Chapter VIII. Sherman's Displeasure with Hooker growing out the Affair at Kolb's Farm—Hooker's Despatch Evidently Misinterpreted —A Conversation with James B. McPherson over the Question of Relative Rank—Encouraging John B. Hood to become a Soldier—Visit to the Camp of Frank P. Blair, Jr.—Anecdote of Sherman and Hooker under Fire—The Assault on Kenesaw—Tendency of Veteran Troops— The Death of McPherson before Atlanta—Sherman's error in a Question of Relative Rank.
Chapter IX. The Final Blow at Atlanta—Johnston's Untried Plan of Resistance—Hood's Faulty Move—Holding the Pivot of the Position —Anecdotes of the Men in the Ranks—Deferring to General Stanley in a Question of Relative Rank—The Failure at Jonesboro'—The Capture of Atlanta—Absent from the Army—Hood's Operations in Sherman's Rear—Sent Back to Thomas's Aid—Faulty Instructions to Oppose Hood at Pulaski—At Columbia—Reason of the Delay in Exchanging Messages.
Chapter X. Hood Forces the Crossing of Duck River—Importance of Gaining Time for Thomas to Concentrate Reinforcements at Nashville —The Affair at Spring Hill—Incidents of the Night Retreat—Thomas's Reply to the Request that a Bridge be Laid over the Harpeth—The Necessity of Standing Ground at Franklin—Hood's Formidable Attack —Serious Error of Two Brigades of the Rear-Guard—Brilliant Services of the Reserve—Yellow Fever Averted—Hood's Assaults Repulsed— Johnston's Criticism of Hood—The Advantage of Continuing the Retreat to Nashville.
Chapter XI. The Correspondence with General Thomas previous to the Battle of Franklin—The Untenable Position at Pulaski—Available Troops which were not Sent to the Front—Correspondence with General Thomas—Instructions Usually Received too Late—Advantage of Delaying the Retreat from Duck River—No Serious Danger at Spring Hill— General Thomas Hoping that Hood might be Delayed for Three Days at Franklin.
Chapter XII. After the Battle of Franklin—The Arrival at Nashville —General Thomas's Greeting—A Refreshing Sleep—Services of the Cavalry Corps and the Fourth Army Corps—Hood's Mistake after Crossing Duck River—An Incident of the Atlanta Campaign Bearing on Hood's Character—An Embarrassing Method of Transmitting Messages in Cipher—The Aggressive Policy of the South.
Chapter XIII. Grant Orders Thomas to Attack Hood or Relinquish the Command—Thomas's Corps Commanders Support Him in Delay—Grant's Intentions in Sending Logan to Relieve Thomas—Change of Plan before the Battle of Nashville—The Fighting of December 15—Expectation that Hood would Retreat—Delay in Renewing the Attack on the 16th —Hopelessness of Hood's Position—Letters to Grant and Sherman— Transferred to the East—Financial Burden of the War—Thomas's Attitude toward the War.
Chapter XIV. Hood's Motive in Attempting the Impossible at Nashville —Diversity of Opinions Concerning that Battle—No Orders on Record for the Battle of December 16—That Battle due to the Spontaneous Action of Subordinate Commanders—Statements in the Reports of the Corps Commanders—Explanation of the Absence of Orders—The Phraseology of General Thomas's Report.
Chapter XV. General Thomas's Indorsement on the Report of the Battle of Franklin—Courtesies to Him in Washington—Peculiarities of the Official Records in Regard to Franklin and Nashville— Documents Which Have Disappeared from the Records—Inconsistencies in General Thomas's Report—False Representations Made to Him— Their Falsity Confirmed by General Grant.
Chapter XVI. Sherman's "March to the Sea"—The Military Theory On Which It Was Based—Did It Involve War or Statesmanship?—The Correspondence Between Grant and Sherman, and Sherman and Thomas— The Effect of Jefferson Davis's Speech on Sherman—Rawlins's Reported Opposition to the March, and Grant's Final Judgment On It.
Chapter XVII. Sherman's Purpose in Marching to the Sea—His Expectations that the Change of Base Would Be "Statesmanship," If Not "War"—The Thousand-Mile March of Hood's Men to Surrender to Sherman—The Credit Given by Grant to Sherman—"Master of the Situation"—The Fame of Sherman's Grand Marches—His Great Ability as a Strategist.