. [Mod]. It is true that we have now converted the o, into a, and write the word mad: but mod was anciently employed.
“Yet sawe I MODNESSE laghyng in his rage.”
Chaucer. Knight’s Tale, fol. 1561, p. 6.
There is so great a resemblance between anger and violent madness, that there is nothing which could more probably have led to the adoption of the term. Dr. Beddoes, who appears to have examined the subject of insanity with the eye of an enlightened philosopher, is decidedly of this opinion, he says, Hygeia, No. 12, p. 40, “Mad, is one of those words which mean almost every thing and nothing. At first, it was, I imagine, applied to the transports of rage; and when men were civilized enough to be capable of insanity, their insanity, I presume, must have been of the frantic sort, because in the untutored, intense feelings seem regularly to carry a boisterous expression.”
Mad is therefore not a complex idea, as has been supposed, but a complex term for all the forms and varieties of this disease. Our language has been enriched with other terms expressive of this affection, all of which have a precise meaning. Delirium, which we have borrowed from the latin, merely means, out of the track, de lira, so that a delirious person, one who starts out of the track regularly pursued, becomes compared to the same deviation in the process of ploughing. Crazy, we have borrowed from the French ecrasé, crushed, broken: we still use the same meaning, and say that such a person is crack’d. Insane, deranged, or disarranged,[1] melancholic, out of one’s wits, lunatic, phrenetic, or as we have corrupted it, frantick, require no explanation. Beside one’s self most probably originated from the belief of possession by a devil, or evil spirit.
The importance of investigating the original meaning of words must be evident when it is considered that the law of this country impowers persons of the medical profession to confine and discipline those to whom the term mad or lunatic can fairly be applied. Instead of endeavouring to discover an infallible definition of madness, which I believe will be found impossible, as it is an attempt to comprise, in a few words, the wide range and mutable character of this Proteus disorder: much more advantage would be obtained if the circumstances could be precisely defined under which it is justifiable to deprive a human being of his liberty.
Another impediment to an accurate definition of madness, arises from the various hypotheses, which have been entertained concerning the powers and operations of the human mind: and likewise from the looseness and unsettled state of the terms by which it is to be defined.
Before treating of the intellect in a deranged state, it will perhaps be expected that some system of the human mind, in its perfect and healthy condition, should be laid down. It will be supposed necessary to establish in what sanity of intellect consists, and to mark distinctly some fixed point, the aberrations from which are to constitute disease.
To have a thorough knowledge of the nature, extent, and rectitude of the human faculties, is particularly incumbent on him who undertakes to write of them in their distempered state; and, in a legal point of view, it is most important that the medical practitioner should be enabled to establish the state of the patient’s case, as a departure from that which is reason.
The difficulty of proposing a satisfactory theory of the human mind, must have been felt by every person, who has touched this delicate string since the days of Aristotle, and failure must be expected in him who attempts it: yet the endeavour is laudable, and miscarriage is not linked with disgrace. Every contribution, to illustrate what are the powers of mind we possess; how we are acted upon by external circumstances in the acquisition of knowledge; and concerning the manner in which we use this knowledge for the purposes of life; ought to be candidly received.