The answers of the two houses noticed, briefly and generally, the various topics of the speech; and, though perhaps less warm than those of the preceding congress, manifested great respect for the executive magistrate, and an undiminished confidence in his patriotic exertions to promote the public interests.
Debate on the bill "for apportioning representatives among the people of the states according to the first enumeration."
Among the first subjects of importance which engaged the attention of the legislature, was a bill "for apportioning representatives among the people of the several states according to the first enumeration." The constitution, in its original form, had affixed no other limits to the power of congress over the numbers of which the house of representatives might consist, than that there should not be more than one member for every thirty thousand persons; but that each state should be entitled to at least one. Independent of the general considerations in favour of a more or less numerous representation in the popular branch of the legislature, there was one of a local nature, whose operation, though secret, was extensive, which gave to this question a peculiar interest. To whatever number of persons a representative might be allotted, there would still remain a fraction, which would be greater or less in each state, according to the ratio which congress should adopt between representation and population. The relative power of states, in one branch of the legislature, would consequently be affected by this ratio; and to questions of that description, few members can permit themselves to be inattentive.
This bill, as originally introduced into the house of representatives, gave to each state one member for every thirty thousand persons. On a motion to strike out the number thirty thousand, the debate turned chiefly on the policy and advantage of a more or less numerous house of representatives; but with the general arguments suggested by the subject, strong and pointed allusions to the measures of the preceding congress were interspersed, which indicated much more serious hostility to the administration than had hitherto been expressed. Speaking of the corruption which he supposed to exist in the British house of commons, Mr. Giles said that causes essentially different from their numbers, had produced this effect. "Among these, were the frequent mortgages of the funds, and the immense appropriations at the disposal of the executive."
"An inequality of circumstances," he observed, "produces revolutions in governments, from democracy, to aristocracy, and monarchy. Great wealth produces a desire of distinctions, rank, and titles. The revolutions of property, in this country, have created a prodigious inequality of circumstances. Government has contributed to this inequality. The bank of the United States is a most important machine in promoting the objects of this monied interest. This bank will be the most powerful engine to corrupt this house. Some of the members are directors of this institution; and it will only be by increasing the representation, that an adequate barrier can be opposed to this monied interest." He next adverted to certain ideas, which, he said, had been disseminated through the United States. "The legislature," he took occasion to observe, "ought to express some disapprobation of these opinions. The strong executive of this government," he added, "ought to be balanced by a full representation in this house."
Similar sentiments were advanced by Mr. Findley.
After a long and animated discussion, the amendment was lost, and the bill passed in its original form.
In the senate, it was amended by changing the ratio, so as to give one representative for every thirty-three thousand persons in each state; but this amendment was disagreed to by the house of representatives; and each house adhering to its opinion, the bill fell; but was again introduced into the house of representatives, under a different title, and in a new form, though without any change in its substantial provisions. After a debate in which the injustice of the fractions produced by the ratio it adopted was strongly pressed, it passed that house. In the senate, it was again amended, not by reducing, but by enlarging the number of representatives.
The constitution of the United States declares that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union according to their respective numbers;" and that "the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative." Construing the constitution to authorize a process by which the whole number of representatives should be ascertained on the whole population of the United States, and afterwards "apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers," the senate applied the number thirty thousand as a divisor to the total population, and taking the quotient, which was one hundred and twenty, as the number of representatives given by the ratio which had been adopted in the house where the bill had originated, they apportioned that number among the several states by that ratio, until as many representatives as it would give were allotted to each. The residuary members were then distributed among the states having the highest fractions. Without professing the principle on which this apportionment was made, the amendment of the senate merely allotted to the states respectively, the number of members which the process just mentioned would give. The result was a more equitable apportionment of representatives to population, and had the rule of construing that instrument been correct, the amendment removed objections which were certainly well founded. But the rule was novel, and overturned opinions which had been generally assumed, and were supposed to be settled. In one branch of the legislature it had already been rejected; and in the other, the majority in its favour was only one.
In the house of representatives, the amendment was supported with considerable ingenuity.