands was also Grand Duke of Luxemburg and as such was a member of the Germanic Confederation. His position had been recognized by the conference which, in its protocol of December 20, 1830, had formally declared its incompetence to interfere with territories forming part of the Confederation, a decision which excited equal dissatisfaction in Paris and in Brussels. If she could not obtain Luxemburg for herself, France hoped to see this province withdrawn from the Germanic Confederation and handed over to Belgium.

On January 29 Bresson reported his return to Brussels, having performed the journey from the French capital in twenty-five hours. He would appear to have been empowered by Louis Philippe himself to assure the members of the national congress that, were Nemours to be elected, he would be allowed to accept the crown. It is probable, however, that he was instructed only to resort to this step should he find it impossible to oppose Leuchtenberg successfully by other means. It may be inferred that neither Bresson nor Lawoëstine felt any enthusiasm about the election of a Neapolitan Bourbon, and were only too anxious to bestir themselves actively on behalf of a French prince. “Ponsonby supports Leuchtenberg as leading up to the Prince of Orange,” wrote Bresson on the day of his return.[81] “The effect of Lord Ponsonby’s communication to the congress of the protocol of January 20 has been very great,” reported Lawoëstine, who also was back in Brussels. “The only way of preventing the election of the Duc de Leuchtenberg is by bringing forward the Duc de Nemours. Even at the risk of a war with the Powers this course should be adopted. Belgium would be with us heart and soul, and we should begin the campaign in possession of the 23 frontier fortresses, all of which are provided with an immense matériel.”[82]

On receipt of this news from his agents at Brussels Sébastiani, in order, presumably, to influence the national congress in favour of the French candidate, despatched a letter to Bresson the contents of which were intended for communication to the Belgian deputies. In this document, dated February 1, Sébastiani stated that France could not give her consent to the delimitation of frontiers or to the apportionment of the debt, as laid down in the 11th and 12th protocols of the London conference, unless these conditions should be deemed satisfactory by both the States concerned. The French government, holding that the conference had been convened for purposes of mediation only, could not allow it to assume a different character.[83] On February 3 the Duc de Nemours was elected King of the Belgians, and a deputation started at once for Paris to communicate the news officially to Louis Philippe.

In the meantime Sébastiani, on February 2, had informed Talleyrand that, were the Belgians to elect a son of Louis Philippe for their King, he would decline to accept the crown, but the occasion was to be utilized for bringing forward the Prince of Naples. He was confident that, in order to escape from the complications entailed by Nemours’ election, the Powers, at present hostile to the Neapolitan prince, would look upon his enthronement as a happy alternative. On February 4 he again affirmed the King’s intention of declining the crown for his son, but his despatch of the following day was replete with complaints of Ponsonby’s efforts upon behalf of the Prince of Orange, a course of conduct which, he declared, would inevitably lead to civil war. Were serious disturbances to break out in Belgium, France would be driven to intervene, and it was, therefore, necessary for Lords Grey and Palmerston to understand that the situation was extremely critical.[84]

Talleyrand, however, was doing all in his power to convince his government of the disastrous effect which the rumours from Brussels were having upon public opinion in London. His declaration to the conference, on February 7, that the King of the French would refuse the crown of Belgium for his son had made a very good impression, and it had induced the plenipotentiaries to guarantee that, were Leuchtenberg to be elected, he would not be acknowledged by their respective Courts.[85] But, on the same day, he reported that the Cabinet, after a prolonged sitting, had resolved to declare war upon France, should the crown of Belgium be accepted by Nemours, and he begged Sébastiani to reflect most seriously upon the consequences of a naval conflict. Bresson’s behaviour at Brussels, he complained, had placed him in a very difficult position, and if the King could not see his way to follow his advice, his continued presence in London could no longer serve any useful purpose, Montrond, who by his desire was returning to Paris, would tell the King and his ministers that in London, at the clubs and in society, the prospects of a war with France were the chief topic of conversation.[86]