[102] I record this episode as an historical curiosity. In my opinion it makes no material difference to the argument whether the text runs “revendications et réclamations” or “renonciation et réclamation”; for I regard either form of words as merely a protective phrase. But the plausibility of M. Klotzʼs position is decidedly weakened (if so weak a case is capable of further weakening) if it is the latter phrase which is authentic. The Editor of the Institute of International Affairs’ History of the Peace Conference of Paris, who was the first to discover and publish the discrepancy in question (vol. v., pp. 370–372), takes the view that the question of which text is used makes a material difference to the value of M. Klotzʼs argument.
[103] Baruch, op. cit., p. 19.
[104] As Mr. Baruch puts it (op. cit., p. 4): “At an election held after the Armistice and agreement as to the basic terms of peace, the English people, by an overwhelming majority, returned to power their Prime Minister on the basis of an increase in the severity of these terms of the peace, especially those of reparation.” (The italics are mine.)
[105] Baruch, op. cit., p. 25.
[106] This Memorandum, which has been published in extenso by Mr. Baruch (op. cit., p. 29 seq.), belonged to the category of most secret documents. It has been given to the world by itself without the accompanying circumstances which, without justifying its arguments (on which indeed no further light could be thrown beyond what we already have in the narrative of Mr. Baruch), might yet throw light on individual motives. I agree with the comment made by The Economist (Oct. 22, 1921) in reviewing Vol. IV. of the History of the Peace Conference of Paris (published under the auspices of the Institute of International Affairs), which has reprinted this Memorandum, that “a very serious injustice will be done to the reputation of General Smuts if this document continues to be reproduced and circulated without any explanation of the circumstances in which it was prepared.” Nevertheless it is well that the world should have this document, and it must take its place in a story which is more important to the world than the motives and reputations of individual actors in it.
[107] The following is the salient passage of the Memorandum: “After the soldierʼs discharge as unfit he rejoins the civilian population, and as for the future he cannot (in whole or in part) earn his own livelihood, he is suffering damage as a member of the civilian population, for which the German Government are again liable to make compensation. In other words, the pension for disablement which he draws from the French Government is really a liability of the German Government, which they must under the above reservation make good to the French Government. It could not be argued that as he was disabled while a soldier he does not suffer damage as a civilian after his discharge if he is unfit to do his ordinary work. He does literally suffer as civilian after his discharge, and his pension is intended to make good this damage, and is therefore a liability of the German Government.”
[108] What Really Happened at Paris, p. 272.
[109] Mr. Lamont adds that “it was not a contempt of logic, but simply an impatience of technicality; a determination to brush aside verbiage and get at the root of things. There was not one of us in the room whose heart did not beat with a like feeling.” These words not merely reflect a little naïvely the modern opportunistʼs impatience of legality and respect for the fait accompli, but also recall the atmosphere of exhaustion and the longing of everyone to be finished, somehow, with this dreadful controversy, which for months had outraged at the same time the intellects and the consciences of most of the participators. Yet, even so, to their lasting credit, the American Delegation had stood firm for the law, and it was the President, and he alone, who capitulated to the lying exigencies of politics.
CHAPTER VI
Reparation, Inter–Ally Debt, and International Trade