Forty-Six Years in the Army

by John McAllister Schofield

DELAY IN RENEWING THE ATTACK ON THE 16TH

The most notable failure, on our side, of the battle of December 16 was the wasting of nearly the entire day, so that operations ended with the successful assault at dark. What was left of Hood's army had time to retreat across the Harpeth during the night and destroy the bridges before the pursuit could be commenced.

But the results of the two days' operations at Nashville were too gratifying to admit of contemporaneous criticism. The battle has been generally accepted as a perfect exemplification of the art of war. It is certainly a good subject for the study of military students, and it is partly for their benefit that I have pointed out some of its prominent defects as I understood them. Its commendable features are sufficiently evident; but in studying the actions that have resulted in victory, we are apt to overlook the errors without which the victory might have been far more complete, or even to mistake those errors for real causes of success.

The pursuit from Nashville was necessarily an imperfect one from the start, simply because the successful assault having been made at the close of day, the broken enemy had time to get across the Harpeth and destroy the bridges before morning. The singular blunder by which General Thomas's pontoon-train was sent toward Murfreesboro' instead of Franklin added somewhat to the delay, but probably did not essentially change the result.

The state of all the roads except the one turnpike, the soft condition of the fields everywhere, the bad weather,—rain, sleet, and ice,—made the movements of troops which were necessary to an effective pursuit extremely difficult, and often impossible. The energy and determination of General Thomas and of all who could take any active part in that pursuit were probably never surpassed in military history, but the difficulties to be overcome were often insurmountable. Under the conditions at that season of the year and in that state of weather, the only possible chance of reaping fruits commensurate with the brilliant victory at Nashville and with the great preparations which had been made for pursuit was to make the final assault at Nashville early enough in the day to leave time before dark to prevent the enemy from crossing the Harpeth and destroying the bridges.

If Hood had retreated in the night of December 15, as Thomas presumed he would, the result would doubtless have been even less serious to the enemy; for he would not have suffered at Nashville the great losses and demoralization which occurred to him on the 16th, and would have been in better condition to make an effective retreat, and even better able to cross the Harpeth in the night and destroy the bridges. But this would have been difficult, if not impossible, to prevent on the 15th, on account of the great extent and nature of the movements necessarily required to open the battle on that day. I now recall very distinctly the desire manifested by General Thomas that those initial operations might, if possible, be expedited. As we sat together on horseback just in rear of Wood's right and of Smith's left, on ground overlooking nearly the entire field, the general would frequently reach for my glasses, which he had occasionally used before and said were the only field-glasses he had ever found of much use to him, and try to peer through the misty atmosphere far over the woods and field where his infantry and cavalry were advancing against the enemy's left. After thus looking long and earnestly, he would return the glasses to me, with what seemed to be a sign of irritation or impatience, for he uttered very few words in that long time, until late in the afternoon, when, after using my field-glasses for the last time, he said to me, with the energy which battle alone could arouse in his strong nature: "Smith has not reached far enough to the right. Put in your troops!"

Occasionally, when a shell struck and exploded near where we were, causing his horse to make a slight start, and only a slight one,— for the nature of the horse was much the same as that of the rider, —the only change visible in the face or form of that stout-hearted soldier was a slight motion of the bridle-hand to check the horse. My own beautiful gray charger, "Frank Blair," though naturally more nervous than the other, had become by that time hardly less fearless. But I doubt if my great senior ever noticed that day what effect the explosion of a shell produced on either the gray horse or his rider. He had on his shoulders the responsibilities of a great battle, while I then had better than ever before opportunity to study the character of my chief.

HOPELESSNESS OF HOOD'S POSITION

A wiser commander than Hood might very probably have saved his army from that terrible and useless sacrifice of December 16. But that last and bravest champion of a desperate cause in the west appears to have decided to remain and invite the total destruction of his army. The position which the Confederates occupied in the morning of the 16th was so close to that of more than half of the Union troops that Hood's left could easily have been crushed by an infantry assault and his rear reached by Thomas's cavalry before noon, and nothing less than a miracle could have prevented the capture of Hood's army.

It is worthy of note as instructive comparison that on November 30 Hood advanced from Spring Hill to Franklin and made his famous assault in just about the same length of time that it took our troops to advance from the first to the second position at Nashville and make the assault of December 16; and that the Fourth and Twenty- third corps on November 29 and 30 fought two battles—Spring Hill and Franklin—and marched forty miles, from Duck River to Nashville, in thirty-six hours. Time is an element in military problems the value of which cannot be too highly estimated, yet how seldom has it been duly appreciated!