Observations on the Disturbances in the Madras Army in 1809

by John Malcolm

7th July. I went early into the Fort. From conversations I had with several officers, I found that I had succeeded in my efforts to restore the temper of the garrison; that they felt grateful for the moderation which I had shown; and some were sorry they had been so warm in their expressions at their first interview. I saw this day a communication from Hyderabad, and one from Jaulnah; both of which forces were prepared to support the garrison in the event of their acting in opposition to Government.

8th July. Nothing particular occurred this day. Some further communications from the westward were shown to me; one of which strongly recommended Masulipatam being kept, and not abandoned; and a force of two battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry were promised to support the garrison, and the corps of the district, all of whom they appeared to think would join. I entered at great length this day into the whole subject with M. H., who, I knew, was in intimate communication with all the senior officers, and had some influence even with the junior. I pointed out to this officer what must be the consequence of the whole or any part of the Company's army plunging down that precipice, on the brink of which they were now standing. I exposed the falseness of that confidence on which numbers were proceeding; how they would be deserted by their brethren and their men, when Government was compelled to declare them in rebellion. I pointed out how wretched their means, how unconnected their plans; and demanded, if even they had double the numbers, if he thought, after the chain of discipline was once broken, and when they were commanded by committees, and every boy thought he possessed the right to question the authority of his superior, whether it was possible to oppose the organized army that must, under all circumstances, remain with Government, and which must every day gain strength from their ranks? The whole of the king's army was, I said, decidedly with Government: and if the last step was taken, many of the Company's officers, and those probably who had the most influence with the native troops, would range on the side of authority. I knew this, I said, to be fact, because I had letters, fully expressive of their sentiments, from some of the best and most popular officers in the army. I was myself, I said, of that opinion, and proud to state it. I had been in this army since I was twelve years of age; and such was my regard for my brother officers, that I would give my life to see the present unfortunate disputes happily adjusted: but if any circumstances whatever led these officers to rise in rebellion against their King and Country, and such they would do the moment they threw off their allegiance to the legal constituted authority in India, I must stand in the opposite rank: and I was convinced so many would be found of the same sentiments, that Government must triumph, though I allowed such a triumph would be one over its own strength, and consequently more mournful than the most signal defeat from a foreign enemy. I added, that I would, for the sake of argument, suppose, what I conceived impossible, that Government was destroyed in the conflict, what would be the consequence of this victory to a few officers who had led the natives of India to the murder of their countrymen and to the destruction of the British Government? Would these natives allow them to live and rule over them? Or would they not be tempted to practise, for the last time, the lesson they had been taught, and get rid at once of a race whose rule they had been taught to consider as oppressive and tyrannical? Supposing they did not, would the King and people of England be ready to make peace with men whose hands were red with the blood of their countrymen? Would they not rather, if they did not abandon this quarter of India altogether, attempt its reconquest? And to what consequence would that lead? You say, I added, that your grievances are intolerable, and that if you abandon your attempts to obtain redress the coast army will be disgraced, while, if you persist with firmness and spirit, Government (which must be aware of all the consequences I have stated) must give way. To this I answer: No grievances of the description this army now has, can warrant its having recourse to arms, because they are such as must come under the cognizance of the controlling and legislative authorities in England, who are alone competent to notice and redress them: and this army, so far from being degraded by a moderate proceeding at a moment like the present, would raise its reputation higher than ever; because it would prove to all the world that it possessed a spirit of the highest loyalty and patriotism; and that when a variety of circumstances had combined to throw it into a flame, the action of these feelings had subdued every other, and it was contented rather to suffer, till the superior authorities in England could judge all those questions on which it thought itself aggrieved, than endanger the general interest of the country. Would such sentiments, I asked, redound to the disgrace or to the honour of this army? With respect, I observed, to the probability of Government giving way, if assailed with unanimity, firmness, and spirit, there was, I feared, a great and dangerous error. Government could not give way, as it was termed, beyond a certain point, without destroying itself; and it had better fall by any hands than its own. It was the very pressure, I added, that was brought against it, that forced it to resistance: and, besides, what were the points which it was required to yield? In the present agitated period of the army, every committee, every individual, had a different opinion; and if it were possible to collect the general sense of the army, I believe, in their present irritated state, concessions would be required that would amount to the virtual abolition of the existing local Government of this Presidency. It was no doubt, I observed, the duty of Government to take every step that it could take with dignity to restore temper, and to compose men's minds; but I, for one, would never blame it for refusing its consent to its own death; and such I should consider any act that made a substantial sacrifice of its strength or authority. From the answer of the gentleman to whom these observations were made, I could perceive that he and many others had been led on from step to step, without contemplating the extreme which was now so likely. It was also evident that the younger part of the army were no longer manageable: they had run away with the rest, who considered themselves too deeply pledged to retreat; and they appeared afraid of the instant obloquy that was cast on every person who withdrew himself.

9th July. As this was Sunday I went to a dressed parade of the regiment, and afterwards visited the hospital and barracks. Nothing particular occurred to-day: all the officers I saw seemed to have returned to good temper; and I can have no fear of this garrison breaking out into any extreme unless the example is given by other parts of the army.

10th July. I went early into the Fort. A singular instance occurred to-day, to show how little men reflect whose minds are in a state of agitation. I was told, before I went to the Fort, that accounts had been received of every thing in Madras being in a state of confusion, and that some great event had happened there. When in the Fort, the letter that gave rise to this belief was shown me. It was dated Hyderabad the 5th July; and said a letter had that moment been received from Madras reporting the confusion which had arisen at that place; and stating that his correspondent, no doubt, "had heard of the remarkable event that had occurred to give rise to it." The moment I saw this communication I pointed out the date; and observed it was an evident allusion to what had occurred at Masulipatam on the 25th June, which had reached Madras the 30th; and the bustle it created had been termed confusion, and sent round again, via Hyderabad, to Masulipatam. This was so clearly the fact, that the only astonishment that was left, was how it had not struck somebody before. By letters from Hyderabad it appears they make no secret of their proceedings. One corresponding officer writes, who says he had received a most extraordinary communication, from good authority, that the officers of the Bengal army had sent in a Memorial to Lord Minto, praying the removal of Sir G. H. Barlow. I laughed at this unfounded assertion, and assured the person who told me, it was one of a thousand reports circulated to inflame their feelings and mislead their judgment. They have received great confidence from the address of the Bombay army[77], which promises their warmest support in any measures they may take in consequence of what they deem the unjust and arbitrary order of the 1st of May.

By a letter from the committee at Hyderabad received to-day, this garrison are advised to defend Masulipatam if they can. A junction is proposed at Ongole or Condapilly. From the former station being mentioned, it would appear as if a forward movement upon Madras had been contemplated by some of the most violent.

11th July. I was with the officers of the regiment almost all this day, and dined at the mess, of which I have become a member. Our dinner was pleasant, and like that of a private party of gentlemen. I have been particularly pleased to observe, that although they communicate to me in confidence when I require it, no officer of the garrison ever begins, when I am present, any conversation on the present situation of the army; and when I speak to them upon it (as I frequently do), they are much more moderate than they were. I have seen some of the principal natives of this place, and find the events of the 25th ultimo caused a very serious alarm, which was not dissipated before my arrival. The defenceless inhabitants ascribe more influence to me than I possess, and think nothing wrong can occur as long as I remain.

12th July. Very severe rains. I did not go into the Fort, and heard nothing of consequence from any quarter.

13th July. Went into the Fort, inquired particularly from the adjutant of the regiment, and found, from his report, that the privates not only conceived they were to be dispersed and disbanded when the order came for them to go as marines, but a report was even current in the barracks, that they were going to Botany Bay. They were, he assured me, now fully satisfied of the misrepresentations that had been made to them; and he believed no discontent remained in the corps excepting that which had long existed among the men enlisted for life; and which, they had hopes, would have been altered before this, as Captain Andrews had published an order, more than a twelvemonth ago, with a view of quieting their minds; in which he stated, that Government had referred the question to England. I desired Mr. Nixon to tell the sergeants that I should inquire into this point, and do any thing in my power towards obtaining them information of what had been done upon the subject.

14th July. I this morning inspected Captain Gibson's company of artillery, and was highly pleased with their appearance. I addressed them on parade, and told them the gratification I had received from their steadiness under arms, and correct movements; adding my conviction, that they would maintain, under all circumstances, the high reputation they had acquired during the late Mahratta war. No tappal[78] for the last three days, owing to the rain.