[70] Fort Sullivan—near the centre of the present village of Athens, where the two rivers approach near each other. It was about one hundred yards square, with a strong block house at each angle, two opposite ones resting on the banks of the rivers, and the two others about midway between. The curtains were made by setting logs endwise in the ground, the whole being surrounded by a ditch, making a work of ample strength. Col. Shreve was left in command with a garrison of two hundred and fifty men beside the invalids, with two pieces of artillery.
[71] The order of march was arranged to form a hollow square, General Hand's Brigade in front; General Poor's on the right; General Maxwell's on the left; and General Clinton's in the rear. Within the square was Col. Proctor's artillery, and eight lines of led pack horses, and the beef cattle. On the right of General Poor was a flanking division, and flank guard, of two hundred and fifty men under Col. Dubois; and a like flanking division and guard, on the left of Maxwell, under command of Col. Ogden. A strong advance guard of light infantry covered the front.
[72] Encamped on the site of Old Chemung, burned Aug. 13th. See note 66.
[73] Encamped on the flats, near New Chemung, see note 66. The army passed a very difficult defile, known as the "Narrows" west of present Chemung; the artillery forded the river twice.
[74] Four towns were destroyed in the vicinity of the battle field, viz.:
1st. Newtown, an Indian village of about twenty houses, occupied in 1779, located on the left bank of the Chemung river about five miles below Elmira, and a mile above the fortified position between Baldwin's creek and the river. It gave the name to the battle fought near it Aug. 29, 1779.
2d. A small village north east of the battle field of Newtown on both sides of Baldwin's creek, of twenty to thirty houses which had never been occupied, and were supposed to have been built for storing the crops grown in the vicinity. This was located at the point where Gen. Poor commenced the ascent of the hill; and was destroyed by Clinton's brigade.
3d. A small village near the angle in the works of the enemy on Baldwin's creek, the timbers of which were used by them in the construction of the fortifications. One house in front of their works was occupied by the enemy as a block house during the engagement.
4th. "Monday, Aug. 30. * * * Went up the river about two miles, then took up a long branch of the river (which runs near S.W.) one mile, burnt five houses and destroyed all the corn in our way."—Beatty's Journal.
[75] The Battle of Newtown was fought on Sunday, Aug. 29, 1779, near the Indian village of the same name, on the left bank of the Chemung river six miles south east of Elmira. The enemy's force of British regulars, two battalions of Royal Greens, and Tories, were led by Colonel John Butler, with Captains Walter N. Butler and Macdonald as subordinates; the Indians by the great Mohawk Captain Thayendanegea, alias Joseph Brant, Butler being in chief command. The design of the enemy appears to have been primarily, an ambuscade. They had artfully concealed their works, and posted their forces in positions to attack simultaneously, both flanks, front, and rear; the position naturally strong, was admirably adapted to their purposes. From Elmira, extending south easterly for several miles, is a mountainous ridge, running parallel with the river, something over six hundred feet in height near the Indian village, but gradually melting away to the level of the plain where it terminates about a mile below; on this south eastern slope was the battle of Newtown. To the north and east of this ridge is a similar one, which also terminates near the battle field, and between them is a considerable stream, which, running nearly parallel with the river in its general course, enters the Chemung a mile and a quarter below. The river here sweeps around in a graceful curve, making a full semi-circle, enclosing several hundred acres of rich bottom lands, on which were the Indian cornfields; the Wellsburg north and south road dividing it into two nearly equal parts. Rising abruptly from this plain is a sharp, narrow ridge, known locally as the Hog Back, this extends from the river across the plain nearly to the creek, a distance of about a third of a mile. The crest of this ridge was occupied by the enemy in force, protected by rude log breast works and rifle pits, which extended to the eastern extremity, and from thence turning north, connected with the steep banks of the creek above. The lines to be defended were these two sides of a triangle, their right resting on the river, their left on the mountain, the path of the army passing between the two lines, along which was also the enemy's line of retreat. From the angle in the works a thin line extended to the mountain, on which was a body of the enemy and also another small body on the mountain to the east. The results at Chemung a few days previous, led the enemy to hope that a like blunder might be repeated, and that Wyoming and Minnisinks were to be re-enacted. Presuming that the army, after crossing the creek, would follow the Indian trail without discovering their works, they flattered themselves that an unexpected fire on the exposed flanks would create great confusion, which if augmented by simultaneous attacks in front and rear by the forces in that quarter, might result in a panic, and a possible stampede of the pack horses and cattle, which would be quite as disastrous as the defeat of the army. But three companies of Morgan's riflemen, the pride of Washington, were in the advance; these veterans of a hundred battles were in no way inferior to the enemy in Indian craft; the works and position of the enemy were discovered when afar off, and this ingenious device of drawing our forces into an ambuscade was frustrated. The ambuscade failing, the alternative was presented of forcing a direct attack in front, under great disadvantage, or of a flanking movement, over very difficult ground, where nearly the entire force of the enemy could be brought to bear on the attacking force at any point on interior lines, possibly in time to repulse one division of the army before the other could come to its relief. The attack in front was invited by repeated sorties of a body of about four hundred of the enemy, who would deliver their fire, and immediately retreat to their works. After three hours of skirmishing, deliberation, and reconnoitering, General Sullivan determined to divide his force, turn the enemy's left, and attack simultaneously in front and flank.