[3] As if an unqualified refusal to forward these Memorials was not adequate to produce this dangerous effect, the names of all the officers who had signed the first Memorial were placed on a proscribed list, and deemed ineligible to any promotion in commands or staff situations. One fact will show the impression that this act made upon the most moderate. I wrote to Colonel Aldwell Taylor, an officer of high rank and respectability, expressing my earnest desire to see him placed in a command in which I thought his principles and character would be useful to Government. In his answer, which is dated the 29th of July, he details the causes of his being in a situation of actual retirement. When he had applied for a command to which his services gave him a right to aspire, he observes, that he was informed of the crime by which he had not only forfeited all hope of that particular station, but also (he adds), "that for having affixed my signature to a respectful address to my superiors and employers, I was placed at the head of a list of names comprising nearly two thirds of the army, and thereby marked by the extreme displeasure of Government, and thence deprived of every future hope of situations of honour and emolument. Whilst smarting under these most serious injuries, I felt it impossible to resume the command of Masulipatam, and made application to retire." This case is more marked than others of the same kind, because there can be little, if any doubt, the violent mutiny that took place at Masulipatam would never have occurred, if Colonel Taylor had remained in command of that garrison. The nature of this unavowed punishment (for though there is, I imagine, no doubt such a resolution was passed by Government, it was never published in any order,) is very peculiar; but it is very characteristic of the system of measures pursued. It was teasing and aggravating in its operation, without efficiency in its end.
[4] Vide the preceding note.
[5] Vide Mr. Pigott's Opinion, printed with the Memorial of Major Boles.
[6] This crude and violent address was never transmitted to the Governor General. The crime laid to the charge of the officers here mentioned, was being implicated in framing it and in promoting its circulation.
[7] There may be some rare exceptions to this rule, which apply to secret confederacies against a state, where the object is to deprive an individual of power, more than to punish as an example. This consideration could, on the 1st of May, have hardly applied even as a fair pretext to any one individual of the many that were punished.
[8] In this officer's case there was no impropriety or disrespect in the letter, that could have aggravated the offence; and the motive which made him state what he had done, was assuredly honourable.
[9] It is, of course, meant the most moderate among those who were at all discontented.
[10] I heard this plan mentioned by an officer high on the staff, the day before I sailed for Masulipatam, and protested against its principle, as directly contrary to that on which I had been desired to act, and indeed to every effort of conciliation. The Governor, to whom I immediately stated this fact, appeared to me to accord in my opinion; but, a few days after my departure, he was induced to adopt this measure, and to provoke disobedience to authority.
[11] The following are the sentiments of Colonel Close upon this subject, as expressed in his letter to Major Barclay under date the 24th of July, 1809, and published in the correspondence laid before the House of Commons:
"It is generally admitted as a sound maxim, not to hazard the giving of an order unless there be a fair ground of presumption that it will be obeyed. From the apparent circumstances of the time, the orders sent to Masulipatam were perhaps fairly hazarded; but, after those orders had been disobeyed, to send orders to Hyderabad for the march of a battalion, might have been regarded as a measure in some degree exceptionable. The officers, who have opposed the orders sent for the purpose, are now more forcibly tied together than before. The extreme of their proceedings is increased, and their danger and fear seriously heightened. Their impulse to act is become more violent; and accordingly the loss to the public cause must be in proportion to all these augmentations. But this is not all. If the measure of moving the battalion was meant to be useful, in having an experimental effect, Hyderabad was assuredly the very place at which the experiment should not have been made; confusion could not be so hurtful any where else."