Hannibal marches to the Adriatic.
Pyrrhus would have marched direct upon Rome, but Hannibal was more far-sighted. His army needed a new organization, and rest, and recruits, so he marched unexpectedly through Umbria, devastated the country, and halted on the shores of the Adriatic. Here he rested, reorganized his Libyan cavalry, and resumed his communication with Carthage. He then broke up his camp, and marched into Southern Italy, hoping to break up the confederacy. But not a single Italian town entered into alliance with the Carthaginians.
Fabius. Efforts of the Romans.
Fabius, the dictator, a man of great prudence, advanced in years, and a tactitian of the old Roman school, determined to avoid a pitched battle, and starve or weary out his enemy. Hannibal adjusted his plans in accordance with the character of the man he opposed. So he passed the Roman army, crossed the Appenines, took Telesia, and turned against Capua, the most important of all the Italian dependent cities, hoping for a revolt among the Campanian towns. Here again he was disappointed. So, retracing his steps, he took the road to Apulia, the dictator following [pg 445] him along the heights. So the summer was consumed by marchings and counter-marchings, the lands of the Hispanians, Campamans, Samnites, Pælignians, and other provinces, being successively devastated. But no important battle was fought. He selected then the rich lands of Apulia for winter quarters, and intrenched his camp at Gerenium. The Romans formed a camp in the territory of the Larinates, and harassed the enemy's foragers. This defensive policy of Fabius wounded the Roman pride, and the dictator became unpopular. The Senate resolved to depart from a policy which was slowly but surely ruining the State, and an army was equipped larger than Rome ever before sent into the field, composed of eight legions, under the command of the two consuls, L. Æmilius Paulus, and M. Terentius Varro. The former, a patrician, had conducted successfully the Illyrian war; the latter, the popular candidate, incapable, conceited, and presumptuous.
Battle of Cannæ. Its great consequences. Varro.
As soon as the season allowed him to leave his winter-quarters, Hannibal, assuming the offensive, marched out of Gerenium, passed Luceria, crossed the Aufidus, and took the citadel of Cannæ, which commanded the plain of Canusium. The Roman consuls arrived in Apulia in the beginning of the summer, with eighty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry. Hannibal's force was forty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, inured to regular warfare. The Romans made up their minds to fight, and confronted the Carthaginians on the right bank of the Aufidus. According to a foolish custom, the command devolved on one of the consuls every other day, and Varro determined to avail himself of the first opportunity for a battle. The forces met on the plain west of Cannæ, more favorable to the Carthaginians than the Romans, on account of the superiority of the cavalry. It is difficult, without a long description, to give clear conceptions of this famous battle. Hannibal, it would seem, like Epaminondas and Alexander, brought to bear his heavy cavalry, under Hasdrubal, upon the weakest point of the enemy, after the conflict had continued awhile without [pg 446] decisive results. The weaker right of the Roman army, led by Paulus, after bravely fighting, were cut down and driven across the river. Paulus, wounded, then rode to the centre, composed of infantry in close lines, which had gained an advantage over the Spanish and Gaulish troops that encountered them. In order to follow up this advantage, the legions pressed forward in the form of a wedge. In this position the Libyan infantry, wheeling upon them right and left, warmly assailed both sides of the Roman infantry, which checked its advance. By this double flank attack the Roman infantry became crowded, and were not free. Meanwhile, Hasdrubal, after defeating the right wing, which had been led by Paulus, led his cavalry behind the Roman centre and attacked the left wing, led by Varro. The cavalry of Varro, opposed by the Numidian cavalry, was in no condition to meet this double attack, and was scattered. Hasdrubal again rallied his cavalry, and led it to the rear of the Roman centre, already in close fight with the Spanish and Gaulish infantry. This last charge decided the battle. Flight was impossible, for the river was in the rear, and in front was a victorious enemy. No quarter was given. Seventy thousand Romans were slain, including the consul Paulus and eighty men of senatorial rank. Varro was saved by the speed of his horse. The Carthaginians lost not quite six thousand.
Revolt of allies.
This immense disaster was the signal for the revolt of the allies, which Hannibal before in vain had sought to procure. Capua opened her gates to the conqueror. Nearly all the people of Southern Italy rose against Rome. But the Greek cities of the coast were held by Roman garrisons, as well as the fortresses in Apulia, Campania, and Samnium. The news of the battle of Cannæ, B.C. 216, induced the Macedonian king to promise aid to Hannibal. The death of Hiero at Syracuse made Sicily an enemy to Rome, while Carthage, now elated, sent considerable re-enforcements.
Wisdom of Hannibal.
Many critics have expressed surprise that Hannibal, after [pg 447] this great victory, did not at once march upon Rome. Had he conquered, as Alexander did, a Persian, Oriental, effeminate people, this might have been his true policy. But Rome was still capable of a strong defense, and would not have succumbed under any pressure of adverse circumstances, and she also was still strong in allies. And more, Hannibal had not perfected his political combinations. He was not ready to strike the final blow. He had to keep his eye on Macedonia, Africa, Sicily, and Spain. Alexander did not march to Babylon, until he had subdued Phœnicia and Egypt. Even the capture of Rome would not prevent a long war with the States of Italy.