MOTLEY'S HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS, PG EDITION, VOLUME 14.
THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC
By JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY
ALVA
CHAPTER I. Part III 1567
Continued dissensions in the Spanish cabinet—Ruy Gomez and Alva—
Conquest of the Netherlands entrusted to the Duke—Birth, previous
career and character of Alva—Organization of the invading army—
Its march to the provinces—Complaints of Duchess Margaret—Alva
receives deputations on the frontier—Interview between the Duke and
Egmont—Reception of Alva by the Duchess of Parma—Circular letters
to the cities requiring their acceptance of garrisons—Margaret's
secret correspondence—Universal apprehension—Keys of the great
cities demanded by Alva—Secret plans of the government, arranged
before the Duke's departure—Arrest of Orange, Egmont, Horn, and
others, determined upon—Stealthy course of the government towards
them—Infatuation of Egmont—Warnings addressed to him by De Billy
and others—Measures to entrap Count Horn—Banquet of the Grand
Prior—The Grand Prior's warning to Egmont—Evil counsels of
Noircarmes—Arrests of Egmont, Horn, Bakkerzeel and Straalen—
Popular consternation—Petulant conduct of Duchess Margaret—
Characteristic comments of Granvelle—His secret machinations and
disclaimers—Berghen and Montigny—Last moments of Marquis Berghen—
Perfidy of Ruy Gomez—Establishment of the "Blood-Council"—Its
leading features—Insidious behavior of Viglius—Secret
correspondence, concerning the President, between Philip and Alva—
Members of the "Blood-Council"—Portraits of Vargas and Hessels—
Mode of proceeding adopted by the council—Wholesale executions—
Despair in the provinces—The resignation of Duchess Margaret
accepted—Her departure from the Netherlands—Renewed civil war in
France—Death of Montmorency—Auxiliary troops sent by Alva to
France—Erection of Antwerp citadel—Description of the citadel.
The armed invasion of the Netherlands was the necessary consequence of all which had gone before. That the inevitable result had been so long deferred lay rather in the incomprehensible tardiness of Philip's character than in the circumstances of the case. Never did a monarch hold so steadfastly to a deadly purpose, or proceed so languidly and with so much circumvolution to his goal. The mask of benignity, of possible clemency, was now thrown off, but the delusion of his intended visit to the provinces was still maintained. He assured the Regent that he should be governed by her advice, and as she had made all needful preparations to receive him in Zeland, that it would be in Zeland he should arrive.
The same two men among Philip's advisers were prominent as at an earlier day—the Prince of Eboli and the Duke of Alva. They still represented entirely opposite ideas, and in character, temper, and history, each was the reverse of the other. The policy of the Prince was pacific and temporizing; that of the Duke uncompromising and ferocious. Ruy Gomez was disposed to prevent, if possible, the armed mission of Alva, and he now openly counselled the King to fulfil his long-deferred promise, and to make his appearance in person before his rebellious subjects. The jealousy and hatred which existed between the Prince and the Duke—between the man of peace and the man of wrath—were constantly exploding, even in the presence of the King. The wrangling in the council was incessant. Determined, if possible; to prevent the elevation of his rival, the favorite was even for a moment disposed to ask for the command of the army himself. There was something ludicrous in the notion, that a man whose life had been pacific, and who trembled at the noise of arms, should seek to supersede the terrible Alva, of whom his eulogists asserted, with, Castilian exaggeration, that the very name of fear inspired him with horror. But there was a limit beyond which the influence of Anna de Mendoza and her husband did not extend. Philip was not to be driven to the Netherlands against his will, nor to be prevented from assigning the command of the army to the most appropriate man in Europe for his purpose.