Eventually the 64th was driven back across the Rally Hill road, where a last stand was made in a large woods covering a broad ridge abutting on the road about three-fourths of a mile southeast of Spring Hill. While in these woods, occurred a bit of exciting personal experience. A bullet, coming from the right, passed through my overcoat, buttoned up to my chin, in a way to take along the top button of my blouse underneath the coat. That big brass button struck me a stinging blow on the point of the left collar-bone, and, clasping both hands to the spot, I commenced feeling for the hole with my finger tips, fully convinced that a bullet coming from the front had gone through me there and had inflicted a serious and possibly a mortal wound. It was not until I had opened the coat for a closer investigation that I found I was worse scared than hurt. Some of the enemy had secured a position on our right flank, where they opened an enfilading fire, and it was one of their bullets that had hit me. To get out of that fire the regiment fell back towards the interior of the woods, where it was so close to our main line that it was called in.
It was then about 3:30 o'clock, and by that time the situation of our army had become so critical that nothing short of the grossest blundering on the part of the enemy could save it from a great disaster, and there was a fine possibility for destroying it.
Wagner's division had so much property to protect that it was stretched out on a line extending from the railway station, nearly a mile northwest of Spring Hill, where two trains of cars were standing on the track, around by the north, east and south, to the Columbia pike on the southwest. Behind this long line the village streets and the adjacent fields were crammed with nearly everything on wheels belonging to our army—ambulances, artillery carriages and army wagons to the number of about 800 vehicles. The nearest support was Ruger's two brigades, eight miles away, and it was about an hour later before Ruger had started for Spring Hill. Opdycke's brigade was covering the railway station and the Franklin pike on the north, and Lane's brigade the Mount Carmel road on the east. They had a connected line, but it was so long that much of it consisted of skirmishers only. They had in their front detachments of Forrest's cavalry feeling along their line for an opening to get at the trains. Bradley's brigade occupied an advanced, detached position, on the ridge to the southeast that has been mentioned, to cover the approach by the Rally Hill road. There was a gap of half a mile between Lane's right in front of Spring Hill and Bradley's left, out on the ridge. Bradley had in his immediate front the main body of Forrest's three divisions of cavalry and the three divisions of infantry composing Cheatham's corps, while four more divisions of infantry were within easy supporting distance. In brief, ten of the twelve divisions, cavalry included, composing Hood's army, were in front of Spring Hill, and at 4 o'clock Hood was attacking with his infantry Wagner's lone division, guarding all our trains, while Schofield was still waiting for Hood at Duck river with four divisions from eight to twelve miles away. If Wagner's division had been wiped out, a very easy possibility for the overwhelming numbers confronting it while stretched out on a line about three miles long, without any breastworks, the rich prize of our ambulance train, six batteries of artillery, and all our wagons with their loads of supplies would have fallen into Hood's hands, and the retreat of the four divisions would have been squarely cut off, while having a short supply of artillery and no food or ammunition except what the men were carrying in their haversacks and cartridge boxes. The escape of our army from this deadly peril was largely due to the great skill with which General Stanley handled the situation at Spring Hill, but manifestly no amount of skill on the part of Stanley could have saved us, where the disadvantages were so great, if the enemy had improved with a very ordinary degree of vigor and intelligence the opportunity opened to them by Schofield's delusion as to Hood's intention. General Hood rode with the advance of his column until after it had crossed Rutherford's creek, two and one-half miles south of Spring Hill. It was then about 3 o'clock. There was no bridge, and his men had to wade the creek, which caused some delay. A short distance north of the crossing Hood met Forrest, and got his report of the situation at Spring Hill as he had developed it during the three hours preceding. He had met with resistance on so long a line that no doubt he greatly overestimated the force holding Spring Hill, and such an estimate would agree with the story told by the captured 64th men.
On the other hand, a courier had arrived with a report from Lee that Schofield's main body was still in his front at Duck river, and Lee's report was confirmed by the sounds of the heavy cannonading that had been coming from his direction. These reports disclosed that a part of Schofield's army was at Spring Hill and a part at Duck river, but they conflicted as to which position was held by his main body. In the uncertainty thus arising Hood decided, as his dispositions clearly show, that his first move must be to plant Cheatham's corps on the pike between those two parts. Developments would then determine his next move. Cleburne's division was the first to cross the creek, and marching up the road until his advance was close to the woods where Forrest's men were fighting with the 64th Ohio, Cleburne halted and formed his battle line along the road facing west towards the Columbia pike. If the intention had been to make a direct attack, his line would have formed facing north towards our line in the woods, where its position had been developed by Forrest. The intention unquestionably was for Cleburne, avoiding any encounter with our line in the woods, first to cross over to the pike and then change direction and advance on Spring Hill astride the pike, while Bate's division, following Cleburne's, received orders as reported by Bate, to cross to the pike and then sweep down the pike towards Columbia. Hood himself gave the orders to Cleburne and Bate, and then established his headquarters at the Thompson farm house, near by, about 500 yards west of the Rally Hill road, and nearly two miles south of Spring Hill, where he remained till next morning. To save time Cleburne started for the pike as soon as he was ready, and Bate, then forming on Cleburne's left, followed as soon as his formation was completed.
While Cleburne and Bate were moving out, General Cheatham was at the crossing hurrying over Brown's division. When Brown got over he could support either Cleburne or Bate, as developments might dictate. Uncandid statements have been made that Cheatham's divisions were moved around in a disjointed manner and without any plan. There was not only a logical plan but a successful plan, if it had been carried out, in the orders given to Cheatham's divisions. The other four divisions were halted south of Rutherford's creek, and fronted into line facing west towards the Columbia pike. This proves that it was then Hood's belief that Schofield's main body was still at Duck river. If it should march up the pike and attack Bate, the four divisions would be on its flank. If it should attempt to reach the fortifications at Murfreesboro by cutting across the country south of Spring Hill the four divisions would be in a position to intercept it.
General Bradley had four regiments in line in the woods on the ridge, with the left towards the Rally Hill road and the right trending away towards the pike. They faced in a southeasterly direction. To cover more ground there were short gaps between the regiments. The 65th Ohio was the right regiment of the four, and to the right rear of the 65th was a gap of a couple hundred yards extending out into cleared land, where the 42d Illinois was posted, refused as to the 65th and facing south to cover that flank. To the front, right and rear of the 42d was a broad expanse of rolling fields extending on the right to the pike, about 1,000 yards away, where two guns were posted to sweep the fields in front of the 42d with their fire. To the left of the 42d an extension of the woods ran out into the fields and concealed the 42d from Cleburne until he had advanced almost abreast of its position. When the 64th came off the skirmish line it was sent to the support of the 42d. The 36th Illinois, Opdycke's only reserve, was hurried across on double-quick from the other side of Spring Hill to support the two guns at the pike. As many guns of the reserve artillery as could be utilized were placed in battery around the southeasterly skirt of the village, looking towards Bradley's position. Bradley's men very hastily had constructed weak barricades of rails or anything else they could lay their hands on. The 42d had such protection as was afforded by a rail fence.
Shortly before 4 o'clock, having completed his formation, Cleburne started to march across to the pike. His division consisted of four brigades, but one was on detached duty, and he had three in line—Lowrey's on his right, then Govan's, then Granbury's. First crossing a field in his front, Lowrey entered the extension of the woods that has been mentioned, and on emerging on the other side his right came in view within easy range of the 42d, and that regiment opened an enfilading fire, Lowrey's line being then almost perpendicular to the line of the 42d. It was this accident of Lowrey's right passing within range of the 42d that led to the failure of Hood's plan, which, up to that minute, had been a great success. When the 42d opened fire the two guns at the pike also opened, their fire crossing that of the 42d, and the 64th, running forward and intermingling ranks with the 42d, poured in their fire. When our fire had thus developed our position, out in those wide fields they could see just what we had. They pulled down the rims of their old hats over their eyes, bent their heads to the storm of missiles pouring upon them, changed direction to their right on double-quick in a manner that excited our admiration, and a little later a long line came sweeping through the wide gap between the right of the 42d and the pike, and swinging in towards our rear. Our line stood firm, holding back the enemy in front until the flank movement had progressed so far as to make it a question of legs to escape capture when the regimental commanders gave the reluctant order to fall back. The contact was then so close that as the men on our right were running past the line closing in on them they were called on with loud oaths, charging them with a Yankee canine descent, to halt and surrender; and, not heeding the call, some of them were shot down with the muzzles of the muskets almost touching their bodies. By the recession of the two regiments on the flank the rear of the four regiments in the woods became exposed. They were attacked at the same time by Forrest in front, and by Cleburne on their right and rear, and were speedily dislodged. The attack was pressed with so much vigor that in a few minutes after the 42d had opened fire Bradley's entire brigade was in rapid retreat towards Spring Hill, with Cleburne in close pursuit, and pouring in a hot fire. In falling back we had to cross the valley of a small stream, and I never think of our strenuous exertions to get out of a destructive cross-fire, while running down the easy slope leading to the stream, without recalling the story of the officer who called to a soldier making the best time he could to get out of a hot fire: "Stop, my man! What are you running for?"
"Because I have no wings to fly with," called back the soldier over his shoulder while increasing his efforts to make better time.
As we descended into the valley we uncovered our pursuers to the fire of the battery at the village, which opened with shrapnel shells, firing over our heads. General Stanley, who was in the battery, reported that not less than eight guns opened fire. As soon as Cleburne encountered that fire he hastily drew back over the ridge, out of sight. All pursuit with its accompanying direct and cross-fire having thus ceased, Bradley's men stopped running and walked on back to the vicinity of the battery where a new line was formed without trouble or confusion. When coming down the slope towards the stream Major Coulter, whose horse had been killed, was running a few feet in front of me, and I was just speculating whether my short legs could keep up with his long ones, when he called back over his shoulder: "Rally at this fence," meaning a rail fence we were approaching. I had a poor opinion of the fence as a place to attempt a rally, for we would still be exposed to a cross-fire, but wishing to obey orders I made for the strongest looking fence corner in my front, and, jumping over and stopping behind it, looked around to see if any concerted effort would be made to reform behind the fence. In my brief halt there I had some opportunity to observe the effect of our artillery fire on the enemy. I saw by the smoke where a number of our shells exploded, and they all seemed too high in the air and too far to the rear, for I could not see any men knocked down by them. No doubt the fear of killing some of our own men caused our gunners to aim high, and it is probable that the noise made by so many guns and exploding shells had more to do with stopping the enemy than the execution that was done. Their after-actions showed that they believed Bradley's brigade to have been an outpost; that our main line was where the battery was posted, and that so much artillery must have a correspondingly strong infantry support.
General Bradley reported a loss of 198 men in his brigade, nearly all of it falling on the three regiments on the exposed flank, the other three regiments falling back with light loss because their position had become untenable. He was disabled with a wound, and Colonel Conrad, of the 15th Missouri, then assumed command of the brigade. By the casualties in the 65th Ohio the command of that regiment devolved upon the adjutant, Brewer Smith, a boy only 19 years old, and possibly the youngest officer to succeed to the command of a regiment throughout the war.