The French troops continuing to occupy Spain after the time stipulated by treaty, Canning sought an explanation from France, but without satisfactory results. He therefore determined at a cabinet meeting held December 14, 1824, to recognize Mexico and Colombia forthwith. On January 1, 1825, after the ministers had left England with instructions and full powers, the fact of recognition was communicated officially to the diplomatic corps and two days later it was made public. That this recognition was a retaliatory measure to compensate England for the French occupation of Spain was understood at the time and was distinctly avowed by Canning two years later.[73] In a speech delivered December 12, 1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French invasion of Spain, he said:
I looked another way—I sought for compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.
In spite of the great indebtedness of South America to Canning, this boast falls somewhat flat when we remember that the Spanish colonies had won their independence by their own valor and had been recognized as independent governments by the United States two years before Great Britain acted in the matter.
Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary and biographer, says that the recognition of Spanish-American independence was, perhaps, the most important measure adopted by the British cabinet while Canning was at the head of the foreign office. He sums up the reasons and results of the act as follows:
First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British interests; being especially calculated to benefit our commerce. Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace, since it compensated us for the continued occupation of Spain by a French force, a disparagement to which, otherwise, it would not have become us to submit. Lastly, it maintained the balance between conflicting principles; since it gave just so much of a triumph to popular rights and privileges, as was sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates at the victory, which absolute principles had obtained by the overthrow of the constitutions of Spain, Portugal, and Naples; and it dealt a death-blow to the Holy Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange fancy, with which they were prepossessed, that the differences between them and the British ministers (where they did differ) were merely feints on the part of the latter to avoid a conflict with public opinion.[74]
The United States government did not relax its efforts in behalf of the South American states with the recognition of England, but continued to exert itself in order to secure the acknowledgment of their independence by the other powers of Europe, particularly Spain.[75] Mr. Clay tried to get the other members of the alliance, especially the emperor of Russia, to use their good offices with Spain for the purpose of inducing her to recognize her late colonies, but the emperor of Russia, the head of the alliance, continued to preach to Spain "not only no recognition of their independence, but active war for their subjugation." To the request of the United States he replied that, out of respect for "the indisputable titles of sovereignty," he could not prejudge or anticipate the determination of the king of Spain.[76] It was some ten years before Spain could be persuaded to renounce her ancient claims.
FOOTNOTES:
[37] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. III, p. 538.
[38] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69, and Moore's Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I, p. 177.
[39] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, pp. 13, 58, and 116.