The Making of Modern Japan / An Account of the Progress of Japan from Pre-feudal Days to Constitutional Government & the Position of a Great Power, With Chapters on Religion, the Complex Family System, Education, &c.

by John Harington Gubbins

In an article contributed in 1914 to the November number of the Shin Nippon, or “New Japan,” a magazine published in Tōkiō, Marquis Ōkuma, who was then Premier, pointed out that the tendency of the times was such as to justify the assumption that in the distant future a few strong nations would govern the rest of the world, and that Japan must prepare herself to become one of these governing nations. And when addressing the Diet in the following month he stated, in explanation of the programme of naval and military expansion submitted to Parliament, that in order to make Japanese diplomatic dealings more effective an increase of force was needed. The lengths to which the Japanese Government was prepared to go in order to render its diplomacy more effective were disclosed when in January, 1915, the Japanese Minister in Peking presented directly to the President of the Chinese Republic the well-known twenty-one Demands.

Divided into several groups, the Demands in the first four included the assent of China to whatever might afterwards be agreed upon between Japan and Germany in regard to the German leased territory in Shantung taken by the Japanese in the previous November; the non-alienation by China to a third Power of any territory in that province or any island along its coast; concessions for railway construction, and the opening of further places for foreign trade in the same province; the extension from twenty-five to ninety-nine years—the term of the German lease of Kiaochow—of the terms of the former Russian leases of Port Arthur, Dalny and the South Manchurian Railway, and of the subsequent Japanese lease of the Antun-Mukden Railway; the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway, when completed, to be granted to Japan for the same term of ninety-nine years; the grant of mining rights to Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; the consent of Japan to be obtained prior to permission being given to other foreigners to build railways, or make loans for railway construction in the territories in question, or prior to the pledging of local taxes in those territories as security for loans made to China by a third Power; Japan to be consulted before the employment by China in the same territories of any political, financial, or military advisers; concessions giving Japan practical control over the valuable coal and iron mines near Hankow belonging to the Hanyeiping Company, which had borrowed money from Japanese firms; and non-alienation to a third Power of any harbour, bay, or island on the coast of China. A further fifth group of Demands included an undertaking on the part of China to employ “influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs”; to grant to Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of China the right of owning land—a right still withheld from foreigners in Japan; to place the police administration of all important places in China under joint Japanese and Chinese control, or, in lieu of this concession, to employ a large number of Japanese in the police departments of those places; to purchase from Japan 50 per cent, or more, of all munitions of war needed by China, or, in lieu of this concession, to arrange for the establishment in China of an arsenal under the joint management of Japanese and Chinese, the material required to be purchased from Japan; to grant further concessions for railway construction in the interior of China; to consult Japan before employing foreign capital for the working of mines, and the construction of railways, harbours and dockyards in the province of Fuhkien; and to grant to Japanese subjects the right to propagate religious doctrines in China. This last point concerned, of course, only Buddhist missionary propaganda, since the propagation of Shintō doctrine in a foreign country was obviously impossible. Its inclusion in the list of demands may seem strange in view of the religious indifference of the Japanese people. The reasons for it may be found in the desire of the Japanese Government to overlook no point which might serve to place Japan on a footing of equality in all respects with Western countries, and its wish to utilize the services of Buddhist missionaries to obtain information about matters in the interior of China.

The startling character of these Demands, no less than the peremptory manner in which they were made, provoked some public criticism even in Japan, and led to enquiries from more than one foreign Government. In the course of the negotiations which ensued at Peking the Chinese raised objections to several points. Eventually the last-mentioned group of Demands was withdrawn for the time being, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs explaining that they were never points on which his Government had intended to insist. Some modifications, moreover, were made in the other groups in order to meet Chinese objections. The Demands thus revised were presented afresh in April, a time limit being named for their acceptance, and on the 9th May the Chinese Government yielded to the pressure and signified its consent. The various points on which the Japanese Government insisted were finally settled on the 25th May by the conclusion of Treaties, the exchange of Notes and the making of Declarations, all bearing that date, as suited the convenience of Japan.

It is difficult to reconcile the assurances repeatedly given by Japanese statesmen as to the absence of any aggressive intentions in regard to China with the policy represented by the Demands above mentioned. Nor is it possible to deny that the pressure thus put upon China constituted just such an interference in the internal affairs of a neighbouring State as the Press of Japan had been the first to denounce.

The various engagements entered into between Japan and Russia in the years shortly following the Treaty of Portsmouth, more especially the Agreement of 1907, to which reference has already been made, were in themselves signs of a relaxation of the tension created by the Russo-Japanese war. And when in 1910 the two Powers concluded the Agreement for maintaining the status quo in Manchuria, which blocked the Knox proposal for neutralizing all railways in that region, it became dear that they discerned the mutual advantage to be gained by working together in the Far East. This common policy, if it may be so called, was strengthened after the outbreak of the Great War by the conclusion of a secret Treaty in the summer of 1916, a moment when the war was not progressing very favourably for the Allies. By this Treaty, signed in the Russian capital, the contracting parties recognized that “the vital interests” of both required “the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever having hostile designs against Russia or Japan.” Whatever hopes may have been entertained in either country from the closer co-operation in China established by this Treaty were put an end to by the Russian revolution in the spring of 1917. It is unnecessary to emphasize the important bearing on Far Eastern affairs of this event, and of its sequel—the military collapse of Russia. The mere fact that China was thus freed from the danger of a combined aggression which she was powerless to resist speaks for itself.

In the autumn of the same year, by which time America had been drawn into the war, Japan, still intent on consolidating her position in the Far East, entered into negotiations at Washington with the United States in regard to the policy to be pursued by the two countries in China. The Japanese negotiator designated as special ambassador for this purpose was Viscount Ishii, who had recently been Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had previously visited America in an official capacity. By the understanding arrived at in November of that year, known as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the United States Government formally recognized, though without defining them, the special interests of Japan in China arising out of geographical propinquity—a concession which tended to extend the liberty of action which Japan had already acquired as a result of the war. The reason for the conclusion of this Agreement, as stated in the Notes exchanged on this occasion, “was in order to silence mischievous reports” that had from time to time been circulated. Another reason may well have been the wish to clear the ground for American and Japanese business co-operation in China, which had been advocated for some time in the Japanese Press, and received some measure of support from capitalists in both countries. The idea was not welcomed by the American community in China, and the efforts made in this direction do not appear to have been attended with any striking success during the continuance of the war.

In the military intervention of the Allied and Associated Powers in Siberia Japan took a prominent part. The course of events in Russia after the revolution caused uneasiness in Great Britain and France. When the Bolsheviks gained control of affairs, the German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, who, owing to the disintegration of the former Russian armies had regained their liberty, and were free to uphold German ambitions, made common cause with them; and it was felt that there was danger of these combined forces spreading through Central and Eastern Siberia. How best to meet this danger, and at the same time to relieve the Czecho-Slovak troops, composed of ex-prisoners of war, who had refused to join the Bolsheviks and were retreating along the Trans-Siberian Railway, was a question which forced itself on the attention of the Governments concerned. The idea of sending an expeditionary force for this double purpose was first mooted in the summer of 1917, but it was not until a year later that an understanding was effected. In this military intervention six of the Allied and Associated Powers were represented, Japan, owing to her nearness to the scene of action, being the first to place troops on the spot.

Meanwhile, in view of the same danger and for the same objects, the Japanese and Chinese Governments had some months before (in May, 1918) concluded a secret military Agreement for Common Defence for the duration of the war, by which arrangements were made for the co-operation of Japanese and Chinese troops both in Chinese and Russian territory. In the following September “detailed stipulations” were attached to the Agreement. One of these provided that Chinese troops when operating in Russian territory should be under the control of a Japanese commander. A similar Naval Agreement was concluded at the same time. In pursuance of the Military Agreement considerable Japanese and Chinese forces were mobilized and employed in operations in Chinese territory and across the Russian border.

The conspicuous services rendered by the navy of Japan throughout the war earned the warm appreciation of her allies; the work done in clearing the seas of predatory enemy craft, convoying troopships from the British dominions to Europe and combating the submarine menace, deserving, as indeed it received, the highest praise. If at times there may have appeared to be a disposition in certain Japanese circles to anticipate the success of German arms, and if the pro-German sympathies of a section of the public may have seemed to assert themselves too loudly, allowance should be made for the large extent to which German ideas had been utilized in the making of modern Japan, and for the natural tendency of army officers to believe in the invincibility of the nation in whose military methods they had been trained.

The Peace Conference which assembled in Paris in January, 1919, set the seal on Japanese ambitions. The representatives of Japan took part in all important deliberations on a footing of recognized equality with those of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States, while, as one of the Great Powers composing the Supreme Council, Japan has had a voice in the decisions that have guided the destinies of the world.