At last Rome declared war, B.C. 149—the wickedest war in which she ever engaged—and Cato had the satisfaction of seeing, at the age of eighty-five, his policy indorsed against every principle of justice and honor. A Roman army landed in Africa unopposed, and the Carthaginians were weak enough to surrender, not only three hundred hostages from the noblest families, but the arms already enumerated. Nothing but infatuation can account for this miserable concession of weakness to strength, all from a blind confidence in the tender mercies of an unpitying and unscrupulous foe. Then, when the city was defenseless, the hostages in the hands of the Romans, and they almost at the gates, it was coolly announced that it was the will of the Senate that the city should be destroyed.
Despair of the Carthaginians.
Too late, the doomed city prepared to make a last stand against an inexorable enemy. The most violent feelings of hatred and rage, added to those of despair, at last animated the people of Carthage. It was the same passion which arrayed Tyre against Alexander, and Jerusalem against Titus. It was a wild patriotic frenzy which knew no bounds, inspired by the instinct of self-preservation, and aside from all calculation of success or failure. As the fall of the city was inevitable, wisdom might have counseled an unreserved submission. Resistance should have been thought of before. In fact, Carthage should not have yielded to the first Africanus. And when she had again become rich and populous, she should have defied the Romans when their spirit was perceived—should have made a more gallant defense against Masinissa, and concentrated all her energies for a last stand upon her own territories. But why should we thus speculate? The doom of Carthage had been pronounced by the decrees of fate. The fall has all the mystery and solemnity of a providential event, like the fall of all empires, like the defeat of Darius by Alexander, [pg 467] like the ruin of Jerusalem, like the melting away of North American Indians, like the final overthrow of the “Eternal City” itself.
The city makes desperate efforts. Hasdrubal.
The desperation of the city in her last conflict proves, however, that, with proper foresight and patriotism, her fall might have been delayed, for it took the Romans three years to subdue her. The disarmed city withstood the attack of the Romans for a period five times as long as it required Vespasian and Titus to capture Jerusalem. The city resounded day and night with the labors of men and women on arms and catapults. One hundred and forty shields, three hundred swords, five hundred spears, and one thousand missiles were manufactured daily, and even a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships was built during the siege. The land side of the city was protected by a triple wall, and the rocks of Cape Camast and Cape Carthage sheltered it from all attacks by sea, except one side protected by fortified harbors and quays. Hasdrubal, with the remnant of his army, was still in the field, and took up his station at Nephesis, on the opposite side of the lake of Tunis, to harass the besiegers. Masinissa died at the age of ninety, soon after hostilities began.
Failure of the Romans.
The first attack on Carthage was a failure, and the army of the Consuls Censorinus and Manius Manilius would have been cut to pieces, had it not been for the the reserve led by Scipio Æmilianus, a grandson of Africanus, who was then serving as military tribune. He also performed many gallant actions when Censorinus retired to Rome, leaving the army in the hands of his incompetent colleague.
Rome disgusted.
The second campaign was equally unsuccessful, under L. Calpurnius Fiso and L. Mancinus. The slow progress of the war excited astonishment throughout the world. The suspense of the campaign was intolerable to the proud spirit of the Romans, who had never dreamed of such resistance. The eyes of the Romans were then turned [pg 468] to the young hero who alone had thus far distinguished himself. Although he had not reached the proper age, he was chosen consul, and the province of Africa was assigned to him. He sailed with his friends Polybius and Lælius. He was by no means equal to the elder Scipio, although he was an able general and an accomplished man. He was ostentatious, envious, and proud, and had cultivation rather than genius.
Mistake of Mancinus.