From Isolation to Leadership, Revised / A Review of American Foreign Policy

by John Holladay Latané

The terms of the Armistice were drawn up by the Interallied Council at Versailles and completed by November 5. They were much more severe than the public had expected them to be. Germany was required immediately to evacuate Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxemburg; to withdraw her armies from the entire territory on the left bank of the Rhine, and from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and Turkey; she was to surrender enormous quantities of heavy artillery and airplanes, all her submarines, and most of her battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. This was practically unconditional surrender. Contrary to the general belief at the time, it is now known that Foch and Haig considered these terms too severe and feared that Germany would not accept them. They wanted an armistice that Germany would accept. General Bliss, on the other hand, wanted to demand "the complete disarmament and demobilization of the military and naval forces of the enemy." In America there was much criticism of the President for being willing to negotiate with Germany at all. "On to Berlin" was a popular cry, and it was thought that the President was preventing a complete military triumph. On October 10 Senator Lodge declared in the Senate: "The Republican party stands for unconditional surrender and complete victory, just as Grant stood. My own belief is that the American people mean to have an unconditional surrender. They mean to have a dictated, not a negotiated peace."

After reviewing the Armistice negotiations André Tardieu, a member of the French Cabinet and delegate to the Peace Conference, says:

"What remains of the fiction, believed by so many, of an armistice secretly determined upon by an American dictator; submitted to by the European governments: imposed by their weakness upon the victorious armies, despite the opposition of the generals? The Armistice was discussed in the open light of day. President Wilson only consented to communicate it to his associates on the triple condition that its principle be approved by the military authorities and its clauses would be drawn up by them; that it be imposed upon the enemy and not discussed with him; that it be such as to prevent all resumption of hostilities and assure the submission of the vanquished to the terms of peace. So it was that the discussion went on with Berlin till October 23, and in Paris from that date till November 5. It was to the Commander-in-Chief [Foch] that final decision was left not only on the principle of the Armistice but upon its application. He it was who drew up the text. And it was his draft that was adopted. The action of the governments was limited to endorsing it and making it more severe. That is the truth:—it is perhaps less picturesque but certainly more in accord with common sense."

The terms of the Armistice were delivered to the Germans by Marshal Foch November 7, and they were given seventy-two hours to accept or reject them. Meanwhile Germany's allies were rapidly deserting her. Bulgaria surrendered September 30, and on October 30 Turkey signed an armistice. Finally on November 4, the rapidly disintegrating Austro-Hungarian Monarchy also signed an armistice. On October 28 there had been a naval mutiny at Kiel which spread rapidly to the other ports. On the 31st the Emperor departed for Army Headquarters, leaving Berlin on the verge of revolution. On the 7th of November the Social Democrats demanded the abdication of the Emperor and the Crown Prince. On the 9th Prince Max resigned the Chancellorship, and the Kaiser abdicated and ignominiously fled across the border into Holland. On the 11th at 5 A. M. the Armistice was signed by the German delegates and Marshal Foch, and it went into effect at 11 o'clock that day.

In two particulars the Wilson principles had been modified by the Allies. In the American note to Germany of November 5 Secretary Lansing stated that the President had submitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the Allied Governments and that he had received in reply the following memorandum:

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference. Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." In transmitting this memorandum Secretary Lansing stated that he was instructed by the President to say that he agreed with this interpretation.

With these modifications the Wilson principles were accepted by all parties as the legal basis of the peace negotiations.

XI

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

It was agreed that the Peace Conference should meet at Paris, and President Wilson considered the issues involved of such magnitude that he decided to head the American delegation himself. Great Britain, France, and Italy were to be represented by their premiers, and it was fitting that the United States should be represented by its most responsible leader, who, furthermore, had been the chief spokesman of the Allies and had formulated the principles upon which the peace was to be made. But the decision of the President to go to Paris was without precedent in our history and, therefore, it met with criticism and opposition. When he announced the names of the other members of the delegation, the criticism became even more outspoken and severe. They were Secretary of State Lansing, Henry White, former ambassador to France, Colonel Edward M. House, and General Tasker H. Bliss. There had been a widespread demand for a non-partisan peace commission, and many people thought that the President should have taken Root, or Roosevelt, or Taft. Mr. White was a Republican but he had never been active in party affairs or in any sense a leader. In the Senate there was deep resentment that the President had not selected any members of that body to accompany him. President McKinley had appointed three senators as members of the commission of five that negotiated the treaty of peace at the close of the Spanish War. With that exception, senators had never taken part directly in the negotiation of a treaty. The delegation was attended by a large group of experts on military, economic, geographical, ethnological, and legal matters, some of whom were men of great ability, and in their selection no party lines were drawn.