The identic note of November 26, 1847, was to have been communicated to the contending parties, on behalf of Great Britain, by Sir Stratford Canning. His instructions, however, provided that he should not present it if, upon his arrival in Switzerland, he should find that the Sonderbund had capitulated and that the war was at an end.[943] Canning, in consequence, made no offer of mediation, but remained about three weeks in Switzerland for the purpose of impressing upon M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues the expediency of treating the defeated Cantons with consideration, and of refraining from any measures which might furnish other Powers with a pretext for intervention. France, Austria, and Prussia, however, adopted a different procedure. M. de Bois-le-Comte received the identic note on November 29, and, forthwith, despatched a copy of it both to the Federal Diet and to the leaders of the Sonderbund, notwithstanding that Lucerne had already surrendered and that it was evident that the Valais could not hold out much longer.[944] His example was followed by the ministers of Austria and Prussia. To these communications the executive at Berne, the members of which had expressed to Sir Stratford Canning their gratification at the attitude adopted by Great Britain, sent an answer couched in very decided language. The offer of mediation was rejected, not only because hostilities had ceased, but because it was impossible to recognize the principle upon which the proposal was based. If the Confederation were at war with another State, it might, or might not, entertain an offer of mediation, but it could not admit, under any circumstances, the claim of the Powers to treat as belligerents the Cantons of the Sonderbund. The treaties by which the Confederation had been constituted provided only for one Diet and for one Federal executive. The alliance of the seven Cantons was simply an act of rebellion which the central government had been strong enough to deal with effectually.[945]
The overthrow of the Sonderbund and the haughty reply returned by the Diet to the French, the Austrian, and the Prussian notes caused a profound sensation. The inability of the absolute Courts and of the government of M. Guizot to render assistance to the Cantons, which had sought to resist the decrees of the majority in the Swiss Diet, was made manifest to the world. Italian nationalists, German Liberals, French reformers, acclaimed the victory of the Radical executive as a triumph for their cause. In governmental circles, at Vienna and at Berlin, there was no disposition to under-rate the gravity of the situation. Largely owing to the restraining influence of Lord Minto, central Italy still presented a certain outward appearance of tranquillity.[946] But Sicily and Naples were in open revolution, and King “Bomba,” who had, hitherto, set his face sternly against all reforms, was, in January, 1848, compelled to concede a constitution. Meanwhile, throughout the Peninsula the feeling of hostility to Austria was growing in intensity. Encouraged by Lord Minto, Sardinia, Tuscany, and the Papal States agreed to abolish all internal lines of customs and to form a commercial league, after the manner of the German Zollverein.[947] The significance of this measure was clearly perceived by Metternich. On December 14, he directed Diedrichstein to acquaint Palmerston that the condition of Italy would necessitate a large increase of the Austrian army in Lombardy.[948] “You and I,” he confided to his old friend, Radetzky, “are not destined to end our days in peace. . . . It has been reserved for the present age to witness the spectacle of a Liberal Pope.”[949]
The forcible dissolution of the alliance of the Catholic Cantons made it the more necessary, the German Cabinets declared, for the Powers vigilantly to watch over the proceedings of the Federal Diet. The conference, which it had been proposed to hold upon Swiss affairs, must, they insisted, still take place.[950] The British government, however, altogether dissented from this view. The Sonderbund no longer existed, the Jesuits had fled, and Palmerston, therefore, could see no occasion for any deliberations upon the domestic affairs of the Confederation. England, in any case, he announced, must now decline to take part in a conference. M. Guizot adopted a different attitude. If Palmerston were resolved to pose as the patron of Radicals and revolutionists, why should not he come forward as the champion of order and stability? The Austrian, Count Coloredo, and the Prussian, General von Radowitz, who had been despatched to Paris by their respective governments, found him most favourably disposed. It was very flattering to his vanity that at this crisis the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin should be prepared to defer to his opinions and should send their emissaries to Paris to consult him. But from London he received a word of warning which made a considerable impression upon him. It would evoke, wrote his friend the Duc de Broglie, recollections of the Holy Alliance and savour overmuch of the deliberations at Laybach and Verona,[951] were France to take part in a conference which England had declined to attend.[952]
In his conversations with Coloredo and Radowitz, M. Guizot, consequently, deprecated the notion of assembling a conference. Let them for the moment, he urged, be content with formally declaring to the Diet that the Powers were resolved not to suffer the violation of the principle of cantonal sovereignty and independence. Should their representations be unheeded, the question of active intervention could be more conveniently discussed at a later date. He had, they must not forget, his parliamentary position to consider. In the coming session, M. Thiers was preparing to assail his foreign policy with the utmost virulence. Metternich consented readily to adopt these suggestions. Far from desiring to aggravate the difficulties of M. Guizot, he considered it of supreme importance that he should remain in office.[953] A joint note, dated January 18, 1848, was, accordingly, drawn up and presented to the Federal executive. Coloredo and Radowitz, thereupon, quitted Paris. It was clearly inexpedient that these agents of the absolute Courts should be present in the French capital, during the heated debates to which the reply to the Address was expected to give rise. But their deliberations were to be regarded as merely suspended, not as definitely concluded. In the spring they were to return and resume their discussions. But this plan was not destined to be realized. Before the time appointed for their second meeting with M. Guizot, the storm burst and swept away the Orleans Monarchy. The revolutionary contagion spread rapidly to Berlin and to Vienna. Metternich, compelled to fly, sought refuge in England, in company with Prince Wittgenstein, M. Guizot, and other ultra-conservative statesmen. At the news of the downfall of the redoubtable Chancellor the Milanese flew to arms. After a memorable conflict of five days’ duration, Radetzky retired upon the Quadrilateral, to prepare for the struggle with Charles Albert, who had thrown down the gauntlet to Austria and marched to the assistance of the Lombards.
A history of Franco-British relations, during the reign of Louis Philippe, is not concerned with the internal reasons which contributed to his downfall. It is sufficient to point out that the existence of the Orleans Monarchy was necessarily precarious, seeing that it was in the nature of a compromise which had only been grudgingly acquiesced in by the nation. The revolution by which it was overwhelmed was, in the words of Lamartine, “une revolution de mépris.” All classes were thoroughly disgusted with the policy of M. Guizot and indignant at the numerous public and private scandals[954] brought to light, during the year 1847. In a constitutional State a change of government is the remedy provided for such a condition of affairs. Louis Philippe, however, was too attached to his system of personal government willingly to part with a minister, who never attempted to restrict him to the rôle of a constitutional sovereign.[955] His last Cabinet, he protested, to the day of his death, had the support of the majority of the Chamber. But the servile body of placemen, which formed the ministerial party, in no way represented the opinion of the nation. The people with one accord condemned the proceedings of the government and identified the King with the unpopular actions of his principal minister. On February 23, 1848, a demonstration in favour of parliamentary reform, followed by a tumult in the streets, sufficed to destroy the discredited régime.
The rupture of “the cordial understanding” with England was followed so closely by the downfall of the monarchy, as to suggest that there must have been a connection between the two events. That the quarrel with England was one of the contributory causes of the revolution is almost universally admitted. English writers have generally referred to the events of ’48 with some complacency, as the just retribution which promptly overtook Louis Philippe. So shrewd an observer as Baron Stockmar appears to have been convinced that the revelations in connection with the Spanish marriages did the “Citizen King” an incalculable amount of harm in the eyes of the French people and precipitated his overthrow.[956] Now, it is clear that the Spanish marriages had one effect which took those who were responsible for them completely by surprise. M. Guizot had confidently anticipated that, whatever other consequences might flow from them, they would be acclaimed as a great diplomatic triumph achieved at the expense of England. But the event completely falsified his expectations. The men, who in the question of the right of search, in the Pritchard affair, and in many other matters, had constantly accused him of truckling to England, were the first to denounce him for having sacrificed “the cordial understanding” to a purely dynastic object. It is more than probable that the indignation professed by M. Thiers and his friends was not very sincere and was, to a large extent, assumed for purposes of party politics. But their words, none the less, made a deep impression upon the middle-classes which had hitherto steadfastly supported the régime of July. These people, says Lord Normanby, were convinced that their material interests had suffered owing to the rupture of the English alliance. The construction of railways in France had led, as in England, to a wild outburst of speculation. The undue inflation of prices was followed by the inevitable reaction. This unexpected depreciation in the value of the shares of the new companies was not, however, ascribed to its true causes. Disappointed speculators persuaded themselves that their losses were due to the disinclination of the British public to invest in French railways, owing to the change which the Spanish marriages had wrought in the political relations of the two countries.[957]
But in so far as the revolution of ’48 is concerned, the true importance of the break-up of “the cordial understanding” consists in the policy which M. Guizot, in consequence, saw fit to adopt. It is undeniable that his attitude towards the Italian national movement and in the Swiss question was severely condemned by the majority of his countrymen, and proved most injurious to the monarchy. Men perceived clearly that the only result of his unnatural alliance with the Cabinet of Vienna had been enormously to diminish French influence at Rome and at Turin. In Switzerland his policy was seen to have been even more ineffectual.[958] All his efforts had been directed to the preservation of the Sonderbund. Nevertheless, the alliance of the reactionary cantons had been promptly and ignominiously dissolved, whilst his proffered mediation had been rejected with a haughty intimation that the victorious party intended to settle its affairs without his interference. It has been urged, however, in his defence that his difficulties were greatly aggravated by Lord Palmerston, whose deliberate purpose it was to thwart him on every occasion. A secret alliance, it has been said, existed between the British Foreign Minister and M. Thiers. Gossip on this subject had been rife ever since the close of the year 1844. It would seem that about that time some friendly messages from Palmerston were conveyed to M. Thiers by Sir John Easthope,[959] the proprietor of the Morning Chronicle, which was generally regarded as Palmerston’s especial organ. In the following year, when M. Thiers visited London, Sir Anthony Panizzi, an Italian political exile, and the chief librarian of the British Museum, took great credit to himself for having cemented a good understanding between the two statesmen.[960] Palmerston afterwards denied absolutely that their interviews were in any way connected with a “conspiracy against M. Guizot.”[961] Greville, however, accuses him of having, during the controversy on the subject of the Spanish marriages, permitted Lord Normanby to supply M. Thiers with the diplomatic documents bearing upon the question. Greville was so ready to believe anything discreditable about Palmerston that he cannot, as a rule, be looked upon as an altogether trustworthy witness. But, at the time referred to, he was in a position to speak of his own knowledge of what was taking place, inasmuch as he was in Paris for the express purpose of trying to re-establish “the cordial understanding” and was, moreover, the guest of Lord Normanby at the British embassy.[962] His testimony, therefore, coupled with the corroborative evidence to be found in the published letters of Panizzi, does suggest that certain of Thiers’ very damaging criticisms of M. Guizot may have been inspired by Lord Palmerston.[963] But, had the policy of M. Guizot been supported by public opinion, the intrigues of a foreign minister with his chief political opponent would have tended to strengthen, rather than to weaken, his position. The whole affair, indeed, is not of much importance. Some of Thiers’ newspaper articles may have been based upon information improperly supplied to him by the agents of Lord Palmerston, but his great speech on the Spanish marriages was not delivered until February 4, 1847,[964] when the British blue book was at the disposal of any one who might desire to purchase it.
But the more serious charge has been made that Palmerston’s whole policy, at this period, was subordinated to his desire to avenge the defeat he had sustained in the Spanish marriages.[965] His attitude in the Swiss and Italian questions has been fully explained. It is difficult to see how any British minister could have acted differently. Had Aberdeen been in office, it may safely be surmised that, out of consideration for Austria, he would not have advocated the despatch of one of his colleagues upon such a mission, as was confided to a member of Lord John Russell’s government. But, without doubt, he would have furnished his agents at the Italian Courts with instructions substantially the same as those drawn up for the guidance of Lord Minto. In the Swiss affair both Aberdeen and Palmerston sought to avert civil war and foreign intervention by inducing the Pope to recall the Jesuits from Lucerne. There is, in short, a continuity in the British policy, whether conducted by Aberdeen or by Palmerston, not to be found in that of M. Guizot. His rapprochement with the Cabinet of Vienna obliged him to adopt towards the Liberal and national movements in progress throughout Europe the views of Prince Metternich. The precise reasons which induced him to make overtures to Austria can only be conjectured. Having shattered “the cordial understanding,”he may have thought that he must be able to show that he had substituted for the English, the Austrian, alliance. Perhaps he may have had some idea of isolating England, by means of the close relations which he proposed to establish between the government of the “Citizen King” and the absolute Courts. But, be his motives what they may, his dealings with Metternich, in 1847, were unquestionably one of the chief reasons of the revolution of ’48.[966]
For the first time, between the years 1830 and 1848, the attempt was seriously made by the French and English governments to establish, as a primary principle of policy, the necessity of maintaining close and intimate relations between the two countries. The result, on the whole, disappointed expectations. The great work of Talleyrand’s old age, the cementing of a good understanding between the Whigs and the Orleans’ Monarchy, without doubt, deterred the absolute Courts from intervening in French affairs after the Revolution of July. Unquestionably, also, it averted a great war in the question of the separation of Belgium from Holland. But, on subsequent occasions, it did not prevent grave differences of opinion from arising between the two governments. The time had not yet come when “the cordial understanding” could be placed upon a firm and durable basis. The maintenance of the settlement, agreed to after the great war, was still the foundation of British policy in Europe. France, on the other hand, chafed bitterly at the conditions imposed upon her by the Congress of Vienna. Even among the peace-loving middle-classes the hope was fondly entertained that the man would arise who, “à grands coups de sabre,” should destroy the treaties of 1815 and give back to France her “natural frontiers.” Bonapartism was a living force by reason of the existence of this feeling. Louis Philippe and his ministers sought to allay the restlessness which it engendered by an active policy in the Mediterranean and in more distant waters. Suspicions and jealousies, the consequences of more than a hundred years of war and rivalry, were thus kept alive. French and British officials, whether of high rank or of low degree, continued to regard each other with instinctive hostility. Bulwer was no less anxious to outwit his colleague, Bresson, than was Pritchard to thwart his fellow-consul, Meerenhout. Nevertheless, the policy which finally broke up the alliance was not a policy which commended itself to the French people. Palmerston’s views upon European affairs, between 1846 and 1848, accorded far more with the sentiments of the majority of Frenchmen than did those of M. Guizot; and his quarrel was not with the French nation, but with the government of Louis Philippe.