The speech read by the Emperor on this occasion was couched in the vague and grandiloquent style common to all utterances from the Throne. It spoke of the Constitution as “an immutable fundamental law,” and described the foundations of the Empire as having been laid by the Founder of the Imperial House and other Imperial ancestors, with the help of their subjects, on a basis that was to last for ever, an achievement due to the glorious virtues of the Imperial ancestors and the bravery and loyalty of the people; and it expressed the hope that the same loyal co-operation between Sovereign and subject would for ever secure the stability of the fabric of State bequeathed by the Imperial ancestors.
The Imperial Decree, or Rescript, issued on the same day as that on which the Constitution was promulgated, and bearing the sign-manual of the Sovereign and the signatures of the nine Ministers of State, appears as a Preamble in the official English text of the “Commentaries on the Constitution,” though it is not found in the original Japanese text. It provided that the Imperial Diet (the name given to the new Parliament) should be convoked for the first time in 1890, and that the date of its opening should be that on which the Constitution should come into force. The date thus fixed was the 29th November, 1890. In this Decree, which contained a reference to the promise of a Parliament made in 1881, the Emperor stated his intention to exercise his Sovereign rights in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, for the execution of which the Ministers of State would be responsible. Stress was also laid on the important condition that any proposal for the amendment of the Constitution in the future must proceed from the Throne, and that in no other way would any attempt on the part of the Emperor’s descendants, or subjects, to alter it be permitted.
Additional solemnity was given to the promulgation of the Constitution by an Oath taken by the Emperor in the Shintō Shrine (called the “Sanctuary” in the English official text of the “Commentaries”) attached to the palace. In this Oath—the second of its kind, the first having, as we have seen, been taken in 1869—the Emperor bound himself “to maintain and secure from decline the ancient form of government,” and, while acknowledging the help received from the Imperial ancestors in the past, implored the continuance of their support in the future.
The Constitution, as promulgated, consisted of seventy-six articles divided into seven chapters, dealing, respectively, with the position and prerogatives of the Sovereign, the rights and duties of the people, the functions of the Diet, the relations between the Cabinet and the Privy Council, the judicature and finance; and one of the supplementary rules attached to it provided for its revision, a point reserved, as we have seen, for the initiative of the Crown. Simultaneously with its promulgation various accessory laws were enacted. These were the Imperial House Law, mentioned in the Imperial Oath, the Imperial Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, the Law of the Houses, the Law of Election of the members of the House of Representatives and the Law of Finance.
The general lines of the Constitution follow those of the Bavarian Constitution, which was taken as the model. Its leading principles are the small limitations placed on the Imperial prerogative and the independence of the Cabinet, which is responsible to the Sovereign alone, and not in any way to the Diet. No mention either of the Cabinet, or of the Minister President, occurs in the Constitution, though they are referred to in Prince Itō’s “Commentaries.” But Article LXXVI of the Constitution provides that all existing enactments, in so far as they do not conflict with it, shall continue in force. The enactment of 1885 reorganizing the Ministry comes under this rule. Consequently the position of the Minister President, and of the Cabinet over which he presided, remained unaltered after the Constitution came into operation.
The enumeration of the Imperial prerogatives occupies much space in the Constitution. The chief points to be noted are that the Sovereign exercises the legislative powers with the consent of the Diet; that his sanction is necessary for all laws; that he is empowered on occasions of emergency which arise when the Diet is not sitting to issue “Imperial Ordinances” which have provisionally the force of law, but which require the approval of the Diet at its next session, when, if not approved, they cease to be operative; that he determines the peace standing of both army and navy; and that the authority to declare war, make peace, announce a state of siege and conclude treaties rests with him. All of these matters are removed from the control of the Diet, which has also no voice in any future modifications of the Law of the Imperial House. The remarkable reverence for the Throne which is characteristic of the people is illustrated by the declaration, in one of the early articles, of the sacredness and inviolability of the person of the Emperor. This, we are told in the “Commentaries,” is a consequence of his divine descent. He must, indeed, it is explained, “pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold him accountable to it”—a statement which seems to involve a contradiction in terms, for it is difficult to understand how a Sovereign who is not accountable to law can be bound to respect it.
Among the duties of Japanese subjects, as defined in the Constitution, is liability to service in the army or navy. It should be explained, however, that whereas service in the army is based on conscription alone, recruiting for the navy is, in practice, based on the volunteer system, supplemented by conscription. Their rights include immunity from arrest, trial or punishment, except in accordance with the provisions of the law; similar immunity in the matter of the entry or search of houses, and as regards private correspondence; and freedom of religious belief. With regard to the omission to place on record the fact that there are two officially recognized religions, Shintō and Buddhism, one may, after reading the explanations on this point given in the “Commentaries,” be tempted to think that the last word has not been said on the subject. At the same time it will be recognized that the course adopted represents the simplest solution of the question.
The Diet, or Parliament—for Japanese writers, when writing in English, use both terms indifferently—comprises two Chambers, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The House of Peers is composed of members of five different categories: (1) Members of the Imperial family who have attained majority, fixed in such cases at twenty years; (2) princes and marquises who have attained legal majority, namely, twenty-five years; (3) other members of the nobility chosen by their respective orders; (4) distinguished persons specially nominated by the Emperor; and (5) persons (one for each urban and rural district) elected by and from the highest taxpayers. Those coming under the first, second and fourth categories are life members; those coming under the third and fifth categories are elected for seven years. The number of members of the House of Representatives, as originally fixed by the Constitution, was 300, and there was a property qualification for membership. They are elected by voters who have attained legal majority, and pay annually direct national taxes amounting to about £1. Under the revised Electoral Law which came into force in 1902 there is no longer any property qualification for membership, the only conditions now being an age limit of thirty years and the possession of civil rights. The same law reduced both property and age qualifications in the case of electors, this extension of the franchise resulting in the number of electors being increased to 1,700,000; substituted the secret ballot for open voting; and raised the number of members of the Lower House to 381, urban districts returning 73 and rural districts 308. The large majority of members in this Chamber have always belonged to the agrarian class. The natural term of the House of Representatives is four years. Dissolution, which is one of the Imperial prerogatives, applies only to the Lower House. When it occurs, the Upper House (or House of Peers) is prorogued. New elections must take place within five months from the date of dissolution, the next session of the Diet becoming what is known as an Extraordinary Session.
The Imperial House Law contains various provisions relating to the succession to the Throne, which is limited to the male line; the appointment of a Regent, for which post in certain circumstances the Empress, Empress Dowager and other ladies of the Court are eligible, and, during the minority of the Sovereign, of a governor, or guardian; and the age (18) at which a Sovereign attains majority. A point to be noted is the restriction of the custom of adoption in the case of the Imperial Family, no member of which is allowed to adopt a son.
In concluding this brief sketch of the Constitution and accessory laws, it may be well to mention a point which has an important bearing on the practical working of the Japanese parliamentary system, namely, the control exercised by the Diet over the Budget. This to some extent remedies the weakness of parliamentary opposition parties—as compared with similar parties elsewhere—which arises out of the fact that the Cabinet is independent of the Diet. When conflicts over the Budget take place, the Diet may by withholding supplies force a dissolution. In these cases by the terms of the Constitution the Government is obliged to substitute, in place of the rejected Budget, the Budget of the previous financial year passed in the preceding session. Any new financial programme, therefore, to which the Government may have committed itself in the rejected Budget is consequently held up, and cannot be proceeded with until a fresh Budget has been passed in a subsequent extraordinary session of Parliament. This means a delay of at least several months. The Government is, however, not necessarily always the sufferer financially thereby, for, as Marquis Ōkuma points out in his book already referred to, the effect of dissolutions occurring through this cause has usually been to reduce expenditure rather than revenue.