The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5 / Commander in Chief of the American Forces During the War / which Established the Independence of his Country and First / President of the United States

by John Marshall

So restless and uneasy was the temper respecting foreign nations, that no surprise ought to be excited at the anxiety which was felt on the negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain, nor at the means which were used, before its contents were known, to extend the prejudices against it.

Great umbrage was taken at the mysterious secrecy in which the negotiation had been involved. That the instrument itself was not immediately communicated to the public, and that the senate deliberated upon it with closed doors, were considered as additional evidences of the contempt in which their rulers held the feelings and understandings of the people, and of the monarchical tendencies of the government. Crowned heads, it was loudly repeated, who were machinating designs subversive of the rights of man, and the happiness of nations, might well cover with an impenetrable veil, their dark transactions; but republics ought to have no secrets. In republics, those to whom power was delegated, being the servants of the people, acting solely for their benefit, ought to transact all national affairs in open day. This doctrine was not too absurd for the extravagance of the moment.

The predetermined hostility to the treaty increased in activity, as the period for deciding its fate approached. On its particular merits, no opinion could be formed, because they were unknown; but on the general question of reconciliation between the two countries, a decisive judgment was extensively made up. The sentiments called forth by the occasion demonstrated, that no possible adjustment of differences with Great Britain, no possible arrangement which might promise a future friendly intercourse with that nation, could be satisfactory. The President was openly attacked; his whole system strongly condemned; and the mission of Mr. Jay, particularly, was reprobated in terms of peculiar harshness. That a treaty of amity and commerce should have been formed, whatever might be its principles, was a degrading insult to the American people; a pusillanimous surrender of their honour; and an insidious injury to France. Between such a compact, and an alliance, no distinction was taken. It was an abandonment of the ancient ally of the United States, whose friendship had given them independence, and whose splendid victories still protected them, for a close connexion with her natural enemy, and with the enemy of human liberty.

The pretended object of the mission, it was said, was a reparation for wrongs, not a contaminating connexion with the most faithless and corrupt court in the world. The return of the envoy without that reparation, was a virtual surrender of the claim. The honour of the United States required a peremptory demand of the immediate surrender of the western posts, and of compensation for the piratical depredations committed on their commerce; not a disgraceful and humiliating negotiation. The surrender, and the compensation, ought to have been made instantly; for no reliance could be placed in promises to be performed in future.

That the disinclination formerly manifested by Great Britain, to give the stability and certainty of compact to the principles regulating the commercial intercourse between the two countries, had constituted an important item in the catalogue of complaints against that power: that the existence, or non-existence of commercial treaties had been selected as the criterion by which to regulate the discriminations proposed to be made in the trade of foreign nations; that, in the discussion on this subject, the favourers of commercial hostility had uniformly supported the policy of giving value to treaties with the United States; these opinions were instantly relinquished by the party which had strenuously asserted them while urged by their leaders in congress; and it was imputed as a crime to the government, and to its negotiator, that he had proceeded further than to demand immediate and unconditional reparation of the wrongs sustained by the United States.

[The] most strenuous and unremitting exertions to give increased energy to the love which was openly avowed for France, and to the detestation which was not less openly avowed for England,[33] were connected with this course of passionate declamation.

Such was the state of parties when the senate advised the ratification of the treaty. Although common usage, and a decent respect for the executive, and for a foreign nation, not less than a positive resolution, required that the seal of secrecy should not be broken by the senate, an abstract of this instrument, not very faithfully taken, was given to the public; and on the 29th of June, a senator of the United States transmitted a copy of it to the most distinguished editor of the opposition party in Philadelphia, to be communicated to the public through the medium of the press.

If the negotiation itself had been acrimoniously censured; if amicable arrangements, whatever might be their character, had been passionately condemned; it was not to be expected that the treaty would assuage these pre-existing irritations.

In fact, public opinion did receive a considerable shock, and men uninfested by the spirit of faction felt some disappointment on its first appearance. In national contests, unless there be an undue attachment to the adversary country, few men, even among the intelligent, are sensible of the weakness which may exist in their own pretensions, or can allow their full force to the claims of the other party. If the people at large enter keenly into the points of controversy with a foreign power, they can never be satisfied with any equal adjustment of those points, unless other considerations, stronger than abstract reason, afford that satisfaction; nor will it ever be difficult to prove to them, in a case unassisted by the passions, that in any practicable commercial contract, they give too much, and receive too little.

On no subject whatever have considerations, such as these, possessed more influence than in that which was now brought before the American people. Their operation was not confined to those whose passions urged them to take part in the war, nor to the open enemies of the executive. The friends of peace, and of the administration, had generally received impressions unfavourable to the fair exercise of judgment in the case, which it required time and reflection to efface. Even among them, strong prejudices had been imbibed in favour of France, which the open attempts on the sovereignty of the United States had only weakened; and the matters of controversy with Great Britain had been contemplated with all that partiality which men generally feel for their own interests. With respect to commerce also, strong opinions had been preconceived. The desire to gain admission into the British West India islands, especially, had excited great hostility to that colonial system which had been adopted by every country in Europe; and sufficient allowances were not made for the prejudices by which that system was supported.