"I have subjoined a few reflections, which occurred to me in reading over the book. By these I pretend
only to show you how much I thought myself obliged to you for the pains you took with me in a like case, and how willing I am to be grateful.
"P. 9, l. ult. et quæ seq.[147:1] These instincts you mention seem not always to be violent and impetuous, more than self-love or benevolence. There is a calm ambition, a calm anger or hatred, which, though calm, may likewise be very strong, and have the absolute command over the mind. The more absolute they are, we find them to be commonly the calmer. As these instincts may be calm without being weak, so self-love may likewise become impetuous and disturbed, especially where any great pain or pleasure approaches.
"P. 21. l. 11.[147:2] In opposition to this, I shall cite a fine writer,—not for the sake of his authority, but for
the fact, which you may have observed. 'Les hommes comptent presque pour rien toutes les vertus du cœur, et idolâtrent les talens du corps et de l'esprit: celui qui dit froidement de soi, et sans croire blesser la modestie, qu'il est bon, qu'il est constant, fidèle, sincère, équitable, reconnoissant, n'ose dire qu'il est vif, qu'il a les dents belles et la peau douce: cela est trop fort.'—La Bruyere.[148:1]
"I fancy, however, this author stretches the matter too far. It seems arrogant to pretend to genius or magnanimity, which are the most shining qualities a man can possess. It seems foppish and frivolous to pretend to bodily accomplishments. The qualities of the heart lie in a medium; and are neither so shining as the one, nor so little valued as the other. I suppose the reason why good nature is not more valued, is its commonness, which has a vast effect on all our sentiments. Cruelty and hardness of heart is the most detested of all vices. I always thought you limited too much your ideas of virtue; and I find I have this opinion in common with several that have a very high esteem for your philosophy.
"P. 30, l. antepen. et quæ seq.[148:2] You seem here to
embrace Dr. Butler's opinion in his "Sermons on Human Nature," that our moral sense has an authority distinct from its force and durableness; and that because we always think it ought to prevail. But this is nothing but an instinct or principle, which approves of itself upon reflection, and that is common to all of them. I am not sure that I have not mistaken your sense, since you do not prosecute this thought.
"P. 52. l. 1. I fancy you employ the epithet ærumnosam[149:1] more from custom than your settled opinion.
"P. 129, et quæ seq.[149:2] You sometimes, in my opinion, ascribe the original of property and justice to public benevolence, and sometimes to private benevolence towards the possessors of the goods; neither of which seem to me satisfactory. You know my opinion on this head. It mortifies me much to see a person who possesses more candour and penetration than any almost I know, condemn reasonings of which I imagine I see so strongly the evidence. I was going to blot out this after having wrote it, but hope you will consider it only as a piece of folly, as indeed it is.