“Secondly: our reason is often puzzled, and at a loss, because of the obscurity, confusion or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about; and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having any perfect idea of the least extension of matter, nor of infinity, we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter; but having perfect, clear, and distinct ideas of number, our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them.”—Works. 4to, vol. i, p. 431.
It can scarcely be necessary, longer to fatigue the patience of the reader, by reverting to the etymology of those terms, which have been considered as significant of mind and its operations. Every one will be able sufficiently to develope imagination, reflection, combination, [as applied to ideas, importing the amalgamation of two into one] abstraction, [vide Mr. Tooke, from p. 15 to 426, vol. ii.] and a variety of others; and to shew, that they have arisen from physical objects, and the circumstances which surround us, and are independant of any operation which mind has elaborated.
But as madness, by some, has been exclusively held to be a disease of the imagination, and by others, to be a defect of the judgment; considering these as separate and independant powers or faculties of the intellect; it is certainly worth the trouble to enquire, whether such states of mind did ever exist as original and unconnected disorders. With respect to imagination, there can be but little difficulty; yet this will so far involve the judgment and memory, that it will not be easy to institute a distinction. If a cobbler should suppose himself an emperor, this supposition, may be termed an elevated flight, or an extensive stretch of imagination, but it is likewise a great defect in his judgment, to deem himself that which he is not, and it is certainly an equal lapse of his recollection, to forget what he really is.
Having endeavoured to give some reasons for not according with the generally received opinions, concerning the different powers of the mind, it may be proper shortly to state, that, from the manner in which we acquire knowledge, the human mind appears to be composed of a sum of individual perceptions: that, in proportion as we dwell by the eye, the ear, or the touch on any object (which is called attention,) we are more likely to become acquainted with it, and to be able to remember it. For the most part, we remember these perceptions in the succession in which they were presented, although, they may afterwards, from circumstances, be differently sorted.
The minds of ordinary men are well contented to deal out their ideas, in the order in which they were received; and, not having found the necessity of bringing them to bear on general subjects, they are commonly minutely accurate in the detail of that which they have observed. By such persons, a story is told with all the relations of time and place; connected with the persons who were present, their situation, state of health, and a vast variety of associated particulars; and these persons, however tedious, generally afford the most correct account. On the other hand, those who are men of business, and have much to communicate in a given space, are obliged to subtract the more material circumstances from the gross narrative, and exhibit these as the sum total. It is in this way, that words, originally of considerable length, have been abbreviated for the conveniency of dispatch, and from this necessity short hand writing has been employed.
As the science of arithmetic consists in addition to, or subtraction from, a given number; so does the human mind appear to be capable solely of adding to, or separating from, its stock of ideas, as pleasure may prompt, or necessity enforce.
Language, the representative of thought, bears the same construction; and it is curious to remark in the investigation of its abbreviations, that those words, which serve to connect ideas together, (conjunctions) and which have been supposed to mark certain operations of intellect, postures of mind, and turns of thought, have merely the force and meaning of to add, or to subtract.
Insanity is now generally divided into Mania and Melancholia, but formerly its distributions were more numerous. Paracelsus, speaking of this disease, says, “Vesaniæ hujus genera quatuor existunt: primi Lunatici vocantur: secundi Insani: tertii Vesani: quarti Melancholici, Lunatici sunt qui omnem suum morbum ex Luna accipiunt, et juxta eam sese gerunt ac moventur. Insani sunt, qui malum id ab utero materno hauserunt, veluti hæreditarium, uno subindè insaniam in alterum transferente. Vesani sunt, qui a cibis ac potibus ita inficiuntur ac taminantur, ut ratione sensuque priventur. Melancholici sunt, qui ex intimæ naturæ vitio a ratione deturbantur, et ad vesaniam precipitantur.” Paracelsus, however, thinks that a fifth genus may be added. “Ad quatuor hac genera genus insuper aliud quodammodo annumerari potest, videlicet obsessi, qui a diabolo variis modis occupari solent.”—Paracelsi Opera, folio, tom. i. fol. 572.
The idea of being besieged, beset, or possessed by the devil was formerly a very favourite notion, and is derived to us by an authority we are taught to reverence: indeed it is still the opinion of many harmless and believing persons, some of whom have bestowed considerable pains to convince me that the violent and mischievous maniacs in Bedlam were under the dominion of this insinuating spirit. They have employed one argument which would seem to have considerable weight, namely, that the most atrocious crimes are stated in our indictments (much to the credit of human nature) to have been committed by the instigation of the devil: and they have also endeavoured to explain, how a late and eminently successful practitioner, by an union of the holy office with consummate medical skill, was enabled to cure nine lunatics out of ten, which certainly has not hitherto been accounted for.
Paracelsus, who contemplated this subject with uncommon gravity and solicitude, is of opinion that the devil enters us much in the same manner as a maggot gets into a filbert.—Vide Fragmentum Libri Philosophiæ de Dæmoniacis et Obsessis, tom. ii. p. 460.