A Revision of the Treaty / Being a Sequel to The Economic Consequence of the Peace

by John Maynard Keynes

The Legality of the Claim for Pensions

“The application of morals to international politics is more a thing to be desired than a thing which has been in operation. Also, when I am made a participant in crime along with many millions of other people, I more or less shrug my shoulders.”—Letter from a friendly critic to the author of The Economic Consequences of the Peace.

We have seen in the preceding chapter that the claim for Pensions and Allowances is nearly double that for Devastation, so that its inclusion in the Alliesʼ demands nearly trebles the bill. It makes the difference between a demand which can be met and a demand which cannot be met. Therefore it is important.

In The Economic Consequences of the Peace I gave reasons for the opinion that this claim was contrary to our engagements and an act of international immorality. A good deal has been written about it since then, but I cannot admit that my conclusion has been seriously disputed. Most American writers accept it; most French writers ignore it; and most English writers try to show, not that the balance of evidence is against me, but that there are a few just plausible, or just not–negligible, observations to be made on the other side. Their contention is that of the Jesuit professors of Probabilism in the seventeenth century, namely that the Allies are justified unless it is absolutely certain that they are wrong, and that any probability in their favor, however small, is enough to save them from mortal sin.

But most people in the countries of Germanyʼs former enemies are not ready to excite themselves very much, even if my view is accepted. The passage at the head of this chapter describes a common attitude. International politics is a scoundrelʼs game and always has been, and the private citizen can scarcely feel himself personally responsible. If our enemy breaks the rules, his action may furnish us with an appropriate opportunity for expressing our feelings; but this must not be taken to commit us to a cool opinion that such things have never happened before and must never happen again. Sensitive and honorable patriots do not like it, but they “more or less shrug” their shoulders.

There is some common sense in this. I cannot deny it. International morality, interpreted as a crude legalism, might be very injurious to the world. It is at least as true of these vast–scale transactions, as of private affairs, that we judge wrongly if we do not take into account everything. And it is superficial to appeal, the other way round, to the principles which do duty when Propaganda is blistering herd emotion with its brew of passion, sentiment, self–interest, and moral fiddlesticks.

But whilst I see that nothing rare has happened and that menʼs motives are much as usual, I do still think that this particular act was an exceptionally mean one, made worse by hypocritical professions of moral purpose. My object in returning to it is partly historical and partly practical. New material of high interest is available to instruct us about the course of events. And if for practical reasons we can agree to drop this claim, we shall make a settlement easier.

Those who think that it was contrary to the Alliesʼ engagements to charge pensions against the enemy base this opinion on the terms notified to the German Government by President Wilson, with the authority of the Allies, on November 5, 1918, subject to which Germany accepted the Armistice conditions.[93] The contrary opinion that the Allies were fully entitled to charge pensions if they considered it expedient to do so, has been supported by two distinct lines of argument: first that the Armistice conditions of November 11, 1918, were not subject to President Wilsonʼs notification of November 5, 1918, but superseded it, more particularly regarding Reparation; and alternatively that the wording of President Wilsonʼs notification properly understood does not exclude Pensions.

The first line of argument was adopted by M. Klotz and the French Government during the Peace Conference, and has been approved more recently by M. Tardieu.[94] It was repudiated by the whole of the American Delegation at Paris, and never definitely supported by the British Government. Responsible writers about the Treaty, other than French, have not admitted it.[95] It was also explicitly abandoned by the Peace Conference itself in its reply to the German observations on the first draft of the Treaty. The second line of argument was that of the British Government during the Peace Conference, and it was an argument on these lines which finally converted President Wilson. I will deal with the two arguments in turn.

1. Various persons have published particulars, formerly confidential, which allow us to reconstruct the course of the discussions about the Armistice. These begin with the examination of the Armistice Terms by the Allied Council of War on November 1, 1918.[96]