The Rector of St. Andrews, first commanded to speak his conscience, said, "I refer to the Superintendent of Fife, for I think we are both of one judgment; and yet, if ye will that I speak first, my conscience is this. If the Queen oppose herself to our religion, which is the only true religion, the Nobility and Estates of this realm, professors of the true doctrine, may justly oppose themselves to her. But, as concerning her own Mass, albeit I know it is idolatry, I am not yet resolved, whether or not we may take it from her by violence." The Superintendent of Fife said, "That is my conscience." So also affirmed some of the Nobility. But others voted frankly, and said that, as the Mass was an abomination, it was just and right that it should be suppressed; and that, in so doing, men did no more wrong to the Queen's Majesty than would they that should, by force, take from her a poisoned cup when she was going to drink it.
Mr John Craig's Judgment.
At last, Mr. John Craig, fellow-minister with John Knox in the Kirk of Edinburgh, was required to give his judgment and vote. "I will gladly show to your Honours what I understand," he said; "but I greatly doubt whether my knowledge and conscience shall satisfy you, seeing that ye have heard so many reasons, and are so little moved by them. But yet I shall not conceal from you my judgment, adhering first to the protestation of my brother that our voting prejudge not the liberty of the General Assembly. I was in the University of Bologna in the year of God 1554, and there, in the place of the Black Friars of the same town, I saw in the time of their General Assembly this conclusion set forth. This I heard reasoned, determined, and concluded:—'All rulers, be they supreme or be they inferior, may be and ought to be reformed or deposed by them by whom they are chosen, confirmed, or admitted to their office, as oft as they break that promise made by the oath to their subjects. Princes are no less bound by oath to the subjects, than are the subjects to their princes, and therefore ought to be kept and reformed equally, according to the law and condition of the oath that is made by either party.'
"This conclusion, my Lords, I heard sustained and concluded, as I have said, in a most notable auditory. The sustainer was a learned man, Monsieur Thomas de Finola, the Rector of the University, a man famous in that country. Magister Vincentius de Placentia affirmed the conclusion to be most true and certain, agreeable both with the law of God and man. The occasion of this disputation and conclusion was a certain disorder and tyranny attempted by the Pope's governors. These began to make innovations in the country against the laws formerly established, alleging themselves not to be subject to such laws, by reason that they were not institute[240] by the people, but by the Pope, who was king of that country. They claimed that they, having full commission and authority from the Pope, might alter and change statutes and ordinances of the country, without any consent of the people. Against this usurped tyranny, the learned and the people opposed themselves openly. When all reasons which the Pope's governors could allege were heard and confuted, the Pope himself was fain to take up the matter, and to promise, not only to keep the liberty of the people, but also that he should neither abrogate any law or statute, nor make any new law without their own consent. Therefore, my Lord, my vote and conscience is, that the princes are not only bound to keep laws and promises to their subjects, but also that, in case they fail, they may be justly deposed; for the bond betwixt the prince and the people is reciprocal."
Then started up a clawback of that corrupt Court, and said, "Ye wot not what ye say; for ye tell us what was done in Bologna; we are a kingdom, and they are but a commonwealth."
"My Lord," said he, "my judgment is, that every kingdom is or, at least, should be a commonwealth, albeit every commonwealth be not a kingdom; and, therefore, I think that, in a kingdom no less than in a commonwealth, diligence ought to be taken that laws be not violated. The tyranny of princes who continually reign in a kingdom is more hurtful to the subjects, than is the misgovernment of those that from year to year are changed in free commonwealths. But yet, my Lords, to assure you and all others further, that head was disputed to the uttermost; and then, in the end, it was concluded, that they spoke not of such things as were done in divers kingdoms and nations by tyranny and negligence of people. 'But we conclude,' said they, 'what ought to be done in all kingdoms and commonwealths, according to the law of God, and the just laws of man. And if, by the negligence of the people, or by the tyranny of princes, contrary laws have been made, yet may that same people, or their posterity, justly crave all things to be reformed, according to the original institution of kings and commonwealths; and such as will not do so, deserve to eat the fruit of their own foolishness.'"
Master James Macgill, then Clerk of Register, perceiving the votes to be different, and hearing the bold plainness of the foresaid servant of God, said, "I remember that this same question was long debated once before this in my house, and there, by reason that we were not all of one mind, it was concluded that Mr. Knox should, in all our names, write to Mr. Calvin for his judgment in the controversy."
"Nay," said Mr. Knox, "my Lord Secretary would not consent that I should write, alleging that the greatest weight of the answer stood in the narrative, and therefore promised that he would write, and I should see it. But when, at divers times, I required him to remember his promise, I found nothing but delay."
Thereto the Secretary did answer, "True it is, I promised to write, and true it is, that divers times Mr. Knox required me so to do. But, when I had more deeply considered the weight of the matter, I began to find more doubts than I did before, and this one amongst others, how durst I, being a subject, and the Queen's Majesty's Secretary, take upon me, without her own knowledge and consent, to seek resolution of controversies depending betwixt her Highness and her subjects." Then was there an acclamation of the clawbacks of the Court, as if Apollo had given his response. It was wisely and faithfully done.