Treaties with Great Britain, with Holland, with Russia, and with France followed in rapid succession, the first three being signed in August, the last-named in October. All four reproduced more or less closely the substance of the American convention. The choice of open ports in Perry’s Treaty—due to solicitude for American whalers, and considerations connected with America’s new trade route to China—had in the interests of general commerce been unfortunate. This defect was remedied in the new treaties by provisions for the opening of additional ports. A tariff and a system of tonnage dues were also established. In other respects the new treaties merely confirmed, or amplified, the provisions of earlier arrangements. They were useful, however, as the forerunners of a whole series of practically uniform agreements, which simplified Japan’s position, while enlarging the scope of foreign relations. One of the last to be concluded was the Austro-Hungarian Treaty of 1869, the English version of which was made the “original,” or authoritative, text. By virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause, which figured in all these conventions, it was this instrument which governed the relations of Japan with Treaty Powers, until the new revised treaties came into force in 1899. When the Japanese people became aware that the character of these treaties was different from those made by Western governments with each other, an early opportunity was taken to protest against the provisions conceding ex-territoriality and fixing a low customs tariff, and against the obstacle to revision presented by the absence in the agreements of any fixed period of duration. The irritation thus caused led later on to an agitation for treaty revision, which did much to embitter Japanese feeling towards foreigners. The complaint was not unnatural, but in making it there was a tendency to overlook the fact that the position of foreigners in Japan under these treaties was also very different from their position under other treaties elsewhere. The residential and commercial rights of the foreigner in Japan applied only to the “open ports,” while his right of travel, except by special permission, not readily granted, did not extend beyond a narrow area at the same ports known as “treaty limits.” The rest of the country remained closed. This limitation of facilities for commercial intercourse was, moreover, accentuated by the fact that the choice of “open” or “treaty ports” was not, as has been pointed out, the best that could have been made. Compelled against their will to consent to foreign intercourse, it was only to be expected that the Japanese should seek to render the concession worthless by selecting harbours neither suitable nor safe for shipping, and places far from markets, and that a similar spirit should dictate the choice of sites for foreign settlements. That the early negotiators who represented Japan were handicapped by ignorance of the principles regulating international relations is undeniable. But the injustice, as they considered it, of the conditions against which protest was made was really a blessing in disguise; for, on the admission of the Japanese themselves, it served as a powerful stimulus to progress on the lines of Western civilization.

In the course of five years from the date of Perry’s Treaty no less than thirteen elaborate agreements, besides other arrangements of a less formal character, had been concluded by Japan. So rapid an extension of foreign intercourse might seem to point to a subsidence of anti-foreign feeling, and a decrease of opposition to the establishment of friendly relations with foreign countries. Such, however, was not the case. The negotiations of these various covenants were carried on in the face of growing anti-foreign clamour, and in the midst of political confusion and agitation,—the precursors of a movement which was to end in the collapse of Tokugawa government.

In order that the subsequent course of events may be understood, some reference, however brief, to the political situation which existed at this time is necessary. It will be seen what complications—quite apart from the embarrassments arising out of the reopening of foreign intercourse—were caused by the inconsequence and ambition of the Court, the weakness of the Shōgunate, and the jealousies of rival statesmen. Some idea may also thus be formed of the ignorance of foreign matters which then prevailed, except in a few official quarters, and of the clumsy timidity of a policy which consisted chiefly of shutting the eyes to facts patent to everyone.

Ever since the establishment of Tokugawa rule there had been a party at the Kiōto Court, consisting of Court nobles, which championed the pretensions of the Throne, mourned over its lost glories, conducted its intrigues, and felt a common resentment against what in its eyes was an administration of usurpers. The fatal mistake of the Shōgunate in referring to Kiōto Perry’s demands for the reopening of foreign intercourse on new and strange conditions—a matter which, in accordance with established precedent, was within its own competency—gave an opportunity to this party to revive the long obsolete pretensions of the Court. The opportunity was at once seized. The party had at this time powerful adherents. Amongst them the chief figure was the ex-Prince of Mito. Early in the previous century his grandfather, the second of his line, had founded a school of literature and politics, which espoused the Imperial cause, and encouraged the native religion and language in opposition to what was borrowed from China,—a profession of principles which sat curiously on a leading member of the Tokugawa House. Holding the same views himself, the ex-Prince had been forced to abdicate some years before in favour of his eldest son for having destroyed the Buddhist temples in his fief, and made their bells into cannon, for the alleged purpose of repelling a foreign invasion. With the ex-Prince were ranged the Tokugawa Prince of Owari and the influential daimiōs of Chōshiū, Échizen, Tosa and Uwajima, whilst a large measure of sympathy with Imperial aims existed among the prominent clans of the south and west. The anti-Shōgunate movement also derived help from the turbulent class of clanless samurai, known as rōnin, which at this time was rapidly increasing in numbers owing to economic distress in feudal territories, and the growing weakness of the Shōgunate. The latter’s supporters, on the other hand, were mostly to be found in the centre, the north and the east, all of which were old Tokugawa strongholds. Its chief strength, however, lay in its being beatus possidens,—having, that is to say, the command of State resources, and being in a position to speak for the Throne; and in the fact that Tokugawa government, by its long duration and the completeness of its bureaucratic organization, had taken so firm a hold of the country, that whatever sympathy might possibly be evoked on behalf of revived Imperial pretensions might not unreasonably be expected to fall short of material support.

One other advantage the Shōgunate possessed was the presence in the Government of a minister of distinguished ancestry, and of great ability and courage, combined with, what was rare in those days, independence of character. This was the famous Ïi Kamon no Kami, generally known as the Tairō, or Regent, whose castle-town, Hikoné, near Kiōto, overlooked Lake Biwa. The early associations of his family made him a staunch upholder of Tokugawa rule. He quickly became the leading spirit of the Ministry, and the liberal views he apparently held on the subject of treaty-making and foreign intercourse brought him at once into collision with the boldest and most uncompromising member of the Court party—the ex-Prince of Mito. The disagreement between them first showed itself in the advice called for by the Throne from the Council of State and the leading feudal nobles on the question of the signature of the American Treaty of 1858. In the controversy which arose on this point they figured as the chief protagonists. The policy of the Court in 1853 had been non-committal. In 1855 it had formally approved of the treaties, the Shōgun’s resident at Kiōto reporting that “the Imperial mind was now at ease.” Nevertheless, in spite of this approval, and notwithstanding the signature of fresh treaties, the crusade of the Court party against foreign intercourse went on unabated. On the present occasion the ex-Prince of Mito argued strongly against the Treaty, while the Council of State, adopting the views of Ïi Kamon no Kami, who was not yet Regent, recommended the signature of the Treaty as being the proper course to follow. But the question which provoked the keenest rivalry and the bitterest antagonism between the two statesmen concerned the succession to the Shōgunate.

The Shōgun Iyésada, appointed in 1853, was childless, and, in accordance with custom in such cases, it was incumbent on him to choose and adopt a successor. The ex-Prince of Mito wished the choice to fall on one of his younger sons, Kéiki, then fifteen years of age, who having been adopted into the Hitotsubashi family, was eligible for the appointment. But the new Shōgun was only twenty-nine, and in no hurry to choose a successor from another family. His relations, moreover, with the ex-Prince of Mito were not cordial; and there were other objections. If he were constrained to adopt a successor, his own choice would, it was known, fall on a nearer kinsman, the young Prince of Kishiū, a boy of ten. The heir preferred by the Shōgun was also the choice of Ïi. The parties supporting the rival candidates were not unequally matched. Though the weight of clan influence was on the side of Kéiki, fated a few years later to be the last of the Tokugawa Shōguns, a section of the Court nobles joined with the Council of State in favouring the candidature of the young Kishiū prince, behind whom stood also the Shōgun.

The two questions in dispute were thus quite distinct, the one being a matter of foreign, the other of domestic policy. But the two protagonists in each being the same, it looked as if the side that was successful in one issue would gain the day in both. And this in fact is what happened. In June, 1858, in the interval between the second and third missions to Kiōto in connection with the signature of the American Treaty, Ïi became Regent—an appointment tenable in times of emergency as well as during a Shōgun’s minority. The end of the conflict, which had lasted nearly five years, was then in sight. In July, as already stated, the American Treaty was signed. Before another week had elapsed the young Kishiū prince was proclaimed heir to the Shōgunate. Ten days later the Shōgun Iyésada died.

CHAPTER V
Anti-Foreign Feeling—Chōshiū Rebellion—Mikado’s Ratification of Treaties—Prince Kéiki—Restoration Movement—Civil War—Fall of Shōgunate.

The signature of the Treaty was loudly condemned by the Court party, the ex-Prince of Mito being conspicuous amongst those who protested. He addressed a violently worded remonstrance to the Council of State, impugning the action of the Government, which was accused of disrespect to the Throne, and disobedience to the Imperial commands. The Regent retorted by striking at once at his enemies with all the force of his newly acquired position, and the prestige of his success in the matter of the succession. The ex-Prince of Mito and the Prince of Owari were confined to their yashikis (a term applied to the feudal residences occupied by daimiōs during their period of service in Yedo); while the latter, together with the daimiōs of Échizen, Tosa and Uwajima, was forced to abdicate. And when the Court, growing uneasy at this sudden reassertion of authority on the part of the Shōgunate, summoned the Regent, or one of the Gosanké, to Kiōto to report on the situation, a reply was sent to the effect that the Regent was detained by State affairs, and that the ex-Prince of Mito and the Prince of Owari were confined to their clan yashikis. A mission, however—the third in succession—proceeded to Kiōto from Yedo. This submitted a report on the subject of the Treaty, which explained the reasons for its signature in advance of Imperial sanction as being the arrival of more Russian and American ships; the defeat of China by the English and French; the news that these two countries were sending to Japan special envoys instructed to carry matters with a high hand; and the advice to sign at once given by the American minister. The Court’s eventual pronouncement in favour of the Treaty displayed in a striking manner the perverseness and inconsequence which characterized Japanese official procedure at that time. The decree conveying the Imperial approval expressed the satisfaction with which the Throne had received the assurance that the Shōgun, the Regent and the Council of State, were all in favour of keeping foreigners at a distance; and urged on the attention of the Shōgun “the Throne’s deep concern in regard to the sea in the neighbourhood of the Imperial shrines and Kiōto, as well as the safety of the Imperial insignia,” which, put into plainer language, meant that no port should be opened near Isé, or the capital. Two suggestions have been made on good authority regarding this decree: (1) that the Shōgun’s agents in Kiōto were directed to accept anything which established the fact of an understanding with the Court having been effected; and (2) that the agents in question succeeded in persuading the Court that, though the signature of this particular Treaty was unavoidable, the Yedo Government was not really in favour of foreign intercourse. Both suggestions are probably correct. In any case the Court’s action in ignoring the Throne’s previous approval of earlier treaties was calculated to stiffen opposition to the Shōgun’s diplomacy, and was thus doubtless responsible for some of the subsequent difficulties attending foreign intercourse, notably in connection with the opening of the port of Hiogo, which, with the consent of the Treaty Powers, was postponed until January, 1868.

As showing how meaningless the Imperial approval, in reality, was it may be well to note that the English text of the Treaty in question provided for the exchange of ratifications at Washington on or before the 4th July, 1859, failing which, however, the Treaty was, nevertheless, to come into force on the date in question. The Treaty went into operation on the date fixed, but the exchange of ratifications did not take place until 1860. The ratification on the part of Japan is described as the verification of “the name and seal of His Majesty the Tycoon.”