The United States and Latin America

by John Holladay Latané

In view of the opposition which the plan encountered in Congress, the instructions to the American delegates were very carefully drawn by Secretary Clay and their powers were strictly limited. They were cautioned against committing their government in any way to the establishment of "an amphictyonic council, invested with power finally to decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any respect their conduct. Such a council might have been well enough adapted to a number of small contracted states, whose united territory would fall short of the extent of that of the smallest of the American powers. The complicated and various interests which appertain to the nations of this vast continent cannot be safely confided to the superintendence of one legislative authority. We should almost as soon expect to see an amphictyonic council to regulate the affairs of the whole globe. But even if it were desirable to establish such a tribunal, it is beyond the competency of the government of the United States voluntarily to assent to it, without a previous change of their actual constitution."

The delegates were also instructed to oppose the formation of an offensive and defensive alliance between the American powers, for, as Mr. Clay pointed out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea of assisting Spain in the conquest of her late colonies. Continuing, he said:

Other reasons concur to dissuade the United States from entering into such an alliance. From the first establishment of their present constitution, their illustrious statesmen have inculcated the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading maxim of their foreign policy. It is true, that in its adoption, their attention was directed to Europe, which having a system of connections and of interests remote and different from ours, it was thought most advisable that we should not mix ourselves up with them. And it is also true, that long since the origin of the maxim, the new American powers have arisen, to which, if at all, it is less applicable. Without, therefore, asserting that an exigency may not occur in which an alliance of the most intimate kind between the United States and the other American republics would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely said that the occasion which would warrant a departure from that established maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such is believed now to exist. Among the objections to such alliances, those which at all times have great weight are, first, the difficulty of a just and equal arrangement of the contributions of force and of other means between the respective parties to the attainment of the common object; and secondly, that of providing beforehand, and determining with perfect precision, when the casus foederis arises, and thereby guarding against all controversies about it. There is less necessity for any such alliance at this juncture on the part of the United States, because no compact, by whatever solemnities it might be attended, or whatever name or character it might assume, could be more obligatory upon them than the irresistible motive of self-preservation, which would be instantly called into operation, and stimulate them to the utmost exertion in the supposed contingency of an European attack upon the liberties of America.[273]

The British government sent a special envoy to reside near the congress and to place himself in frank and friendly communication with the delegates. Canning's private instructions to this envoy declared that,

Any project for putting the U. S. of North America at the head of an American Confederacy, as against Europe, would be highly displeasing to your Government. It would be felt as an ill return for the service which has been rendered to those States, and the dangers which have been averted from them, by the countenance and friendship, and public declarations of Great Britain; and it would probably, at no distant period, endanger the peace both of America and of Europe.

The Panama Congress was without practical results, and it possesses merely an historical interest. As a matter of fact, only four republics, Colombia, Central America, Peru, and Mexico, were represented. Several treaties and conventions were drafted with the view mainly of combined defense against Spain, but ratification was withheld by all of the states except Colombia, which gave only a partial approval to what had been done. Before adjourning, the Congress of Panama decided to meet again at the town of Tacubaya, near the city of Mexico, and to continue its sessions at stated intervals. But as the result of the failure of the states represented at the congress to ratify the agreements arrived at, and as the result of internal disorders, the plan was not carried out, although Mexico issued invitations for another congress in 1831, 1838, 1839, and 1840.

In 1847 the republics of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada, and Peru held a so-called "American Congress" at Lima, which drafted a treaty of confederation, one of commerce and navigation, a consular convention, and a postal convention. These treaties were not ratified and, therefore, the congress was without practical results. The preamble of the proposed treaty of confederation referred to the nations assembled as being "bound to each other by the ties of a common origin, a common language, a common religion, common customs, and the common cause for which they have struggled, as well as by their geographical position, the similarity of their institutions, and their analogous ancestors and reciprocal interests." It is evident, therefore, that this particular congress was Spanish-American rather than Pan American.[274]

In 1856 the republics of Peru, Chile, and Ecuador signed at Santiago a treaty of confederation, known as "the Continental Treaty," for the purpose of "cementing upon substantial foundations the union which exists between them, as members of the great American family, which are bound together by the ties of a common origin, similar institutions, and many other signs of fraternity." This treaty was not ratified. It seems to have been dictated by a spirit of hostility to the United States as the result of the filibustering enterprise of William Walker in Central America.

The question of a "continental" league was discussed between Costa Rica and Colombia in 1862. After stating that, "There are not always at the head of the Great Republic moderate, just, and upright men as those who form the administration of President Lincoln," Costa Rica continued:

If our Republics could have the guaranty that they have nothing to fear from the United States of North America, it is indubitable that no other nation could be more useful and favorable to us. Under the shelter of her powerful eagles, under the influence of her wise institutions, and under the spur of her astonishing progress our newly-born nationalities should receive the impulse which they now need, and would be permitted to march with firm step, without experiencing the troubles and difficulties with which they have had to struggle.... In view of the above considerations, the idea has occurred to my government that a new compact might be draughted by which the United States of North America should bind themselves solemnly to respect, and cause others to respect, the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the sister republics of this continent; not to annex to their territory, either by purchase or by any other means, any part of the territory of the said republics; not to allow filibustering expeditions to be fitted up against the said nations, or to permit the rights of the latter to be in any way abridged or ignored.[275]