England and the Orléans Monarchy

by John Hall

In every part of the world France and England were opposed to each other. M. Guizot’s own relations with Lord Normanby were very far from friendly. The public denial of the French minister that he had used certain words, imputed to him by the British ambassador, had been followed by a personal quarrel, which had only been arranged by the intervention of Count Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador.[895] At Madrid, the consequences of the distasteful marriage forced upon the young Queen were already apparent. Isabella was practically separated from her husband, and her relations with General Serrano were a cause of scandal. French and British rivalry was actively maintained by Bresson and by Bulwer, who, with the full knowledge of Palmerston, was deeply involved in all the intrigues of the palace.[896] At Athens, where King Otho had been compelled to grant a constitution, Lyons and Piscatory, the British and French ministers, were closely identified with different political parties. In South America, a dispute between Lord Howden and Comte Walewski threatened to put an end to the mediation of France and England in the war, which for some time past had been in progress between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video.[897]

M. Guizot, under these circumstances, resolved to make approaches to Austria. The British government alone was disposed to sympathize sincerely with the Liberal movement which was causing so much anxiety to the absolute Courts. If only he could arrive at an agreement with Metternich as to the policy to be adopted towards German, Swiss and Italian affairs, England would be isolated completely. But the negotiation of such an understanding was a delicate matter. An alliance between the government of the “Citizen King” and the Cabinet of Vienna, for the maintenance of despotism and of the settlement of 1815, was an unnatural combination which might prove fatal to its promotor. Public opinion in France was on the side of the peoples struggling for political freedom. M. Thiers, the leader of the Opposition, had loudly declared that this was only the principle upon which French policy could be based. M. Guizot, therefore, considered it advisable, in his intercourse with Metternich, not to make use of the ordinary channels of communication, but to employ a secret agent. In the spring of 1847, accordingly, he sent to Vienna, a certain Klindworth,[898] who on several former occasions appears to have been entrusted with confidential missions by the French Foreign Office. He was to assure Prince Metternich that the French government was determined to uphold the territorial status quo, and was prepared to co-operate with Austria in opposing the introduction of any fundamental changes in the system of government of the different Italian States.[899]

M. Guizot, furthermore, entered into a direct correspondence with Prince Metternich. But no precise agreement as to their respective policies was concluded.[900] Guizot appears to have been mainly concerned to assure the Austrian Chancellor of the high esteem which he entertained for his perspicacity and judgment. Nor did he, on occasions, disdain to employ language which can only be described as that of fulsome adulation.[901] Metternich could not be otherwise than pleased and flattered by the advances thus made to him. He was not, however, disposed to set an undue value upon the protestations of M. Guizot. He had little doubt that, were Austria to invade the Papal States, France would at once dispatch an army to Italy, proclaiming that she had taken His Holiness under her protection. But, although no formal compact resulted from M. Guizot’s overtures at Vienna, his desire to propitiate Prince Metternich was reflected in his instructions to his agents at the different Italian Courts. By the spring of 1847, it was evident that the Italian Liberal movement was regarded with nearly as much disapproval by the government of Louis Philippe as by the Cabinet of Vienna.

Metternich was under no illusions as to the true meaning of the events which were taking place in Italy. Above the popular expressions of joy at the reforms, conceded by the Pope or by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, rose the threatening cry for the expulsion of the foreigner. Unless the Liberal movement could be crushed, the Emperor, he perceived clearly, would have to fight to retain his Italian possessions. “Nationality,” he bade Buol warn Charles Albert, “was the new device which the revolutionists had inscribed upon their banners.”[902] Resolutely he prepared for the struggle which he saw was impending. Troops were poured into Lombardy and the Austrian garrison at Ferrara was strengthened. Moreover, he was strongly suspected of fomenting a counter-revolutionary plot at Rome, with the object of forcibly displacing the Liberal advisers of His Holiness, and of surrounding him with members of the reactionary party. The discovery of this conspiracy, in which the governor of Rome was involved, caused an immense excitement. No certain evidence could be procured of the participation of Austrian agents in the affair. It was significant, however, that the garrison of Ferrara received a substantial accession of strength on the very day fixed upon by the conspirators for the execution of their plans.[903] But, if Metternich’s connection with the Roman plot of July 1847 may be held to be not proven, his intention to provoke the Liberal and national party into some ill-considered act of violence, which should furnish him with a pretext for armed intervention, admits of no doubt. Hitherto, as specified by the treaty, the garrison at Ferrara[904] had been confined to the citadel. But now the Austrians proceeded to occupy the whole town, the troops adopting a most insulting attitude towards the population, and especially towards the civic guard. But this clumsy device for bringing on a collision failed in its object. In the words of the British minister at Florence, the newly enrolled citizen soldiers “observed the most extraordinary moderation under the most contumelious treatment.”[905] The Austrian proceedings at Ferrara called forth a strong protest from His Holiness, who, at the same time requested Charles Albert to send a frigate to Civita Vecchia for his personal protection. His Sardinian Majesty promptly complied with this demand, whereupon, the French ambassador tendered an offer of assistance on the part of his government. This proposal, however, was declined, no doubt being entertained at Rome, that France and Austria were acting together in Italian affairs.[906] Thus Metternich, by his aggressive attitude, had only succeeded in creating a bond of union between the Papal government and the Court of Turin.[907]

At the end of July, 1847, Metternich resolved to inquire of the different Powers, which were parties to the treaties of 1815, whether they, as “the principal guardians of the political peace,”[908] intended to maintain the territorial divisions of the Italian peninsula as settled by the Congress of Vienna. The revolution, he told Lord Ponsonby, must now be considered as complete in the Roman States and in Tuscany. A revolution, he explained, was accomplished, once a government had been deprived of all power. But the real object of the party which had triumphed at Rome was to create a united Italy. The Emperor, however, while studiously respecting the independence of the sovereign States of the Peninsula, was determined to preserve his own Italian kingdom.[909] The British government, wrote Palmerston in reply, holds that the stipulations of treaties must everywhere be observed, and that no changes in an agreement can properly be effected, except with the concurrence of all the Powers which are parties to it. But Her Majesty’s government, at the same time, is no less strongly of opinion that the right to carry out internal reforms is a right inherent to independent sovereignty.[910] A month later, on September 11, when the threatening communications made by Count Buol to the Court of Turin, and the proceedings of the military commander at Ferrara suggested that Austria might be contemplating some act of aggression against the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Papal dominions, Palmerston reverted to this subject. “The crowns of Great Britain and of Sardinia,” he warned Metternich, “had long been bound together by the ties of an intimate and faithful alliance, and Great Britain could neither forget nor repudiate claims founded upon such honourable grounds.” The Papal States were an essential element in the political independence of the Italian Peninsula, and no invasion of them could take place “without leading to consequences of great gravity and importance.”[911]

At the time when Palmerston was holding this language, the British government had decided upon a measure, which was afterwards the subject of much criticism. In the month of April, the Papal nuncio in Paris had expressed to Lord Normanby a fear that His Holiness would experience great difficulty in carrying out his projected reforms. It was plain that no assistance would be forthcoming from the French government, and it was, in consequence, very necessary that the cause of social improvement in Italy should receive “a more active moral support from England.” If there were constitutional objections to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with the Holy See,[912] might not some one, he suggested, in the confidence of Her Majesty’s government, be sent to Rome for the purpose of communicating with the Pope and his ministers?[913] The Russell Cabinet was strongly in favour of acceding to this request, but the manner in which the British government should extend its “moral support” was somewhat difficult to determine. Palmerston advocated that Lord Minto, the Lord Privy Seal, should be sent upon a special mission to Turin, Florence and Borne. The Queen, however, raised certain objections to this plan. In an able memorandum Prince Albert pointed out that to despatch a member of the government to Italy, to encourage the rulers of the different States to adopt measures, which Austria regarded as highly dangerous to her existence as an Italian power, was “a most hostile step towards our old and natural ally.” It would be more friendly, he contended, and certainly more honest, to let it be clearly understood at Vienna that an attack upon any Italian Sovereign, who was desirous of effecting administrative reforms, would be looked upon as a violation of treaties to which England was a party. But His Royal Highness was ready to admit that, by adopting such a policy, England would be morally bound to uphold the independence of the Italian States, whereas the projected mission of Lord Minto would not commit her actively to interfere on their behalf.[914] After some further discussion and correspondence Palmerston carried his point. On September 11, his already quoted despatch was sent off to Vienna, and, a week later, Lord Minto was supplied with his instructions and started upon his journey.

Moderate as was the language which Lord Minto was directed to hold at the different Italian Courts, his mission was necessarily regarded with extreme disapproval at Vienna. Yet Minto had no mandate to encourage the movement in favour of Italian unity, nor was he instructed to counsel the adoption of any measures which could be regarded as even an indirect attempt to deprive the Emperor of his Italian possessions. On the contrary, he was to insist upon the necessity of maintaining the peace. At Turin, he was to warn Charles Albert of the danger of allowing his natural irritation at the interference of Austria in his affairs to betray him into some act, which might furnish the Court of Vienna with a pretext for attacking him. But Metternich, being determined to place an absolute check upon the development of Liberal ideas, was naturally greatly annoyed that a British minister should visit Florence, Rome and Turin for the purpose of congratulating the Sovereigns upon the reforms which they had already carried out, and of urging them to persevere in the same course in the future.[915]

Another task, however, had been confided to Lord Minto, besides that of counselling the Italian rulers to advance with prudence and circumspection along the path of reform. On his way to Turin he was instructed to visit Switzerland, where a very grave condition of affairs had arisen. By the Federal Pact of 1815 Switzerland consisted of twenty-two sovereign and independent Cantons, each of which possessed one vote in the Federal Diet. The repercussion of the revolution of 1830, in France, was acutely felt in Switzerland, and, about that time, the cantonal constitutions were revised in a democratic spirit. Some nine years later, however, the Conservatives, by raising the cry that religion was in danger, succeeded in many of the Cantons in regaining their lost power. The victorious party made no attempt, even in those Cantons where their ascendency was the most complete, to repeal the Liberal legislation of the past few years. On the contrary, in the very Catholic cantons of Lucerne and of the Valais, the popular veto and the referendum were introduced. It was plainly the opinion of the clergy that their influence over the people would enable them to obtain, by means of these democratic institutions, the rejection of any measure of which they disapproved. In the Canton of Aargau, however, of which the population was half Protestant and half Catholic, the clerical party failed to establish its ascendency by peaceful means. An attempt was, accordingly, made to overturn the existing government by force. But the insurrection proved unsuccessful and the eight monasteries, the inmates of which were proved to have been actively concerned in the plot, were suppressed. The existence of these establishments had been guaranteed by an article of the Federal Pact, and the action of the Grand Council of Aargau, in decreeing their abolition, was, in consequence, brought before the Federal Diet. The matter was not settled until the year 1843, when the Canton of Aargau agreed to restore four suppressed female convents; a compromise which was accepted as satisfactory by the majority of the Diet. But scarcely had this controversy, which had evoked intense bitterness of feeling, been settled, then disturbances broke out in the Valais. The clerical party in that Canton contrived, after severe fighting, to overturn the Radical government. The success of this revolution, it was clear, was largely due to the secret assistance which the reactionaries had received from the Grand Council of Lucerne. Such conduct was the more inexcusable seeing that, at the time, Lucerne was the directing Canton and, therefore, the more bound to observe an attitude of impartiality. The Jesuits were generally regarded as the chief instigators of the affair, and throughout the greater part of Switzerland a feeling of extreme hostility arose against them. But the men in power at Lucerne were indifferent to the dislike with which the Order was regarded by the majority of their countrymen, and they, forthwith, proceeded to call in the Jesuits and to give them the complete control of all the educational establishments in their Canton. Meanwhile, with the admitted connivance of the Radical governments of Berne, Aargau and Soleure, volunteers were being enrolled and, at the end of the year 1844, and again in April, 1845, armed bands, known as the corps francs, deliberately attacked Lucerne. But, having concluded an alliance with Uri, Zug, and Unterwalden, Lucerne successfully repelled these invaders. In this same year the expulsion of the Jesuits from the whole of Switzerland was moved in the Federal Diet.

As far back as the year 1832, the Cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden, had entered into a combination, known as the League of Sarnen, with the object of resisting the democratic tendencies of the age. The association was, subsequently, strengthened by the accession of Fribourg, Zug, Lucerne, and, in 1844, of the Valais. Early in the year 1846, the character of the league was transformed completely. From a peaceful association it was converted into a military alliance, for the purpose of upholding the right of every independent Canton to live under such laws as its legislature might enact. The Sonderbund, as this alliance of the seven Catholic Cantons was called, was at once denounced as an infraction of Article VI. of the Federal Pact, prescribing that “no alliance, prejudicial either to the general confederacy or to the rights of other Cantons, could be formed by separate Cantons among themselves.” A motion to that effect was, accordingly, brought forward in the Federal Diet, but no decision in its favour was obtained. Before the next year, however, in some cases by constitutional means, in others, as at Geneva, by force and violence, the composition of the governments in several Cantons was changed and Radical Grand Councils were installed in power. Under these circumstances, a majority was easily obtained in favour both of the expulsion of the Jesuits and of declaring the illegality of the Sonderbund. The allied Catholic Cantons, however, refused to submit to this decision of the Federal Diet and proclaimed their intention of resisting, by arms if necessary, any attempt to interfere with their independence. Thus, at the time when Lord Minto departed for the continent, all the signs pointed to the probability that Switzerland would, before long, be the scene of a bloody civil war.

The rapid advance of democracy in Switzerland had necessarily excited the alarm of the absolute Courts. Moreover, between the years 1830 and 1840, not only the Cabinet of Vienna but the French government had had, on several occasions, good cause to complain that, unchecked by the authorities, political refugees were allowed to concert their measures for disturbing the peace of neighbouring States. After 1840, the internal disputes and the increasing lawlessness of the country began to attract the serious attention of all the Powers responsible for the settlement of 1815. Both Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot were agreed that, could the question of the Jesuits be arranged, the chief element of danger in the situation would be removed. The French minister consented readily to exert his influence to induce the Pope to recall them. Let it be well understood at Rome, he wrote to Rossi, on June 6, 1845, that, should a Radical government be established at Geneva, there would be a majority in favour of the expulsion of the Order in the Federal Diet. Make it perfectly clear to His Holiness that “the fate of the disciples of Loyola is in the hands of the followers of Calvin.”[916] Prince Metternich was at this time instructing the Austrian ambassador at Rome to employ similar arguments. But Gregory XVI. showed no disposition to interfere, and all hope had soon to be abandoned of obtaining his co-operation in the affair.[917] In the following year, the overthrow of the Conservative governments at Geneva and in the Canton of Vaud, and the prospect that, in the ensuing session, the Radicals would be in a majority in the Federal Diet, increased Metternich’s uneasiness. Hitherto, France had set her face resolutely against intervention in any shape or form. But, in the autumn of 1846, Louis Philippe, being anxious to assure himself of the neutrality of the Northern Courts in the question of the Spanish marriages, the Austrian Chancellor took the opportunity of proposing that the Powers should seriously take in hand the affairs of Switzerland. M. Guizot was rather disposed to accede to this suggestion, but the King, being still hopeful of re-establishing “the cordial understanding,” refused to sanction any participation in measures which might lead eventually to armed intervention.[918] In the spring of 1847, however, when it was clear that England had no intention of forgetting the affront which she had received in the matter of the Spanish marriages, and when, in consequence, M. Guizot was desirous of effecting a close understanding with Austria, French policy towards Switzerland was altered to suit the exigencies of the situation.