At the outbreak of the war of the rebellion he had been made Colonel of the 6th U. S. Cav.—a new regiment—and commanded a division at Bull Run, where he showed great gallantry and was wounded. He had been sent out to Fremont as his second in command and adviser, in the hope that he would control in some measure the commander's erratic course and be instrumental in promoting better methods in his administration.
He was true to his duties in communicating to his superiors just what he found in the Department of the West and properly representing Fremont's incompetence. It was not intended that he should have permanent command of the army, and probably no man was less desirous that he should be than he himself, for he had a modest opinion of his own abilities and never hesitated to subordinate himself when he thought another man would do better in the place.
The command was given him merely as a stop-gap until another commander could be determined upon.
In the same envelope which contained Lincoln's letter to Gen. Curtis inclosing the order for the supersedure of Gen. Fremont, was another reading as follows:
Washington, Oct. 24, 1861. To the Commander of the
Department of the West
Sir: The command of the Department of the West having
devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions.
Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander
in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much
always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing
events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable
margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.
The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is
believed to have passed Dade County in full retreat upon
northwestern Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from
the enemy, excepting in the southeast of the State.
Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are
not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making
too long a line from your own base of supplies and
reinforcements, that you should give up the pursuit halt
your main army, divide it into two corps of observation,
one occupying Sedalla and the other Rolla, the present
termini of railroad; then recruit the condition of both
corps by reestablishing and improving their discipline and
instruction, perfecting their clothing and equipments, and
providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course, both
railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously
employing just so much force as is necessary for this. 'From
these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in
judicious cooperation with Lane on the Kansas border, it
would be so easy to concentrate and repel an army of the
enemy returning on Missouri from the southwest that It is
not probable any such attempt to return will be made before
or during the approaching cold weather.
Before Spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no
favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which
have so much afflicted and impoverished them during this. If
you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I anticipate, you
will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have
a surplus of force, which you can withdraw from these points
and direct to others, as may be needed, the railroads
furnishing ready means of reinforcing their main points, if
occasion requires. Doubtless local uprisings will for a time
continue to occur, but these can be met by detachments and
local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of
themselves.
While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large
discretion must be and is left with yourself, I feel sure
that an indefinite pursuit of Price or an attempt by this
long and circuitous route to reach Memphis will be
exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the
whole force engaged. Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
This letter, undoubtedly dictated by McClellan, who was then the dominant military influence at Washington, is yet strikingly characteristic of President Lincoln, and abounds in that profound common sense which made him easily the first General of the War.
The army was already 125 miles away from its base of suppliess on the railroad, with a terrible rough intervening country. Consequently, the problem of supplying it was of momentous seriousness and the expense appalling.