"Early in August we received advice that a powerful armament was fitting out and embarking at Batavia, its destination not perfectly known, but rumoured to be for Bengal. The Governor sent early notice of this to Meer Jaffier, who immediately sent a Purwannah to the Dutch Governor, a copy of which he forwarded to Governor Clive, demanding withal, by virtue of the treaty subsisting with the English, that he should join his forces to oppose and prevent any foreign troops being brought into his country.
"About this time a Dutch ship arrived in the river with European troops and buggoses, of which the Governor advised the Nabob, who was much embarrassed at the news; he, however, despatched a second Purwannah to the Dutch, and ordered Omarbeg Khan Fouzdaar of Hooghley, immediately to join the Governor with a body of troops, and repeated his demand of our assistance, to prevent the Dutch troops or ships advancing up the river. To the Nabob's first Purwannah, the Dutch sent a reply and solemn promise of obedience to his orders; to the second, they as solemnly assured him, the ship which was arrived came in by accident for water and provisions; that she was drove from her destined port of Nagapatam by stress of weather, and that she and her troops should leave the river as soon as they were supplied.
"Notwithstanding these solemn assurances from the Dutch, it was judged expedient to send a detachment of troops, joined with one of the Subah's, under the command of the Fouzdaar's officer, to take possession of Tanna Fort and Charnoc's Battery opposite to it, with orders to stop and search all boats and vessels that passed, without giving them further molestation; and parties were likewise sent out on each side of the river to prevent any foreign troops advancing by land. In consequence of these orders, every Dutch boat and budgerow was brought to, and those that had no troops suffered to pass; amongst others, Mynheer Suydland, the Dutch master-attendant, not only refused for sometime being either brought to or searched, but struck the commanding officer at Charnoc's Battery. Himself and another Dutch gentleman with him were made prisoners for a few hours, until an order from the Governor went down for releasing them and the budgerow, on board of which were found concealed eighteen buggoses, which were conducted down under a guard by land, until within sight of their ship at Fulta, and released. On these transactions, we received very long remonstrances from the gentlemen at Chinsura, to which we replied, that, as principals, we had, by the custom and laws of nations, a right to search all vessels whatever, advancing up this river, not knowing but they might introduce French troops into the country; and that as auxiliaries to the Mogul, we were under a necessity, by solemn treaty, to join his Viceroy in opposing the introduction of any European or foreign troops whatever into Bengal; and that we should absolutely and religiously do our duty to the utmost of our strength and power in both capacities.
"Early in October, Jaffier Ally Khan arrived here on a visit to the Governor. During his stay with us, advice came from below, of the arrival of six or seven more Dutch capital ships, crammed with soldiers and buggoses. Now the Dutch mask fell off, and the Nabob (conscious of having given his assent to their coming, and at the same time of our attachment and his own unfaithful dealings with us,) was greatly confused and disconcerted. He, however, seemed to make light of it; told the Governor he was going to reside three or four days at his Fort of Hooghley, where he would chastise the insolence and disobedience of the Dutch, and drive them soon out of the river again.
"On the 19th of October he left Calcutta; and in place of his going to his Fort at Hooghley, he took up his residence at Cajah Wazeed's garden, about half way between that and Chinsura; a plain indication that he had no apprehensions from the Dutch, whom he received there in the most gracious manner he could, more like friends and allies than as enemies to him and his country. In three or four days after his departure from Calcutta, the Governor received a letter from him, wherein he informed him of 'some indulgence he had granted the Dutch in their trade, and that they had engaged to leave the river with their ships and troops as soon as the season would permit.' The season permitting their immediate departure with the greatest safety and propriety, the last condition in the Nabob's letter, joined to his whole behaviour, convinced us, that leaving the river was no part of their intention, but that, on the contrary, they had his assent to bring up their troops if they could; which Colonel Clive was determined they should not, as the Nabob had not withdrawn his orders to oppose them, and in this he was heartily joined by his Council. Ruin to the Company, if not to the country, must have been the inevitable consequences of their junction with the troops they had in garrison at Chinsura; which once accomplished, would have been beyond all doubt attended with a declaration from the Government in their favour, and as probably a union between them, which must have ended in our destruction. A very few days justified our suspicions and resolutions; for in place of the Dutch leaving the river, we received certain intelligence of their moving up, and that they were enlisting troops under every denomination, at Chinsura, Cossimbazar, and Patna, and this plainly with connivance of the Nabob.
"Whatever may have been the joint or separate views of the Dutch and Nabob against us, it is most certain they never could have had a more favourable conjuncture to carry them into execution; for what with the unforeseen and inevitable long stay of our troops on the Golconda expedition, the detention on the coast of Coromandel of the forces appointed for this settlement, and the necessity the Governor was under of leaving a considerable party at Patna, in May last, our garrison here was inconsiderable. Our Governor, with indefatigable despatch, made every necessary disposition to circumvent the designs of our enemies; the 'Calcutta,' 'Duke of Dorset,' and 'Hardwicke' (the only ships we had in the river), were ordered to proceed immediately to town; the detachments at Tanna and Charnoc's were strengthened, and heavy cannon mounted at each, as also on two faces of our new fort commanding the river. The Patna party was recalled, and the militia put under arms. The Governor wrote likewise to the Nabob in strong and peremptory terms, to send his son down with his army to invest Chinsura; but the politics of the Durbar at this period, we believe, ran counter, where we judge it was determined to let the English and Dutch weaken and destroy one another, when they would probably have attempted to reduce both, or join with the strongest.
"Soon as the Dutch thought their schemes ripe for action, they sent us an immense remonstrance, recapitulating the whole of all their former ones, and vowing vengeance and reprisals if we persisted in searching their boats, and obstructing the advance of their troops up the river. To this we replied, once for all, that we had given no insult to their colours, or attacked or touched their property, or infringed their privileges; that with respect to their bringing troops into Bengal, the Nabob knew best how far it was incumbent on him to preserve the peace and tranquillity of his country; that their boats had been stopped and searched, and the advance of their troops opposed, by orders from the Viceroy, and under the Emperor his master's colours, and by his troops; that they must apply therefore to him, and that we were ready to interpose our friendly offices to mitigate his resentment. This, it may be thought, savoured a little of audacity, but facts vindicated us; as the Fouzdaar had neither withdrawn his troops (which consisted of four or five hundred horse), nor the Nabob his orders; and all that was done below was under the Government's colours. Notwithstanding which, on receipt of the last Dutch remonstrance, we found our sentiments a good deal embarrassed, doubting whether we should stand justified to our country and employers, in commencing hostilities against an ally of England, supposing they should persist in passing the batteries below with their ships and troops. In this situation, we anxiously wished the next hour would bring us news of a declaration of war with Holland; which we had indeed some reason to expect by our last advices from England. Another strong reason which determined us to oppose them, and on which subject we had been guarded against by the Court of Directors, who had intimated that in all likelihood the Dutch would first commence hostilities against us in India.
"Thus circumstanced, the Dutch themselves removed all our difficulties by beginning hostilities below, attacking with shot, and seizing seven of our vessels, grain-boats, &c., tearing down our colours, disembarking our guns, military stores, &c., from our vessels to their own ships, making prisoners of the captains, officers, &c. They also began hostilities on shore in our Purgunnahs off Fulta and Riapore, where they tore down our colours, and burnt the houses and effects of the Company's tenants in those parts. Amongst the vessels they attacked and seized was the 'Leopard Snow,' Captain Barclay, whom we had despatched with expresses to Admiral Cornish, to hasten his coming to our succour, which we judged would meet him somewhere on the Arracan coast.
"On this event, we concluded, with the greatest probability, that the Dutch had received intelligence of a rupture between them and us in Europe, or that they were sure of the Nabob joining them, or of his standing neuter at least; and having the utmost reason to suspect the Nabob's whole conduct, Governor Clive apprised him of the acts of violence the Dutch had committed below, adding, that as they had commenced actual war against us, he should judge the quarrel now subsisted between them and us only, desiring he would leave chastising the Dutch to us, and desist from sending either his son or any part of his army to our assistance; but that, if he would convince us of his sincerity and attachment, he should directly surround their subordinates, and distress them in the country to the utmost.
"Hitherto we knew not whether the Dutch intended to pass the batteries with their ships and troops on board, or whether their intention was to land the latter as high up as they could, and march them over land. The Governor, however, made the necessary dispositions against both, as far as our small body of troops would permit, consisting, on the whole, of about two hundred and forty Europeans of the battalion, about eighty of the train, and one thousand two hundred sepoys. The best troops and largest proportion of these, with many volunteers draughted from the militia, and part of the independent company, formed into a troop of horse, were stationed at Charnoc's and Tannas under the command of Captain Knox. Colonel Forde, on account of his ill state of health and dismission from the service, had returned to us a few days before these troubles; and, notwithstanding both, most obligingly and readily, at the Governor's request, took upon him the command of the remaining troops in the garrison, which marched to the northward the 19th of November; on which day Mr. Holwell was ordered to take charge of Fort William with the militia, consisting of about two hundred and fifty Europeans, besides some of the Portuguese inhabitants; the Governor dividing his attention and presence between both divisions, those at Charnoc's and those in the field.