Her majesty's government believed that the only way to relieve the situation was to extend the invitation to all maritime states to participate in an agreement based on the stipulations of the convention of 1850.[173]
The task of replying to Lord Granville's two dispatches fell upon Mr. Blaine's successor in the State Department, Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Frelinghuysen's voluminous dispatch of May 8, 1882, reiterated in the main the arguments advanced by Mr. Blaine. He adduced evidence at great length to try to show that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was a special contract for the accomplishment of a specific object, which had never been achieved, and was no longer binding; that Great Britain had violated the treaty by converting her settlement of British Honduras into a possession without ever receiving the assent of the United States, and that such act would entitle the United States to renounce the treaty. The dispatch was further characterized by a direct appeal to the Monroe Doctrine in these words:
The President believes that the formation of a protectorate by European nations over the isthmus transit would be in conflict with a doctrine which has been for many years asserted by the United States. This sentiment is properly termed a doctrine, as it has no prescribed sanction and its assertion is left to the exigency which may invoke it. It has been repeatedly announced by the executive department of this government, and through the utterances of distinguished citizens; it is cherished by the American people, and has been approved by the government of Great Britain.
After quoting a part of President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, and reviewing the circumstances under which it was delivered, Mr. Frelinghuysen said:
Thus the doctrine of non-intervention by European powers in American affairs arose from complications in South America, and was announced by Mr. Monroe on the suggestion of the official representative of Great Britain.[174]
In his reply of December 30, 1882, Lord Granville proved conclusively that Article VIII. of the treaty was understood by the American government during the discussions of 1850-1860 as establishing a general principle applicable to all waterways connecting the two oceans. In answer to the second point, Lord Granville adduced the notes exchanged between Mr. Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer in July, 1850, which made it perfectly clear that, in the understanding of both governments at that time, the claims of Great Britain to Belize or British Honduras were not affected one way or the other by the treaty.[175]
In a later dispatch, August 17, 1883, Lord Granville briefly touched upon Mr. Frelinghuysen's appeal to the Monroe Doctrine, reminding him very pertinently that neither the American administration which negotiated the treaty nor the Senate which ratified it considered that they were precluded by the utterances of President Monroe from entering into such a treaty with one or more of the European powers.[176]
The correspondence on the treaty closed with Mr. Frelinghuysen's dispatch of November 22, 1883, in which he reiterated with no small degree of bluntness and pertinacity the arguments of his earlier dispatches.
The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was designed at the time of its execution to establish a permanent principle of control over interoceanic communication in Central America. No provision was made, as in most treaties, for its abrogation, and the American government could not terminate it without the consent of Great Britain for fear that she would return to her position of vantage at the time the treaty was made. For this reason, while Mr. Frelinghuysen claimed that the treaty was voidable, he did not actually declare it void.
Mr. Blaine's efforts to secure a modification were the result of the development of a new policy by the United States and the arguments presented by Mr. Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen in support of this policy were disingenuous and flimsy. It may be safely said that no state papers have ever emanated from our government on so serious a question equally lacking in logical consistency and moral force.