From Isolation to Leadership, Revised / A Review of American Foreign Policy

by John Holladay Latané

Secretary Knox then tried another solution of the question. On February 26, 1913, a new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to the Senate by the terms of which Nicaragua agreed to give the United States an exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and a naval base in Fonseca Bay, in return for the payment of three millions of dollars. The Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of the Taft administration was then at hand. The Wilson administration followed the same policy, however, and in July, 1913, Mr. Bryan submitted to the Senate a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition certain provisions of the Platt amendment, which defines our protectorate over Cuba. This treaty aroused strong opposition in the other Central American states, and Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras filed formal protests with the United States Government against its ratification on the ground that it would convert Nicaragua into a protectorate of the United States and thus defeat the long-cherished plan for a union of the Central American republics. The Senate of the United States objected to the protectorate feature of the treaty and refused to ratify it, but the negotiations were renewed by the Wilson administration and on February 18, 1916, a new treaty, which omits the provisions of the Platt amendment, was accepted by the Senate. This treaty grants to the United States in perpetuity the exclusive right to construct a canal by way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, and leases to the United States for ninety-nine years a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, and also the Great Corn and Little Corn islands as coaling stations. The consideration for these favors was the sum of three millions of dollars to be expended, with the approval of the Secretary of State of the United States, in paying the public debt of Nicaragua and for other public purposes to be agreed on by the two contracting parties.

The treaty with the black Republic of Haiti, ratified by the Senate February 28, 1916, carries the new Caribbean policies of the United States to the farthest limits short of actual annexation. It provides for the establishment of a receivership of Haitian customs under the control of the United States similar in most respects to that established over the Dominican Republic. It provides further for the appointment, on the nomination of the President of the United States, of a financial adviser, who shall assist in the settlement of the foreign debt and direct expenditures of the surplus for the development of the agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources of the republic. It provides further for a native constabulary under American officers appointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination by the President of the United States. It further extends to Haiti the main provisions of the Platt amendment. By controlling the internal financial administration of the government the United States hopes to remove all incentives for those revolutions which have in the past had for their object a raid on the public treasury, and by controlling the customs and maintaining order the United States hopes to avoid all possibility of foreign intervention. The treaty is to remain in force for a period of ten years and for another period of ten years if either party presents specific reasons for continuing it on the ground that its purpose has not been fully accomplished.

Prior to the Roosevelt administration the Monroe Doctrine was regarded by the Latin-American states as solely a protective policy. The United States did not undertake to control the financial administration or the foreign policy of any of these republics. It was only after their misconduct had gotten them into difficulty and some foreign power, or group of foreign powers, was on the point of demanding reparation by force that the United States stepped in and undertook to see to it that foreign intervention did not take the form of occupation of territory or interference in internal politics. The Monroe Doctrine has always been in principle a policy of American intervention for the purpose of preventing European intervention, but American intervention always awaited the threat of immediate action on the part of some European power. President Roosevelt concluded that it would be wiser to restrain the reckless conduct of the smaller American republics before disorders or public debts should reach a point which gave European powers an excuse for intervening. In a message to Congress in 1904 he laid down this new doctrine, which soon became famous as the Big Stick policy. He said: "If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." In other words, since we could not permit European powers to restrain or punish American states in cases of wrongdoing, we must ourselves undertake that task. As long as the Monroe Doctrine was merely a policy of benevolent protection which Latin-American states could invoke after their unwise or evil conduct had brought European powers to the point of demanding just retribution, it was regarded with favor and no objection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt doctrine, that if we were to continue to protect Latin-American states against European intervention, we had a right to demand that they should refrain from conduct which was likely to provoke such intervention, was quite a different thing, and raised a storm of criticism and opposition.

The Roosevelt application of the Monroe Doctrine was undoubtedly a perfectly logical step. It was endorsed by the Taft administration and further extended by the Wilson administration and made one of our most important policies in regard to the zone of the Caribbean. President Roosevelt was right in drawing the conclusion that we had arrived at a point where we had either to abandon the Monroe Doctrine or to extend its application so as to cover the constantly increasing number of disputes arising from the reckless creation of public debts and loose financial administration. It was absurd for us to stand quietly by and witness the utterly irresponsible creation of financial obligations that would inevitably lead to European intervention and then undertake to fix the bounds and limits of that intervention. It is interesting to note that President Wilson did not hesitate to carry the new policy to its logical conclusion, and that he went so far as to warn Latin-American countries against granting to foreign corporations concessions which, on account of their extended character, would be certain to give rise to foreign claims which would, in turn, give an excuse for European intervention. In discussing our Latin-American policy shortly after the beginning of his administration, President Wilson said: "You hear of 'concessions' to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege; and states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs—a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. . . . What these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate."

These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which Pearson and Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia. This concession is said to have covered practically all of the oil interests in Colombia, and carried with it the right to improve harbors and dig canals in the country. However, before the meeting of the Colombian congress in November, 1913, which was expected to confirm the concession, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson and Son, withdrew the contract, alleging as his reason the opposition of the United States.

Unfortunately President Roosevelt's assertion of the Big Stick policy and of the duty of the United States to play policeman in the western hemisphere was accompanied by his seizure of the Canal Zone. This action naturally aroused serious apprehensions in Latin America and gave color to the charge that the United States had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a protective policy into a policy of selfish aggression. Colombia felt outraged and aggrieved, and this feeling was not alleviated by Mr. Roosevelt's speech several years later to the students of the University of California, in which he boasted of having taken the Canal Zone and said that if he had not taken it as he did, the debate over the matter in Congress would still be going on. Before the close of his administration President Roosevelt undertook to placate Colombia, but the sop which he offered was indignantly rejected. In January, 1909, Secretary Root proposed three treaties, one between the United States and Panama, one between the United States and Colombia, and one between Colombia and Panama. These treaties provided for the recognition of the Republic of Panama by Colombia and for the transference to Colombia of the first ten installments of the annual rental of $250,000 which the United States had agreed to pay to Panama for the lease of the Canal Zone. The treaties were ratified by the United States and by Panama, but not by Colombia.

The Taft administration made repeated efforts to appease Colombia, resulting in the formulation of a definite proposition by Secretary Knox shortly before the close of President Taft's term. His proposals were that if Colombia would ratify the Root treaties just referred to, the United States would be willing to pay $10,000,000 for an exclusive right of way for a canal by the Atrato route and for the perpetual lease of the islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence as coaling stations. These proposals were also rejected. The American minister, Mr. Du Bois, acting, he said, on his own responsibility, then inquired informally whether $25,000,000 without options of any kind would satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. Mr. Knox, in reporting the matter to the President, said that Colombia seemed determined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration. Secretary Bryan took up the negotiations where Knox dropped them, and concluded a treaty, according to the terms of which the United States was to express regret at what had occurred and to pay Colombia $25,000,000. The Senate of the United States refused to ratify this treaty while Wilson was in the White House, but as soon as Harding became president they consented to the payment and ratified the treaty with a few changes in the preamble.

The facts stated above show conclusively that the two most significant developments of American policy in the Caribbean during the last twenty years have been the establishment of formal protectorates and the exercise of financial supervision over weak and disorderly states. Our protectorate over Cuba was clearly defined in the so-called Platt amendment, which was inserted in the army appropriation bill of March 2, 1901, and directed the President to leave control of the island of Cuba to its people so soon as a government should be established under a constitution which defined the future relations with the United States substantially as follows: (1) That the government of Cuba would never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power which would impair the independence of the island; (2) that the said government would not contract any public debt which could not be met by the ordinary revenues of the island; (3) that the government of Cuba would permit the United States to exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, and for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty; (4) that all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof should be ratified and validated; (5) that the government of Cuba would carry out the plans already devised for the sanitation of the cities of the island; and finally that the government of Cuba would sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

It is understood that these articles, with the exception of the fifth, which was proposed by General Leonard Wood, were carefully drafted by Elihu Root, at that time Secretary of War, discussed at length by President McKinley's Cabinet, and entrusted to Senator Platt of Connecticut, who offered them as an amendment to the army appropriation bill. The Wilson administration, as already stated, embodied the first three provisions of the Platt amendment in the Haitian treaty of 1916. Prior to the World War, which has upset all calculations, it seemed highly probable that the Platt amendment would in time be extended to all the weaker states within the zone of the Caribbean. If the United States is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right to intervene and the conditions of intervention should be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed. Hitherto whatever action we have taken in Latin America has been taken under the Monroe Doctrine—a policy without legal sanction—which an international court might not recognize. Action under a treaty would have the advantage of legality. In other words, the recent treaties with Caribbean states have converted American policy into law.

The charge that in establishing protectorates and financial supervision over independent states we have violated the terms of the Monroe Doctrine is one that has been frequently made. Those who have made it appear to be laboring under the illusion that the Monroe Doctrine was wholly altruistic in its aim. As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine has never been regarded by the United States as in any sense a self-denying declaration. President Monroe said that we should consider any attempt on the part of the European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." The primary object of the policy outlined by President Monroe was, therefore, the peace and safety of the United States. The protection of Latin-American states against European intervention was merely a means of protecting ourselves. While the United States undertook to prevent the encroachment of European powers in Latin America, it never for one moment admitted any limitation upon the possibility of its own expansion in this region. The whole course of American history establishes the contrary point of view. Since the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated we have annexed at the expense of Latin-American states, Texas, New Mexico, California, and the Canal Zone. Upon other occasions we emphatically declined to bind ourselves by treaty stipulations with England and France that under no circumstance would we annex the island of Cuba. Shortly after the beginning of his first term President Wilson declared in a public address at Mobile that "the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." This declaration introduces a new chapter in American diplomacy.