28Tó-tuñg.

29I never witnessed a peacemaking and I never had a chance to assist at one of the referred combats of the Banuáon people, mentioned above.

CHAPTER XIX

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; CUSTOMARY, PROPRIETARY, AND LIABILITY LAWS

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Bisáyas and other people who have had more or less familiar dealings with Manóbos almost invariably make the statement that Manóbo justice is the oppression of the weak by the strong; that there is no customary law that governs in social dealings except that one which is founded on the caprice and villainy of the warrior chiefs and of those who have most influence and following. Now I utterly repudiate such statements and rumors as being due either to lack of familiarity; to a too ready tendency to believe malicious reports; or to undisguised ill will toward, and contempt of, Manóbos. I have lived on familiar terms with these primitive people for a considerable period and have found no evidence of oppression and tyranny. Disputes and misunderstandings arise at times, people sometimes fly into a rage, killings take place on occasions, but such things happen among other peoples. It is truly surprising, considering the lack of tribal and interclan cohesion in Manóboland, that such occurrences are not more frequent or even continual. The statement that the warriors and other influential men rule by caprice and oppression is unfounded. There is no coercion in Manóboland, except such as arises from the influence of relatives, and from gentle persuasion and general consent. A warrior chief, or any other man who would try to use a despotic hand or even to be insolent, exacting, or unrelenting in his manner, would not only lose his friends and his influence, but would arouse hostility and place himself and his relatives in jeopardy.

It must be understood from the outset that in Manóboland there is no constituted judicial authority nor any definite system of laws. There are no courts, and no punishments such as imprisonment, torturing, and whipping. All social dealings by which one contracts an obligation to another are regulated by the principle that one and all must act according to established custom. This principle governs the procedure even of chiefs and influential men when they endeavor to bring about a settlement through the weight of their influence.

Voluntary and involuntary departures from the beaten track cause disputes when these deviations affect another's rights. Thus to refuse one the hospitality of the house, or to overlook him intentionally in the distribution of betel nut would give rise to a dispute, because these courtesies are customary and are therefore obligatory.

Punishment for a violation of customary obligation then becomes a matter of private justice. The injured one either singly, or by means of his relatives and of such friends as he may interest in his cause, seeks reparation from the offender. If he can not secure it through an appeal to customary law supported by the consensus of opinion of the relatives on each side, he takes justice into his own hands and kills his opponent or orders him to be killed.