[75] Francs are here converted at 2.20 to the gold mark and the £ sterling at the ratio of 1:20.
[76] This is exactly the figure of the estimate which I gave in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (p. 160). But I there added: “I feel much more confidence in the approximate accuracy of the total figure than its division between the different claimants.” This proviso was necessary, as I had over–estimated the claims of France and under–estimated those of the British Empire and of Italy.
[77] “Elle avait été le résultat dʼun compromis assez pénible entre la délégué français, lʼhonorable M. Dubois, et le représentant anglais, Sir John Bradbury, depuis lors démissionnaire, qui voulait sʼen tenir au chiffre de cent quatre milliards et qui avait défendu la thèse du gouvernement britannique avec une habileté passionnée.”
[78] The chief question of legitimate controversy in this connection was that of the rate of exchange for converting paper francs into gold marks.
[79] Made up of about £5,500,000 advanced by Great Britain, 772,000,000 francs by France, 96,000,000 francs by Belgium, 147,000,000 lire by Italy, and 56,000,000 francs by Luxembourg.
[80] The German authorities have published a somewhat higher figure. According to a memorandum submitted to the Reichstag in September 1921 by their Finance Minister, the costs of the Armies of Occupation and the Rhine Provinces Commission up to the end of March 1921 were mks. 3,936,954,542 (gold), in respect of expenditure met in the first instance by the occupying Powers, and subsequently recoverable from Germany, plus mks. 7,313,911,829 (paper), in respect of expenditure directly met by the German authorities.
[81] I do not vouch for the accuracy of these figures, which are rough estimates of my own on the basis of incomplete published information.
[82] On the other hand Great Britainʼs view was adopted as to the valuation of shipping.
[83] In view of the political difficulties in which this Agreement involved M. Briandʼs Cabinet, the matter was apparently adjusted by Great Britain and Belgium receiving their quotas as above, “subject to adjustment of the final settlement” of the questions dealt with in the Agreement. The net result on September 30, 1921, was that, including the above sum, Great Britain had been repaid £5,445,000 in respect of the Spa coal advances, and had also received, or was in course of collecting, about £43,000,000 towards the expenses of the Army of Occupation (approximately £50,000,000). Thus, as the result of three yearsʼ Reparations, Great Britainʼs costs of collection had been about £7,000,000 more than her receipts.
[84] To value these ships at what they fetched during the slump, yet to value Germanyʼs liability for submarine destruction at what the ships cost to replace during the boom, appears to be unjust. My estimate (in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 174) of the value of the ships to be delivered was $600,000,000.