England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

To the commissioner of the Porte sent to remonstrate with him for thus invading a neighbouring pashalic, without the permission of the Sultan, Mehemet Ali loudly protested the loyalty of his intentions. The presumptuous Abdullah, he swore, had “insulted his beard whitened in the service of his sovereign,” and, in the interests of the Porte, he now proposed to chastise his arrogance. These assurances were, however, estimated at their true value, and neither the Sultan nor his ministers had had any doubts that the Pasha was now launched upon a career of conquest.[272] The destruction of his powerful vassal had, for many years past, been an object very near to Mahmud’s heart. To accomplish this purpose, he was prepared to strain to their uttermost the exhausted resources of the empire. His favourite, Hosrew, the Seraskier,[273] was the sworn enemy of Mehemet Ali, and both the Grand Vizier and the Capudan Pasha[274] were the creatures of this minister.[275] On the other hand, however, the Ulemas and the Mullahs argued in favour of an arrangement with the rebellious viceroy, even at the price of large concessions. The three guaranteeing Powers had settled upon the boundaries of the new Kingdom of Greece, and Sir Stratford Canning was about to arrive at Constantinople to arrange the final conditions of separation with the Porte. But, were peace to be maintained with the Pasha of Egypt, contended the true Mussulman party, a united front could be turned to Europe, and the concessions demanded, in respect of Greece, might be scornfully rejected.[276]

Notwithstanding his wrath, this consideration appears to have carried some weight with the Sultan. But his hesitation was not of long duration. Hussein Pasha, a former janissary, and Mahmud’s chief instrument in the destruction of his comrades, was appointed to the command of the troops in Syria. No pains were spared to render the army of operations as efficient and as numerous as possible, and, early in May, both Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim were declared outlaws. Meanwhile, the siege of Acre had been proceeding, but the defence was stubborn, and it was not until May 27, 1832, that Ibrahim carried the fortress by storm. The victorious general now set his face northwards. On June 15, Damascus opened its gates, and, on July 9, he defeated the advanced Turkish troops at Homs. A week later, he entered Aleppo, and, on July 29, routed Hussein Pasha himself, who had taken up a strong position near Alexandretta. This victory left him free to pass the Taurus mountains and to enter Asia Minor.

It was to the politic attitude which he had observed towards the people of the country through which he had passed, rather than to any superiority of his Arab troops over the Turks, that the success of Ibrahim’s invasion should be ascribed. In those wild and mountainous districts any resistance on the part of the inhabitants must have greatly impeded the advance of an army. Ibrahim, however, maintained the strictest discipline, and paid promptly for all the requirements of his troops. The people, contrasting his behaviour with the treatment they had been accustomed to experience at the hands of the Turks, were strongly impressed in favour of the Egyptians.[277] The Emir Beshir, the powerful chief of the Lebanon, threw in his lot with the invaders. The warlike Druses and the Maronites tendered Ibrahim their services. Christians were won over by promises of equal rights, and Moslems by the prospect of escaping from Ottoman oppression. Ibrahim’s troops were equipped in European fashion, but there was nothing about their uniform which could offend the most rigid Mussulman. He himself was dressed in the same simple manner as his soldiers, and he affected always to be a strict observer of Turkish customs. Although in private, in the company of the Christian officers of his staff, he would often indulge freely in French wine, in public he was never seen to drink anything stronger than water.[278]

Ibrahim’s rapid succession of victories and his continued advance filled the Sultan with consternation. Having resolved to throw all the resources of the Empire into the struggle with Mehemet Ali he could not afford to quarrel with the Christian Powers. Stratford Canning, accordingly, experienced little difficulty in bringing the Porte to agree to the conditions under which it was proposed that Greece should be separated from Turkey. Soon after his arrival, however, on May 17, in the course of a confidential talk, Mustafa-Effendi, the Sultan’s private secretary, let fall certain expressions indicative of a desire on the part of his master to enter into a close and intimate connection with England.[279] On August 7, 1832, on the occasion of Sir Stratford’s audience for the purpose of taking leave, the Sultan “honoured him with the gift of his portrait suspended by a gold chain and set in brilliants,” a mark of His Highness’ consideration which, the ambassador reported, “was without precedent.”[280] Direct proposals for the conclusion of an alliance between England and Turkey were immediately afterwards made to him both by the Reis-Effendi[281] and by the Sultan himself.[282] Furthermore, M. Maurojeni, the Turkish chargé d’affaires at Vienna, was sent to London to sound the British government upon the subject, and, on October 18, Namic Pasha, a major-general of the Imperial Guard, set out for England with a letter from His Highness to King William IV. praying for naval assistance on the coast of Syria.[283]

Had the decision rested with Palmerston alone it is possible that aid of some kind might have been furnished to the Porte. But the majority of the members of the Cabinet were strongly averse to embarking upon any fresh adventure, while the Belgian question was still unsettled. Moreover, since the conclusion of the great war, the naval establishments had been cut down to so low a point that it would have been highly inconvenient to reinforce the Mediterranean squadron. The British chargé d’affaires at Constantinople was, therefore, instructed to inform the Porte that “naval assistance was a matter of greater difficulty than at first sight it would appear to be.” Nevertheless, the request was regarded as a striking proof of the Sultan’s confidence in British friendship, and His Majesty’s government would at once convey to Mehemet Ali “an expression of regret that he should so far have forgotten what was due to his Sovereign.”[284] This was all the comfort which Mandeville was able to give to the distracted Turkish ministers, at the moment when the news reached Constantinople that the Grand Vizier had been completely defeated at Konieh, that he himself was a prisoner in Ibrahim’s hands and that, in the words of the Reis-Effendi, “the Turkish army existed no longer.”[285]

A few days before the arrival of the news of the disaster at Konieh, the Russian general, Muravieff, suddenly appeared at Constantinople. On December 23 both he and Boutenieff, the Russian ambassador, had a conference with the Reis-Effendi and the Seraskier, and, on the 27th, the general was received in private audience by the Sultan, to whom he presented a letter from the Tsar. No mystery was made of the fact that Muravieff had been charged to proceed to Cairo, to warn Mehemet Ali that, should he persist in refusing to make his submission to the Sultan, he would bring down upon himself the wrath of the Emperor Nicholas. But both Mandeville and Varennes, the French chargé d’affaires, were soon satisfied, notwithstanding the secrecy with which the Russian proceedings were surrounded, that an offer of military assistance had been tendered to the Porte. Their information was correct.[286] Boutenieff had offered to place a squadron of the Black Sea fleet at the Sultan’s disposal, but his Highness, with profuse expressions of gratitude, had declined the proffered assistance. Rather than accept help from Russia, he was prepared to humble his pride and to send Halil Pasha to attempt to arrange a settlement with his rebellious vassal. On January 5, 1833, this decision was conveyed to Boutenieff, whereupon Muravieff at once set out upon his mission to Mehemet Ali, the Sultan’s envoy, Halil Pasha, having already started upon his way to Alexandria.

There had, for a long time past, been a disposition in England to regard French relations with Egypt with suspicion. Ever since Bonaparte’s descent upon the country, Egypt was believed to have a sentimental attraction for the French. Now that by their acquisition of Algiers, they had gained a footing upon the African shore of the Mediterranean, this feeling of distrust had increased. It was remembered that Polignac had seriously entertained the notion of subsidizing Mehemet Ali and of employing a corps of Egyptian troops in the Algerian expedition. During the course of Ibrahim’s campaign in Syria, both Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked with sour disapproval upon Varennes’ efforts to persuade the Porte to allow France to mediate between the Sultan and the Pasha.[287] But both the French and English governments were agreed as to the necessity of preserving the Ottoman Empire and were resolved to prevent, if possible, the Porte from falling completely under the influence of Russia. The Duc de Broglie, when he learnt that offers of assistance had been made to the Sultan by Boutenieff, at once suggested the joint mediation of France and England in the Turco-Egyptian dispute, and was greatly disappointed to find that his proposal met with no response in London. Palmerston, for the present, was content to direct Lord Ponsonby to proceed from Naples to Constantinople, as ambassador to the Porte, and to despatch Colonel Campbell to Egypt, in the capacity of British agent and consul-general, with instructions to communicate “freely and confidentially” with the French and Austrian representatives at Alexandria.[288]

It was one of the ironies of the situation that, at this time, when Russia was suspected of intending to put into execution long-matured schemes against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, her traditional policy towards Turkey had in fact been completely reversed. As far back as the year 1802 the minister, Kotchuby, taking as his text Montesquieu’s doctrine that no Power can have a better neighbour than a weak State, had drawn up a memorandum to prove that the preservation, not the destruction, of Turkey should be the object of Russian policy. More recently, in 1829, when the terms of the peace of Adrianople were under consideration, the members of the eastern committee had endorsed Kotchuby’s views, and the Tsar Nicholas had reluctantly adopted their conclusions.[289] Muravieff’s instructions had been drawn strictly in this spirit. Mehemet Ali, Nesselrode laid down, must not be allowed to reach Constantinople and to overthrow the existing régime. Such a development would be opposed to the Imperial policy, which aimed at maintaining Turkey in her present “stationary condition.” Should the Pasha succeed in establishing himself at Constantinople, Russia would be placed “in contact with a strong and victorious Power instead of a weak and defeated neighbour.”[290]

Meanwhile, Ibrahim who was still at Konieh was believed to be on the point of moving forward to Brusa.[291] Both to Colonel Duhamel, Muravieff’s aide-de-camp, and to a messenger despatched to him by M. de Varennes, he returned the same answer. He was a soldier and must obey his orders, his father alone could decide upon his movements. He should be sorry to displease the Emperor Nicholas, but he must abide by his instructions.[292] Ibrahim’s uncompromising attitude overcame the Sultan’s hesitation. Boutenieff was informed that the promised naval assistance would be thankfully accepted and that, in addition, His Highness craved for the despatch of 30,000 Russian troops for the defence of his capital. The Sultan knew well that to invoke the military protection of the Tsar must lower him in the eyes of his subjects and of every true Mussulman. But, upon the whole, he regarded it as less dangerous than to allow Ibrahim to advance to the shores of the Bosphorus. It was in vain, therefore, that Varennes and Mandeville exerted themselves to induce the Porte to withdraw the demand for Russian help.[293] “A drowning man,” said the Reis-Effendi, “will clutch at a serpent.”[294]