Hence the firmarii of this corpus comitatus were from the first the firmarii (that is, the sheriffs) of Middlesex inclusive of London. This, similarly, is beyond dispute. As with the firma so with the sheriffs. Whether described as "of London," or "of Middlesex," or "of London and Middlesex," they are, from the first, the sheriffs of Middlesex inclusive of London.
This conclusion throws a new light on the charter by which Henry I. granted to the citizens of London Middlesex (i.e. Middlesex inclusive of London) at farm. Broadly speaking, the transaction in question may be regarded in this aspect. Instead of leasing the corpus comitatus to any one individual for a year, or for a term of years, the king leased it to the citizens as a body, leased it, moreover, in perpetuity, and at the low original firma of £300 a year. The change effected was simply that which was involved in placing the citizens, as a body, in the shoes of the Sheriff "of London and Middlesex."[1037]
The only distinction between this lease and one to a private individual lies in the corporate character of the lessee, and in the consequent provision for the election of a representative of that corporate body: "Ita quod ipsi cives ponent vicecomites qualem voluerint de seipsis."
It would seem that under the régime adopted by Henry I., the financial exactions of which a glimpse is afforded us in the solitary Pipe-Roll of his reign, included the leasing of the counties, etc. (i.e. of the financial rights of the Crown in them), at the highest rate possible. This was effected either by adding to the annual firma, a sum "de cremento," or by exacting from the firmarius, over and above his firma, a payment "de gersoma" for his lease. Where the lease was offered for open competition it would be worth the while of the would-be firmarius to offer a large payment "de gersoma" for his lease, if the firma was a low one. But if the firma was a high one, he would not offer much for his bargain. In the case of Oxfordshire we find the sheriff paying no less than four hundred marks "de gersoma, pro comitatu habendo."[1038] But in Berkshire the payment "de gersoma" would seem to have been considerably less.[1039] Sometimes the county (or group of counties) was leased for a specified term of years. Thus "Maenfininus" had taken a lease of Bucks. and Beds. for four years,[1040] for which, seemingly, he paid but a trifling sum "de gersoma," while William de Eynsford (Æinesford) paid a hundred marks for a five years' lease of Essex and Herts.[1041] Now, the fact that William de Eynsford was not an Essex but a Kentish landowner obviously suggests that in taking this lease he was actuated by speculative motives. It is, indeed, an admitted fact that the Norman gentry, in their greed for gain, were by no means above indulging in speculations of the kind. But when we make the interesting discovery that William de Eynsford, in this same reign, had acted as Sheriff of London,[1042] may we not infer that, there also, he had indulged in a similar speculation? That the shrievalty of London (i.e. London and Middlesex) was purchased by payments "de gersoma" is a matter, itself, not of inference, but of fact. Fulcred fitz Walter is debited in the Pipe-Rolls with a sum of "cxx marcas argenti de Gersoma pro Vicecomitatu Londoniæ."[1043]
The firmarius who had succeeded in obtaining a lease would have to recoup himself, of course, from his receipts the amount of the actual "firma" plus his payment "de gersoma," before he could derive for himself any profit whatever from the transaction. This implied that he had closely to shear the flock committed to his charge. If he was a mere speculator, unconnected with his sphere of operations, he would have no scruple in doing this, and would resort to every means of extortion. What those means were it is now difficult to tell, for, obscure as the financial system of the Norman period may be, it is clear that just as the rotulus exactorius recorded the amounts to which the king was entitled from the firmarii of the various counties, so these firmarii, in their turn, were entitled to sums of ostensibly fixed amount from the various constituents of their counties' "corpora." Domesday, however, while recording these sums, shows us, in many remarkable cases, a larger "redditus" being paid than that which was strictly due. The fact is that we are, and must be, to a great extent, in the dark as to the fixity of these ostensibly stereotyped payments. That the remarkable rise in the annual firmæ exacted from the towns which, Domesday shows us, had taken place since, and consequent on, the Conquest would seem to imply that these firmæ, under the loose régime of the old system, had been allowed to remain so long unaltered that they had become antiquated and unduly low. In any case the Conqueror raised them sharply, probably according to his estimate of the financial capacity of the town. And this step would, of course, involve a rise in the total of the firma exacted from the corpus comitatus. The precedent which his father had thus set was probably followed by Henry I., who appears to have exacted, systematically, the uttermost farthing. It was probably, however, to the oppressive use of the "placita" included in the "firma comitatus" that the sheriffs mainly trusted to increase their receipts.
But whatever may have been the means of extortion possessed by the sheriffs in the towns within their rule,[1044] and exercised by them to recoup themselves for the increased demands of the Crown, we know that such means there must have been, or it would not have been worth the while of the towns to offer considerable sums for the privilege of paying their firmæ to the Crown directly, instead of through the sheriffs.[1045]
I would now institute a comparison between the cases of Lincoln and of London. In both cases the city formed part of the corpus comitatus; in both, therefore, its firma was included in the total ferm of the shire. Lincoln was at this time one of the largest and wealthiest towns in the country. Its citizens evidently had reason to complain of the exactions of the sheriff of the shire. London, we infer, was in the same plight. Both cities were, accordingly, anxious to exclude the financial intervention of the sheriff between themselves and the Crown. How was this end to be attained? It was attained in two different ways varying with the circumstances of the two cases. London was considerably larger than Lincoln, and Middlesex infinitely smaller than Lincolnshire. Thus while the firma of Lincoln represented less than a fifth of the ferm of the shire,[1046] that of London would, of course, constitute the bulk of the ferm of Middlesex. Lincoln, therefore, would only seek to sever itself financially from the shire; London, on the contrary, would endeavour to exclude, still more effectually, the sheriff, by itself boldly stepping into the sheriff's shoes. The action of the citizens of Lincoln is revealed to us by the Roll of 1130:—
"Burgenses Lincolie reddunt compotum de cc marcis argenti et iiij marcis auri ut teneant ciuitatem de Rege in capite" (p. 114).
The same Roll is witness to that of the citizens of London:—
"Homines Londonie reddunt compotum de c marcis argenti ut habeant Vic[ecomitem?] ad electionem suam" (p. 148).