The United States and Latin America

by John Holladay Latané

On June 24 Mr. Marcy wrote that the President was far from satisfied with the manner in which our demands were treated by the Spanish government, but that before resorting to extreme measures he was determined to make a final appeal to Spain for the adjustment of past difficulties and for the guarantee of more friendly relations in the future. Although satisfied with the spirited manner in which Mr. Soulé had performed the duties of his mission, the President was considering the expediency of reinforcing the demands of the United States by the appointment of an extraordinary commission of two distinguished citizens to act in conjunction with him. He instructed him, therefore, not to press the affair of the Black Warrior, but to wait until the question of the special commission could be laid before Congress.

During the summer there was a change of ministry in the Spanish government, which, as was not infrequently the case, was attended with more or less serious disorders. In August Mr. Marcy wrote that in view of the unsettled condition of affairs in Spain and for other reasons not stated, the purpose of sending a special mission had, for the present at least, been abandoned. Without pressing matters Mr. Soulé was, nevertheless, to avail himself of any opportunity which might be presented, of settling the affairs in dispute and of negotiating for the purchase of Cuba.

Under the same date he proposed to Mr. Soulé the plan of consulting with Mr. Mason and Mr. Buchanan, our ministers at Paris and London, for the purpose of overcoming any obstacles that England and France might interpose. This suggestion led to the celebrated meeting at Ostend and the so-called manifesto.

In accordance with the instructions of the President, Messrs. Soulé, Mason, and Buchanan proceeded to make arrangements for the proposed conference, which was held at Ostend, in Belgium, October 9, 10, 11, 1854. They then adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle for a week, where the reports of their proceedings were prepared.

The greater part of the report is taken up with an enumeration of the advantages that would accrue to the United States from the acquisition of Cuba, and an elaborate exposition of the ways in which the interests of Spain would be promoted by the sale. The only specific recommendation of the report was that a proposal should be made through the proper diplomatic channel to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble, to purchase Cuba from Spain, the maximum price to be $120,000,000. The report then proceeds to discuss the question, what ought to be the course of the American government should Spain refuse to sell Cuba? The ministers declared:

After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

The report also recommended that all proceedings in reference to the negotiations with Spain "ought to be open, frank, and public." This recommendation, together with the general character of the report, indicates that its authors were rather bent on making political capital of the affair at home than on seriously furthering negotiations at Madrid. As a matter of fact the Ostend Manifesto made Buchanan an acceptable presidential candidate to the southern wing of the Democratic party and played no small part in securing for him the nomination in 1856.[107]

The objectionable features of the report were politely but firmly repudiated by the administration in Marcy's reply to Soulé and Soulé promptly resigned his mission. This fact was generally overlooked at the time, while the unfortunate publicity given to the proceedings at Ostend brought endless censure upon President Pierce and Secretary Marcy.

In spite of the "jingo" policy attributed to the Pierce administration, the complications arising out of the seizure of the Black Warrior were not made a casus belli, as might easily have been done. After Mr. Soulé's return to the United States the negotiations were continued by his successor. The conduct of the officials concerned in the seizure was disavowed, and the indemnity claimed by the American citizens concerned was paid. The administration closed on terms of comparative friendship with Spain, although there were numbers of claims still unadjusted. The Cuban question figured conspicuously in the campaign of 1856. The platform of the Democratic party was strongly in favor of acquisition, while the new Republican platform stigmatized the Ostend manifesto as the highwayman's plea.