Caesar Borgia: A Study of the Renaissance

by John Leslie Garner

He was held in the Castle of St. Angelo almost a year, and under date of June 9, 1502, Burchard has the following entry in his diary:—

“This day there was recovered from the Tiber, strangled and dead, the Lord of Faenza—a young man of about eighteen years, so fair, and handsome of form that among a thousand scarcely could his equal be found. A great stone was tied to his neck.”

The same day the river gave up the bodies of several other persons, among them two young men, one fifteen, the other twenty-five, both bound, and also a woman.

Vettori states that Manfredi perished at the hands of Bianchino di Pisa by order of Caesar, who was in Rome at the time. Manfredi was in the power and possession of the Borgia at the time of his death; consequently, whoever actually performed the murder, Alexander VI. and Caesar Borgia were responsible for it.

The murder of the Lord of Faenza shocked all Italy, and served to strengthen the suspicion that Valentino had caused the assassination of his brother, the Duke of Gandia, and also of his brother-in-law, Alfonso, Prince of Bisceglia.

Caesar’s motive is perfectly clear; he was determined to rule in Romagna. Manfredi was magnetic and brave, and skilful in war. His subjects had fought valiantly to save him, and were broken-hearted at his departure. Of all the petty sovereigns of Italy, he was almost the only one who enjoyed the love of his people, who continued loyal to him and looked forward to his return. In addition, his powerful kinsmen, the Este of Ferrara and the Bentivoglio of Bologna, might take it into their heads any day to restore him to power. Manfredi dead, Caesar’s progress would be easier and more certain. In spite of Valentino’s able administration of the government of Faenza, he had utterly failed to secure the goodwill of the people. Faenza was the least certain of his conquered territories. Before setting out to attack Camerino and Urbino it was, according to Caesar, the part of wisdom to eliminate Astorre from the desperate game which the virtuosi of renascent Italy were playing.

This deliberate planning of the destruction of a prince or a reigning family, for the sole purpose of securing possession of their property or power, seems peculiarly monstrous.

Caesar Borgia, aided by his father, Alexander VI., was building up a great power in central Italy for himself and his family, of which he clearly regarded himself as the head. Politics, parties, and dynasties, although apparently of vital importance to a people, are now really of slight moment, and it is only when the headstrong exercise of power leads to oppression that a people revolts. In the Far East the people are wholly indifferent to a change of rulers, consequently conquests in Asia are as easy as they are fruitless; the people pursue the even tenor of their way regardless of who their masters are, except so far as their economic situation is concerned—and the people of Italy during the Renaissance resembled them in this particular. We have seen how ready the cities of the Romagna were to open their gates to Caesar Borgia, and the same phenomenon has been noted elsewhere in the peninsula. In Naples whether France or Spain prevailed was of no importance. In Milan the people were equally indifferent to Ludovico il Moro and to Louis XII., and in Florence not until the greed of the Medici passed all bounds did the people drive them out. With advancing civilisation party lines vanish; one party usurps the principles of another, and modifies them sufficiently to cause them to appear to accord, or be identical, with its own doctrines; and just in proportion as party lines disappear the one enduring relation which has existed from all time, the relation of exploiter and exploited, stands forth more clearly—in fine, the whole organisation of civilised society is reducible to the hedonic postulate.

Caesar had collected an army in the neighbourhood of Spoleto, and thither he went June 12, 1502. His forces consisted of about 10,000 men—6,000 foot-soldiers, and 700 men-at-arms; in addition he had about 2,000 men conveniently placed in Romagna. Large bodies of troops were likewise held in reserve about Sinigaglia, Urbino, and Verruchio. Valentino had issued an order requiring every family in Romagna to furnish one man-at-arms. Resorting to cunning, he then announced that he intended to attack Camerino, and he went to the Duke of Urbino and asked for his artillery for his lieutenant, Vitelli; he also requested him to send supplies to Gubbio, assuring Montefeltre the while that “among all the princes of Italy there is none more dear to me than you are.” While he was advancing by way of Nocera and Costaciaro, he dispatched 2,000 men to secure Cagli, which they entered June 20th without resistance. There was nothing left for the Duke of Urbino’s representative to do but to warn his master of the advance of Valentino, “who will appear as an enemy before the gates of Urbino on the morrow.”

The Duke of Urbino was so confident that Caesar had no designs on his domain that he had gone to one of his suburban villas for a brief sojourn, and he was still there when his representative at Fossombrone informed him of the advance of a large force by way of Isola di Fano. Montefeltre, learning that the roads leading to the fortress of San Leo, which was regarded as impregnable, were already in Caesar’s possession, determined to flee to Florence. With him he had only a few servants and soldiers, whom he soon dismissed, and disguising himself as a peasant, he fled to Mantua, where he arrived about the end of the month.