It was plain that the world could not have two absolute [pg 535] masters, for both Pompey and Cæsar aspired to universal sovereignty. One must succumb to the other—be either anvil or hammer. Neither would have been safe without their unities and their armed followers. And if both were destroyed, the State would still be convulsed with factions. All true constitutional liberty was at an end, for both generals and demagogues could get such laws passed as they pleased, with sufficient money to bribe those who controlled the elections. It was a time of universal corruption and venality. Money was the mainspring of society. Public virtue had passed away,—all elevated sentiment,—all patriotism,—all self-sacrifice. The people cared but little who ruled, if they were supplied with corn and wine at nominal prices. Patrician nobles had become demagogues, and demagogues had power in proportion to their ability or inclination to please the people. Cicero despaired of the State, and devoted himself to literature. There yet remained the aristocratic party, which had wealth and prestige and power, and the popular party, which aimed to take these privileges away, but which was ruled by demagogues more unprincipled than the old nobility. Pompey represented the one, and Cæsar the other, though both were nobles.
Both these generals had rendered great services. Pompey had subdued the East, and Cæsar the West. Pompey had more prestige, Cæsar more genius. Pompey was a greater tactician, Cæsar a greater strategist. Pompey was proud, pompous, jealous, patronizing, self-sufficient, disdainful. Cæsar was politic, intriguing, patient, lavish, unenvious, easily approached, forgiving, with great urbanity and most genial manners. Both were ambitious, unscrupulous, and selfish. Cicero distrusted both, flattered each by turns, but inclined to the side of Pompey as more conservative, and less dangerous. The Senate took the side of Pompey, the people that of Cæsar. Both Cæsar and Pompey had enjoyed power so long, that neither would have been contented with private life.
The Senate demands the abdication of Cæsar. Cæsar seeks a compromise. Rejected by Pompey. Cæsar pursues Pompey.
In the year B.C. 49, Cæsar's proconsular imperium was to terminate one year after the close of the Gallic war. He wished to be re-elected consul, and also secure his triumph. But he could not, according to law, have the triumph without disbanding the army, and without an army he would not be safe at Rome, with so many enemies. Neither could he be elected consul, according to the forms, while he enjoyed his imperium, for it had long been the custom that no one could sue for the consulship at the head of an army. He, therefore, could neither be consul nor enjoy a triumph, legitimately, without disbanding his army. Moreover, the party of Pompey, being then in the ascendant at Rome, demanded that Cæsar should lay down his imperium. The tribunes, in the interests of Cæsar, opposed the decree of the Senate; the reigning consuls threatened the tribunes, and they fled to Cæsar's camp in Cisalpine Gaul. It should, however, be mentioned, that when the consul Marcellus, an enemy of Cæsar, proposed in the Senate that he should lay down his command, Curio, the tribune, whose debts Cæsar had paid, moved that Pompey should do the same; which he refused to do, since the election of Cæsar to the consulship would place the whole power of the republic in his hands. Cæsar made a last effort to avoid the inevitable war, by proposing to the Senate to lay down his command, if Pompey would also; but Pompey prevaricated, and the compromise came to nothing. Both generals distrusted each other, and both were disloyal to the State. The Senate then appointed a successor to Cæsar in Gaul, ordered a general levy of troops throughout Italy, and voted money and men to Pompey. Cæsar had already crossed the Rubicon, which was high treason, before his last proposal to compromise, and he was on his way to Rome. No one resisted him, for the people had but little interest in the success of either party. Pompey, exaggerating his popularity, thought he had only to stamp the ground, and an army would appear, and when he discovered that his rival was advancing on the Flaminican way, [pg 537] fled hastily from Rome with most of the senators, and went to Brundusium. Cæsar did not at once seize the capital, but followed Pompey, and so vigorously attacked him, that he quit the town and crossed over to Illyricum. Cæsar had no troops to pursue him, and therefore retraced his steps, and entered Rome, after an absence of ten years, at the head of a victorious army, undisputed master of Italy.
Cæsar in Spain.
But Pompey still controlled his proconsular province of Spain, where seven legions were under his lieutenants, and Africa also was occupied by his party. Cæsar, after arranging the affairs of Italy, marched through Gaul into Spain to fight the generals of Pompey. That campaign was ended in forty days, and he became master of Spain. While in Spain he was elected to his second consulship, and also made dictator. He returned to Rome as rapidly as he had marched into Spain, and enacted some wholesome laws, among others that by which the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul, the northern part of Italy, obtained citizenship. After settling the general affairs of Italy, he laid down the dictatorship, and went, to Brundusium, and collected his forces from various parts for a decisive conflict with Pompey, who had remained, meanwhile, in Macedonia, organizing his army. He collected nine legions, with auxiliary forces, while his fleet commanded the sea. He also secured vast magazines of corn in Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, and Cyrene.
Military preparations.
Cæsar was able to cross the sea with scarcely more than fifteen thousand men, on account of the insufficiency of his fleet, and he was thrown upon a hostile shore, cut off from supplies, and in presence of a vastly superior force. But his troops were veterans, and his cause was strengthened by the capture of Apollonia. He then advanced north to seize Dyrhachiuim, where Pompey's stores were deposited, but Pompey reached the town before him, and both armies encamped on the banks of the river Apsus, the one on the left and the other on the right bank. There Cæsar was joined by the remainder of his troops, brought over with [pg 538] great difficulty from Brundusium by Marcus Antonius, his most able lieutenant and devoted friend. Pompey was also re-enforced by two legions from Syria, led by his father-in-law, Scipio. Both parties abstained from attacking each other while these re-enforcements were being brought forward, and Cæsar even made a last effort at compromise, while the troops on each side exchanged mutual courtesies.
Battle of Dyrhachium. Battle of Pharsalia.
Pompey avoided a pitched battle, and intrenched himself on a hill near Dyrhachium. Cæsar surrounded him with lines of circumvallation. Pompey broke through them, and compelled Cæsar to retire, with considerable loss. He retreated to Thessaly, followed by Pompey, who, had he known how to pursue his advantage, might, after this last success—the last he ever had—have defeated Cæsar. He had wisely avoided a pitched battle until his troops should become inured to service, or until he should wear out his adversary; but now, puffed up with victory and self-confidence, and unduly influenced by his officers, he concluded to risk a battle. Cæsar was encamped on the plain of Pharsalia, and Pompey on a hill about four miles distant. The steep bank of the river Enipeus covered the right of Pompey's line and the left of Cæsar's. The infantry of the former numbered forty-five thousand; that of the latter, twenty-two thousand, but they were veterans. Pompey was also superior in cavalry, having seven thousand, while Cæsar had only one thousand. With these, which formed the strength of Pompey's force, he proposed to outflank the right of Cæsar, extended on the plain. To guard against this movement, Cæsar withdrew six cohorts from his third line, and formed them into a fourth in the rear of his cavalry on the right. The battle commenced by a furious assault on the lines of Pompey by Cæsar's veterans, who were received with courage. Meanwhile Pompey's cavalry swept away that of Cæsar, and was advancing to attack the rear, when they received, unexpectedly, the charge of the cohorts which Cæsar had posted there, The cavalry broke, and fled to the mountains. The six cohorts then turned upon the slingers [pg 539] and archers, who had covered the attack of the cavalry, defeated them, and fell upon the rear of Pompey's left. Cæsar then brought up his third line, and decided the battle. Pompey had fled when he saw the defeat of his cavalry. His camp was taken and sacked, and his troops, so confident of victory, were scattered, surrounded, and taken prisoners. Cæsar, with his usual clemency, spared their lives, nor had he any object to destroy them. Among those who surrendered after this decisive battle was Junius Brutus, who was not only pardoned, but admitted to the closest friendship.