During his stay at Berlin, Orloff tried to win over the Prussian government to the Tsar’s views upon the Belgian question. But his attempts were unsuccessful. Ancillon, the chief minister, was greatly alarmed at the disturbance of the European Concert to which he feared the Russian policy must lead. Were Austria, Prussia and Russia to make their ratification of the separation treaty depend upon the acceptation of its conditions by the King of the Netherlands, the Powers must necessarily fall into two opposing groups: France and Great Britain on the one side, and the three Northern Courts on the other. Rather than help to create so perilous a situation, Prussia would, with much regret be obliged to “aller en avant et de ratifier.” Ancillon seems to have succeeded in extracting from Orloff a promise that he would for the present, at least, refrain from communicating the secret clauses of his instructions to the King of the Netherlands, and to have directed the Prussian minister at St. Petersburg to endeavour to persuade Nicholas to cancel them. Metternich, reported Lamb, regarded the matter in the same light as Ancillon, and was resolved to assimilate his policy to that of the Court of Berlin. It was presumably for the purpose of thwarting the Russian plan that a copy of Orloff’s secret instructions was placed in the hands of the British ambassador.[209]
When France and England had ratified the treaty of separation, Palmerston at once instructed the British representatives at Vienna and at Berlin to urge the Austrian and Prussian Courts to follow the example of the western Powers. Metternich, wrote Lamb, eluded the question, and insisted upon the necessity of waiting to hear the result of Orloff’s mission.[210] At Berlin, Mr. Chad was enjoined to remind M. Ancillon that the action of the Prussian government in refusing to ratify was a violation of its promises.[211] In M. Casimir Périer’s opinion, the policy of the absolute Courts was dictated by the hope that a second rejection of the Reform Bill by the House of Lords might lead to a change of government in England.[212] In the meanwhile, Count Orloff had arrived at the Hague on February 20. At Berlin, he had intimated that under no circumstances would his stay in Holland be prolonged beyond ten days.[213] Nevertheless, the period which he had assigned for the duration of his visit was greatly exceeded. There was reason to believe, however, that communications had reached him from his Court which, if they did not absolutely annul, unquestionably modified his instructions and brought them more into harmony with the views of the constitutional Powers.[214] Without doubt, the repugnance evinced at Vienna and at Berlin to break with the London conference was largely responsible for the changed disposition of Nicholas. But the arrival at St. Petersburg, after Orloff had left, of the draft of a proposed new treaty of separation, in which the King of the Netherlands put forward the most absurd pretensions, would seem to have impressed the Tsar most unfavourably. He appears to have grown very suspicious that the Dutch Court, acting under the inspiration of the French legitimists, was striving to embroil the Great Powers in a war.[215]
Palmerston, under these circumstances, decided to exercise an increased pressure upon the wavering resolution of the Northern Courts. The sittings of the conference, he announced, would be suspended until the signatory Powers of the treaty of separation should have ratified that agreement. Furthermore, on March 16, Sir Charles Bagot, the British ambassador, was instructed to protest against Count Orloff’s continued stay at the Hague.[216] The threat that the London conference would be dissolved appears to have excited considerable alarm at Berlin.[217] Although the obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands was proof against all remonstrances, Palmerston’s action, which had the support of the French government, was probably successful in bringing Orloff’s mission to an end. In any case, on March 22, Verstolk, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, officially informed Nicholas’ envoy that the King could not accept the separation treaty of the twenty-four articles as it existed. No sooner had he made this statement than Count Orloff at once handed him the declaration which he had been instructed to deliver. The note in question was to the effect that, although His Imperial Majesty would not participate himself in any measures of coercion to force the King to accept the treaty, he should not oppose those steps which his allies might resolve to take in order to impose its conditions upon Holland. Directly they learnt that Orloff had delivered his declaration, the Austrian and Prussian ministers sent separate notes to M. Verstolk, notifying the adhesion of their respective Courts to the course pursued by the Russian Cabinet. Orloff, two days later, took leave of the King and started for London.[218]
The failure of Orloff’s mission deprived the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets of all reasonable excuse for withholding their assent to the treaty. Indeed, before the Russian agent had taken his departure from the Hague, Metternich informed Sir Frederick Lamb that the Austrian ratification would be forwarded to London without further delay. The presence of the French in Italy, and the fear that the course upon which the absolute Courts had embarked would tend to promote a close alliance between England and France were factors in the situation, which, in the opinion of the British ambassador, had greatly influenced Metternich’s decision.[219] Accordingly, on April 18, at the London Foreign Office the Austrian and Prussian plenipotentiaries exchanged ratifications of the treaty of November 15, 1831, with the representative of Belgium. The Prussian minister, Bülow, had been furnished with a discretionary power either to proceed with the matter or to await the Russian ratification, and he appears to have yielded to the pressure brought to bear upon him by Palmerston and Talleyrand.[220] Both the Prussian and Austrian ratifications were accompanied by reservations with respect to the rights of the Germanic Confederation in Connection with any cession or exchange of a portion of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.[221]
It was resolved, as on former occasions, to keep open the protocol in order that Russia might still be enabled to become a party to the treaty. Lieven and Matuszewic, the Russian plenipotentiaries, had authority to ratify, but with reservations respecting three articles of the treaty which concerned the navigation of the Scheldt, the construction of a road, and the share of the debt to be borne by Belgium. But, were a limited ratification of this description to be accepted, Russia would necessarily be placed in a different situation as regards Belgium to that occupied by the other contracting parties. This was a development to which Palmerston was altogether opposed. On the other hand, he was desirous above all things to avoid the necessity of excluding Russia from the treaty. The rift in the European Concert, which such a result would disclose, must encourage the King of the Netherlands to resist the decisions of the conference and might endanger the general peace. The representatives of the Powers, not excepting Orloff, Lieven and Matuszewic were, however, sincerely anxious to discover a way out of the difficulty. At Brussels it was contended with some reason that the limited ratification of Russia might be held to invalidate the treaty as a whole. But Stockmar, the counsellor of Leopold, pointed out that the existing governments in France and England considered that their acts of ratification bound them indissolubly to the treaty. The struggle over the Reform Bill had, however, entered upon its final stage, and it was doubtful whether Lord Grey and his colleagues would emerge from it successfully. Under these circumstances, urged Stockmar, it was well to remember that both Wellington and Aberdeen had declared that they should not consider the treaty of the twenty-four articles as binding, until it should have been ratified by all the signatory Powers. Were Grey to fall, and were a Tory Cabinet to be formed, Russia very probably might altogether refuse to ratify.[222]
On May 4 the deliberations of the conference at the Foreign Office were prolonged far into the night. Talleyrand’s powers of persuasion, Palmerston’s determined will and skill in argument were alike directed to the task of devising some solution of the problem, which all parties might accept with dignity. The desired result was at last attained by means of an explanation of the purpose of the Russian reservation, which was inserted into the protocol. According to this declaration, the Russian plenipotentiaries asserted that their Court had no other intention than to leave open the matters contained in the three articles in question for subsequent settlement by Holland and Belgium. Under these conditions, Van de Weyer agreed to accept the Russian ratification with the proviso, which was also to be embodied into the protocol, that his Court laid claim to the full benefit of the engagements contracted towards Belgium by the five Powers. That same night Orloff departed from England.[223] Nicholas had been very gratified by the flattering welcome which had been accorded to his favourite in London society.[224] His satisfaction on this point contributed, doubtless, to the happy termination of the negotiation. But the statesmanlike conduct of Van de Weyer was, at the time, little appreciated in political circles in Brussels, where he was censured for accepting the limited ratification of Russia.[225]