From the weight of the fire, and the circumstance of his being attacked nearly at the same time in front and rear, General St. Clair was of opinion that he was overpowered by numbers. The intelligence afterwards collected would make the Indian force to consist of from one thousand to fifteen hundred warriors. Of their loss, no estimate could be made; the probability is, that it bore no proportion to that sustained by the American army.
Nothing could be more unexpected than this severe disaster. The public had confidently anticipated a successful campaign, and could not believe, that the general who had been unfortunate, had not been culpable.
1792
The Commander-in-chief requested with earnestness that a court martial should sit on his conduct; but this request could not be granted, because the army did not furnish a sufficient number of officers of a grade to form a court for his trial on military principles. Late in the session, a committee of the house of representatives was appointed to inquire into the cause of the failure of the expedition, whose report, in explicit terms, exculpated the Commander-in-chief. This inquiry, however, was instituted rather for the purpose of investigating the conduct of civil than of military officers; and was not conducted by military men. More satisfactory testimony in favour of St. Clair is furnished by the circumstance, that he still retained the undiminished esteem and good opinion of the President.
The Indian war now assumed a still more serious aspect. There was reason to fear that the hostile tribes would derive a great accession of strength from the impression which their success would make upon their neighbours; and the reputation of the government was deeply concerned in retrieving the fortune of its arms, and affording protection to its citizens. The President, therefore, lost no time in causing the estimates for a competent force to be prepared and laid before congress. In conformity with a report made by the secretary of war, a bill was brought into the house of representatives, directing three additional regiments of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry to be raised, to serve for three years, if not sooner discharged. The whole military establishment, if completed, would amount to about five thousand men. The additional regiments, however, were to be disbanded as soon as peace should be concluded with the Indians; and the President was authorized to discharge, or to forbear to raise, any part of them, "in case events should, in his judgment, render his so doing consistent with the public safety."
Opposition to the increase of the army.
This bill met with great opposition. A motion was made to strike out the section which authorized an augmentation of force. By those who argued in favour of the motion, the justice of the war was arraigned, and the practicability of obtaining peace at a much less expense than would be incurred in its further prosecution, was urged with vehemence. An extension of the present frontier was said not to be desirable, and if the citizens of the United States were recalled within their proper boundaries, hostilities would cease. At any rate, it was an idle waste of blood and treasure, to carry the war beyond the line of forts already established. It was only exposing their arms to disgrace, betraying their own weakness, and lessening the public confidence in the government, to send forth armies to be butchered in the forests, while the British were suffered to keep possession of posts within the territory of the United States. To this cause was to be ascribed any disposition which might exist on the part of the Indians to continue hostilities, and to its removal the efforts of the government ought to be directed.
But, admitting the war to have been just in its commencement, and its continuance to be required by the honour and interest of the nation, yet as an invasion of the Indian country ought not to be attempted, this augmentation of the military establishment could not be necessary. Regular troops could only be useful as garrisons for posts to which the militia might resort for protection or supplies. Experience had proved that the sudden desultory attacks of the frontier militia and rangers were productive of more valuable consequences, than the methodical operations of a regular force. But, should it even be conceded that invasion and conquest were to be contemplated, the existing establishment, if completed, would be sufficiently great; and it was still insisted that, even for the purposes of conquest, the frontier militia were superior to any regulars whatever.
The expense of such an army as the bill contemplated was said to be an object worthy of serious attention; and members were requested to observe the progress of this business, and to say where it would stop. At first, only a single regiment had been raised, and the expense was about one hundred thousand dollars; a second was afterwards added, which swelled the expense to three hundred thousand; and now a standing force of five thousand one hundred and sixty-eight men is contemplated, at an annual expense of above a million and a quarter. They were preparing to squander away money by millions; and no one, except those who were in the secrets of the cabinet, knew why the war had been thus carried on for three years.
Against the motion for striking out, it was urged that the justice of the war could not be questioned by any man who would allow that self preservation, and indispensable necessity, could furnish sufficient motives for taking up arms. It was proved by unquestionable documents, that from the year 1783 to 1790, there had been not less than fifteen hundred persons, either the inhabitants of Kentucky, or emigrants on their way to that country, who had been massacred by the savages, or dragged into captivity; and there was reason to believe that on the frontiers of Virginia, and of Pennsylvania, the murdered and the prisoners would furnish a list almost equally numerous.