From Isolation to Leadership, Revised / A Review of American Foreign Policy

by John Holladay Latané

Meanwhile a technical state of war with Germany existed and American troops were still on the Rhine. On July 2, 1921, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring the war at an end, but undertaking to reserve to the United States "all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages" to which it was entitled under the terms of the Armistice, or by reason of its participation in the war, or which had been stipulated for its benefit in the Treaty of Versailles, or to which it was entitled as one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or to which it was entitled by virtue of any act or acts of Congress. On August 25 the United States Government, through its commissioner to Germany, signed at Berlin a separate treaty of peace with Germany, reserving in detail the rights referred to in the joint resolution of Congress. About the same time a similar treaty was signed with Austria, and the two treaties were ratified by the Senate of the United States October 18. The proclamation of peace produced no immediate results of any importance. American troops continued on the Rhine, and there was no apparent increase in trade, which had been carried on before the signing of the treaty by special licenses.

If mankind is capable of learning any lessons from history, the events leading up to the World War should have exploded the fallacy that the way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. Competition in armament, whether on land or sea, inevitably leads to war, and it can lead to nothing else. And yet, after the terrible lessons of the recent war, the race for armaments continued with increased momentum. France, Russia, and Poland maintained huge armies, while the United States and Japan entered upon the most extensive naval construction programs in the history of the world. Great Britain, burdened with debt, was making every effort to keep pace with the United States.

This naval rivalry between powers which had so lately been united in the war against Germany, led thoughtful people to consider the probable outcome and to ask against whom these powers were arming. We had no quarrel with England, but England was the ally of Japan, and relations between Japan and the United States in the Pacific and in Eastern Asia were far from reassuring. The question of the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed at the British Imperial Conference, which met at London in the early summer of 1921. The original purpose of this compact was to check the Russian advance in Manchuria. It was renewed in revised form in 1905 against Germany, and again renewed in 1911 against Germany for a period of ten years. With the removal of the German menace, what reasons were there for Great Britain to continue the alliance? It bore too much the aspect of a combination against the United States, and was of course the main reason for the naval program which we had adopted. So long as there were only three navies of importance in the world and two of them united in a defensive alliance, it behooved us to safeguard our position as a sea power.

One of the main objects of the formation of the League of Nations was to bring about a limitation of armaments on land and sea, and a commission was organized under the League to consider this question, but this commission could not take any steps toward the limitation of navies so long as a great naval power like the United States refused to coöperate with the League of Nations or even to recognize its existence. As President Harding had promised the American people some substitute for the League of Nations, he decided, soon after coming into office, to convene an international conference to consider the limitation of armament on land and sea. By the time the Conference convened it was evident that no agreement was possible on the subject of land armament. It was recognized from the first that the mere proposal to limit navies would be utterly futile unless effective steps could be taken to remove some of the causes of international conflict which make navies necessary. Therefore the formal invitation to the Conference extended to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, August 11, 1921, linked the subject of Limitation of Armament with Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. The European powers accepted the invitation without much enthusiasm, but Japan's answer was held back for some time. She was reluctant to have the powers review the course she had pursued in China and Siberia while they were at war with Germany. After agreeing to attend the Conference, Japan endeavored to confine the program to as narrow limits as possible, and she soon entered into negotiations with China over the Shantung question with the hope of arriving at a settlement which would prevent that question from coming before the Conference. Invitations to the Conference were later sent to the governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and China. Portugal was interested because of her settlement at Macao, the oldest European settlement in China. Holland of course is one of the great colonial powers of the Pacific. While Belgium has no territorial interests in the Orient, she has for years been interested in Chinese financial matters.

The Washington Conference convened in plenary session November 12, 1921, in Memorial Continental Hall. Seats were reserved on the main floor for press representatives, and the galleries were reserved for officials and those individuals who were fortunate enough to secure tickets of admission. The question of open diplomacy which had been much discussed, was settled at the first session by Secretary Hughes, who, in his introductory speech, boldly laid the American proposals for the limitation of navies before the Conference. There were in all seven plenary sessions, but the subsequent sessions did little more than confirm agreements that had already been reached in committee. The real work of the Conference was carried on by committees, and from the meetings of these committees the public and press representatives were as a matter of course excluded. There were two principal committees, one on the Limitation of Armament, and the other on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. There were various sub-committees, in the work of which technical delegates participated. Minutes were kept of the meetings of the two principal committees, and after each meeting a communiqué was prepared for the press. In fact, the demand for publicity defeated to a large extent its own ends. So much matter was given to the press that when it was published in full very few people had time to read it. As a general rule, the less real information there was to give out, the longer were the communiqués. Experienced correspondents maintained that decisions on delicate questions were made with as much secrecy in Washington as at Paris.

The plan of the United States for the limitation of armament presented by Secretary Hughes at the first session proposed (1) that all programs for the construction of capital ships, either actual or projected, be abandoned; (2) that a large number of battleships of older types still in commission be scrapped; and (3) that the allowance of auxiliary combatant craft, such as cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and airplane carriers, be in proportion to the tonnage of capital ships. These proposals, it was claimed, would leave the powers under consideration in the same relative positions. Under this plan the United States would be allowed 500,000 tons of capital ships, Great Britain 500,000 tons, and Japan 300,000 tons.

Japan objected to the 5-5-3 ratio proposed by Secretary Hughes, and urged a 10-10-7 ratio as more in accord with existing strength. The American proposal included the scrapping of the Mutsu, the pride of the Japanese navy, which had been launched but not quite completed. The sacrifices voluntarily proposed by the United States for its navy were much greater than those which England or Japan were called upon to make, and in this lay the strength of the American position. The Japanese refused, however, to give up the Mutsu, and they were finally permitted to retain it, but in order to preserve the 5-5-3 ratio, it was necessary to increase the tonnage allowance of the United States and Great Britain. In the treaty as finally agreed upon, Japan was allowed 315,000 tons of capital ships and the United States and Great Britain each 525,000 tons.

In his address at the opening session, Secretary Hughes said: "In view of the extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thought to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnage allowance of these nations, but the United States proposes that this subject be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference." This somewhat blunt, matter-of-fact way of stating the case gave unexpected offense to the French delegation. During the next four or five weeks, while Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were discussing the case of the Mutsu and the question of fortifications in the Pacific, the French delegates were cherishing their resentment at being treated as the representatives of a second-class power. Hughes's failure to regard the susceptibilities of a great nation like France undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the upsetting of that part of the naval program relating to subsidiary craft and submarines.

When, after the agreement on the 5-5-3 ratio, the question of the allowance of capital ship tonnage for France and Italy was taken up in committee, the other powers were wholly unprepared for France's demand of 350,000 tons of capital ships. According to Hughes's figures based on existing strength, she was entitled to 175,000 tons. It is not probable that the French delegates intended to insist on such a large tonnage. It is more likely that they put forth this proposal in the committee in order to give the other delegates to understand that France could not be ignored or dictated to with impunity and in order to pave the way for their submarine proposal. Unfortunately the French demands were given to the press through some misunderstanding and caused an outburst of criticism in the British and American papers. In the committee the relations between the British and French delegates became very bitter over the refusal of the latter to abandon the submarine, or even agree to a moderate proposal as to submarine tonnage. On December 16 Secretary Hughes cabled an appeal, over the heads of the French delegation, to Briand, who had returned to Paris. As a result, the French finally agreed to accept the 1.75 ratio for capital ships, but refused to place any reasonable limits upon cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or aircraft. Italy accepted the same ratio as France.

Thus an important part of the Hughes program failed. As a result, the treaty leaves the contracting parties free to direct their energies, if they so desire, to the comparatively new fields of submarine and aerial warfare. As is well known, many eminent naval authorities, such as Sir Percy Scott in England and Admiral Sims in this country, believe that the capital ship is an obsolete type, and that the warfare of the future will be carried on by submarines, aircraft, and lighter surface ships. The unfortunate feature of the situation created by the naval treaty is, therefore, that those who regard the capital ship as obsolete will now have an opportunity to bring forward and press their submarine and aircraft programs. There is no limitation upon the building of cruisers, provided they do not exceed 10,000 tons displacement or carry guns with a calibre exceeding eight inches.