About the latter part of January my scouts reported that the
enemy were concentrating in force at Rolla, and shortly
thereafter they occupied Lebanon. Believing that this
movement could be for no other purpose than to attack me,
and knowing that my command was inadequate for such
resistance as the Interest of my army and the cause
demanded, I appealed to the commanders of the Confederate
troops In Arkansas to come to my assistance. This from
correspondence I was confidently led to expect, and, relying
upon it, I held my position to the very last moment, and, as
the sequel proved, almost too long, for on Wednesday, Feb.
12, my pickets were driven in, and reported the enemy
advancing upon me in force. No resource was now left me
except retreat, without hazarding all with greatly unequal
numbers upon the result of one engagement. This I deemed it
unwise to do. I commenced retreating at once. I reached
Cassville with loss unworthy of mention in any respect. Here
the enemy in my rear commenced a series of attacks running
through four days. Retreating and fighting all the way to
Cross Hollows, in this State, I am rejoiced to say my
command, under the most exhausting fatigue all that time,
with but little rest for either man or beast and no sleep,
sustained themselves and came through, repulsing the enemy
upon every occasion with great determination and gallantry.
My loss does not exceed four to six killed and some 15 to 18
wounded. That of the enemy we know to be ten times as great.
Gen. Price's estimate of the losses he inflicted is widely divergent from that of Gen. Curtis, who does not admit any losses in killed in the noisy engagements while pushing Price back through the rough gorges, until he arrived at the Sugar Creek Crossing, six miles into Arkansas, where he lost 13 killed and 15 or 20 wounded in a very spirited little fight with the combined troops of Price and McCulloch, and camped that night upon the battlefield from which the enemy had retreated. Here Col. Cyrus Bussey joined him with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., having made a forward march from Rolla, Mo., in four days.
Curtis was so encouraged by his success that he kept on pushing Price back upon McCulloch, even upon the boasted "Gibraltar" at Cross Hollows, and then, to the astonishment and delight of himself and the whole army, forced the evacuation of this stronghold by a flank movement The rebels' abandonment of it was so complete that they burned all their stores and the great array of cabins built for quarters, leaving only the chimneys to mark the long rows.
Thus any expectation of a sanguinary battle fell in disappointment. So much had been said about Cross Hollows that the Union troops were certain that they would have to fight a desperate battle at or near it. It was known that at least 4,000 regularly-organized troops had been quartered there for months, subjected to thorough drill and discipline. Gen. McCulloch had boasted that he had prepared a trap in which to catch and ruin the Federal General if he ventured that far south. McCulloch's only fear was of being unable to draw the Federal General into the trap.
The Confederates left their sick and wounded behind them in the hospitals, and the untiring Gen. Asboth, commanding the cavalry, pushed the rear guard rapidly through to Bentonville. Returning to Curtis's camp a day or two later, Gen. Asboth was sent with a force of cavalry to Fayetteville, a most important town in northwestern Arkansas, where he learned that his enemies had hid themselves in the Boston Mountains.
Gen. Curtis had completed his work of driving Price from Missouri and some distance beyond her borders. He then drew his forces together and established himself at Cross Hollows, with the ultimate intention of retiring to the better position of Sugar Creek Crossing, in the event of the enemy concentrating any force against him. In the meanwhile he would hope that the turning movements which Halleck had planned would occupy Price's and McCulloch's attention, and draw them away from him.