town, and from the East India Company, refused to receive any articles but those from the governor, who commanded in the name of his most Christian majesty. He even refused liberty to the garrison to march out; well knowing that, as the town was not invested, they could take that liberty whenever they pleased.
Meanwhile, every accident concurred to render the enterprise of the English abortive. Some deserters got into the town, who informed the garrison of the true force of the English, which, conjecturing from the greatness and number of the ships, they had much magnified. Even this small body diminished daily, from the fatigue of excessive duty, and from the great rains that began to fall. Scarce three thousand were left to do duty, which still augmented the fatigue to the few that remained; especially when joined to the frequent alarms, that the unaccountable panic they were struck with made but too frequent. Rains had so spoilt the roads as to render it impracticable to bring up any heavier cannon, or more of the same calibre, so long a way, by the mere force of seamen. But what, above all things, made the enterprise appear desperate, was the discovery of the ignorance of the engineers, chiefly of the director-general, who in the whole course of his proceedings appeared neither to have skill in contrivance, nor order and diligence in execution. His own want of capacity and experience, made his projects of no use; his blind obstinacy rendered him incapable of making use of the capacity of others. Though the general offered to place and support the battery wherever the engineer thought proper, he chose to set it above six hundred yards from the wall, where such small cannon could do no manner of execution. He planted it at so oblique an angle to the wall that the ball thrown from the largest cannon must have recoiled, without making any impression. He trusted much to the red-hot balls, with which he promised to lay the town in ashes in twenty-four hours; yet, by his negligence, or that of others, the furnace with which these balls were to be heated, was forgot. After the furnace was brought, he found that the bellows, and other implements necessary for the execution of that work, were also left on board the store-ships. With great difficulty, and infinite pains, ammunition and artillery stores were drawn up from the sea-shore in tumbrels. He was totally ignorant, till some days after, that he had along with him ammunition wagons, which would have much facilitated this labour. His orders to the officers of the train were so confused, or so ill obeyed, that no ammunition came regularly up to the camp, to serve the few cannon and the mortars that played upon the town. Not only fascines, piquets, and every thing necessary for the battery, were supplied
him beyond his demand; but even workmen, notwithstanding the great fatigue and small numbers of the army. These workmen found no addition to their fatigue in obeying his orders. He left them often unemployed, for want of knowing in what business he should occupy them.
Meanwhile the French garrison, being so weakly attacked, had leisure to prepare for a defence, and make proper use of their great number of workmen, if not of soldiers, and the nearness and plenty of their military stores. By throwing up earth in the inside of the wall, they had planted a great many cannon, some of a large calibre, and opened six batteries against one that played upon them from the English. The distance alone of the besiegers' battery, made these cannon of the enemy do less execution; but that same distance rendered the attack absolutely ineffectual. Were the battery brought nearer, to a hundred paces for instance, 'twould be requisite to make it communicate with the camp by trenches and a covered way, to dig which was the work of some days for so small an army. During this time, the besieged, foreseeing the place to which the attack must be directed, could easily fortify it by retrenchments in the inside of the wall; and planting ten cannon to one, could silence the besiegers' feeble battery in a few hours. They would not even have had leisure to make a breach in the thin wall, which first discovered itself; and that breach, if made, could not possibly serve to any purpose. Above fifteen thousand men, completely armed by the East India Company, and brave while protected by cannon and ramparts, still stood in opposition to three thousand, discouraged with fatigue, with sickness, and with despair of ever succeeding in so unequal a contest.
A certain foreign writer, more anxious to tell his stories in an entertaining manner than to assure himself of their reality, has endeavoured to put this expedition in a ridiculous light; but as there is not one circumstance of his narration, which has truth in it, or even the least appearance of truth, it would be needless to lose time in refuting it. With regard to the prejudices of the public, a few questions may suffice.
Was the attempt altogether impracticable from the beginning? The general neither proposed it, nor planned it, nor approved it, nor answered for its success. Did the disappointment proceed from want of expedition? He had no pilots, guides, nor intelligence, afforded him; and could not possibly provide himself in any of these advantages, so necessary to all military operations. Were the engineers blamable? This has always been considered
as a branch of military knowledge, distinct from that of a commander, and which is altogether intrusted to those to whose profession it peculiarly belongs. By his vigour in combating the vain terrors spread amongst the troops, and by his prudence in timely desisting from a fruitless enterprise, the misfortune was confined merely to a disappointment, without any loss or any dishonour to the British arms. Commanders, from the situation of affairs, have had opportunities of acquiring more honour; yet there is no one whose conduct, in every circumstance, could be more free from reproach. On the first of October, the fleet sailed out of Quimperlay Road, from one of the most dangerous situations that so large a fleet had ever lain in, at so late a season, and in so stormy a sea as the Bay of Biscay. The reflection on this danger had been no inconsiderable cause of hastening the re-embarkation of the troops. And the more so, that the secretary had given express orders to the admiral not to bring the fleet into any hazard. The prudence of the hasty departure appeared the more visibly the very day the fleet sailed, when a violent storm arising from the south west, it was concluded, that if the ships had been lying at anchor on the coast, many of them must have necessarily been driven ashore, and wrecked on the rocks that surrounded them. The fleet was dispersed, and six transports being separated from the rest, went immediately for England, carrying with them about eight hundred of the forces. The rest put into Quiberon Bay, and the general landed his small body on the peninsula of that name. By erecting a battery of some guns on the narrow neck of land, which joins the peninsula to the continent, he rendered his situation almost impregnable, while he saw the fleet riding secure in his neighbourhood, in one of the finest bays in the world.
The industry and spirit of the general supported both himself and the army against all these disadvantages, while there was the smallest prospect of success. But his prudence determined him to abandon it, when it appeared altogether desperate.
The engineers, seeing no manner of effect from their shells and red-hot balls, and sensible that 'twas impossible either to make a breach from a battery, erected at so great a distance, or to place the battery nearer, under such a superiority of French cannon, at last unanimously brought a report to the general, that they had no longer any hope of success; and that even all the ammunition, which, with infinite labour, had been brought, was expended: no prospect remained of being farther supplied, on account of the broken roads, which lay between them and the fleet. The council of war held in consequence of this report, balanced the reasons for continuing