Hon. W. P. Harris, Confederate States Congress.
My Dear Sir: Language was said by Talleyrand to be useful
for the concealment of one's thoughts; but in our day it
falls to communicate any thought. If it had been otherwise,
the complaint in relation to Gen. Price of which you speak
could not have been made. The Commissioners of Missouri were
informed that when that State offered troops they would be
organized according to our military laws, and Generals would
be appointed for brigades and divisions. Until then I have
no power to appoint Generals for those troops. The same
statements, substantially, were made to the members of
Congress from Missouri who called on me yesterday. They were
also informed that, from conversation with Informed persons
and from correspondence now on file in the War Department, I
was convinced that it was needful to the public interest
that a General should be sent to the Arkansas and Missouri
Division who had not been connected with any of the troops
on that line of operations; and to the statement that the
Missouri troops would not fully enlist under any one except
Gen. Price, I asked if they required their General to be put
in command of the troops of Arkansas, of Texas, and of the
other Southern States. To bring these different forces into
harmonious co-operation is a necessity. I have sought to
effect it by selecting Gen. Heth to command them in
combination. If it is designed, by calling Heth a West Point
Cadet, merely to object to his education in the science of
war, it may pass for what it is worth; but if it be Intended
to assert that he is without experience, his years of active
and distinguished service on the frontier of Missouri and
the territory west of it will, to those who examine before
they censure, be a sufficient answer. The Federal forces are
not hereafter as heretofore to be commanded by pathfinders
and holiday soldiers, but by men of military education and
experience in war. The contest is therefore to be on a scale
of very different proportions than that of the partisan
warfare witnessed during the past Summer and Fall. I have
long since learned to bear hasty censure, in hope that
justice, if tardy, is sure; and in any event to find
consolation in the assurance that all my ends have been my
country's.
With high respect,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
Gen. Ben McCulloch thought best to go on to Richmond to explain his course since Wilson's Creek, and also to look after the very tender subject of his rank and powers. He left Gen. James S. Mcintosh in command of his troops. Mcintosh had grievances of his own. He was not being recognized by the Confederate authorities as he thought a man of his abilities and soldierly experience should have been, and he seems to have liked cooperation with Gen. Price very much less even than did Gen. McCulloch. In no very gentlemanly terms he repelled Price's proposition to combine their forces and push forward to the Missouri River. The best that Price could get out of him was the assurance that if the Federals advanced upon him at Springfield he, Mcintosh, would come forward to his assistance.
Price had greatly underestimated Gen. Halleck's energy and aggressiveness. Gen. Halleck was the first of our commanders to really rise to the level of the occasion and take a comprehensive grasp upon affairs. Unlike some others, he wasted no time in sounding proclamations or in lengthy letters of advice to the Administration as to the political conduct of the war. He was a soldier, proud of his profession, true to his traditions, and possibly had ambition to be reckoned among the great commanders. He had been noted for high administrative ability, and this trait was well illustrated in his grasp of the situation in Missouri and on the borders of the State. His main communications to the people were orders, plain, practical, and to the point. Whatever he did was on the highest plane of the science of warfare as he understood it.
Proper military discipline and subordination were introduced everywhere and a rigid system of accountability. He had troubles with his own men to add to his difficulties with the enemy. We find the most note of this with reference to the Germans.
The Missouri Germans were a splendid lot of men, taken as a whole, and had an unusual number of officers who were trained soldiers of considerable military experience. At the head of this class was Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus, who had been a private soldier under Lyon in securing the Arsenal, and had commanded a battalion with high credit to himself at Wilson's Creek. He was now a Colonel commanding a brigade.
With this excellent material there was a large per cent that ranged from worthless to actually criminal. Many adventurers from the European armies had hastened to this country to sell their swords to the best advantage, and many black sheep, who had been forced out of their armies, sought in our troubles and our ignorance of military matters an opportunity for their own exaltation and profit. Halleck dealt with all with a firm, unsparing hand. He began to weed out the worthless officers and to court-martial the rascals. Company, battalion and regimental organizations which he found too mutinous and disorderly for hopeful management, he either disarmed and set to hard labor or discharged from the service.
The raids of the vengeful Kansans across the Missouri borders gave him excessive annoyance, and he issued orders that all Kansas parties entering the State should be arrested and disarmed. That he might have more complete control of them, however, he recommended that the Department of Kansas be merged with his command, and as this was in had mony with Gen. Hunter's ideas, it was subsequently done. In the meanwhile he had to look out for the Mississippi River and the highly important point of, Cairo. He started to construct a fleet of gunboats to help control the river and assist the Army in its operations.