Gen. Price was strenuous in his insistence upon attack, and finally McCulloch consented to meet all the general officers at his headquarters. In the council McCulloch was plain in his unwillingness to engage Lyon or to enter on any aggressive campaign, but Price, seconded by Gens. Parsons, Bains, Slack and McBride, were most determined that Lyon should be attacked at once, and declared that if McCulloch would not do it he would resume command and fight the battle himself. McCulloch finally yielded, and ordered a forward movement, and on the morning of Aug. 6 the entire force was in camp along the bank of Wilson's Creek, about six miles south of Springfield. This position was taken largely because of its proximity to immense cornfields, which would supply the troops and animals with food.

Wilson's Creek, rising in the neighborhood of Springfield, flows west some five miles, and then runs south nine or 10 miles in order to empty into the James River, a tributary of White River. Tyrel's Creek and Skegg's Branch, which have considerable valleys, are tributaries of Wilson's Creek. Above Skegg's Branch rises a hill, since known as Bloody Hill, nearly 100 feet high. Its sides are scored with ravines, the rock comes to the surface in many places, and the hight was thickly covered with an overgrowth of scrub-oak. There are other eminences and ravines, generally covered with scrub-oak and undergrowth, and the Confederates were camped in an irregular line along these for a distance of about three miles up and down Wilson's Creek, from the extreme right to the extreme left. Here they remained three days, with the much-disturbed McCulloch riding out every day with his Maynard rifle slung over his shoulder for a personal reconnoissance, which, as far as could be judged from his conversation on his return, was quite unsatisfactory.

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He had little stomach for the attack, and naturally found reasons against it.

Price and his Generals, on the other hand, were fretting over the delay. Price's accurate information of Lyon's condition made him sure that Lyon would do the obvious thing—retreat. It was the warlike thing to do to attack at once, which had every chance of success. Success meant as telling a stroke for Secession in the West as Bull Run had been in the East It would be quite as sensational, for there was no refuge or rallying point for the beaten Union army short of Rolla, 120 miles away, and the rough country, cut by innumerable valleys, gorges and streams, would enable the swarming mounted force to get in its wild work, and not permit the escape of a man, a gun or a wagon.

McCulloch, yielding to Price's importunities, ordered the army forward, and at dawn of Aug. 19 he and Mcintosh were sitting down to breakfast with Price and Snead, preparatory to leading their forces forward, when they were startled by their pickets being driven in. McCulloch, who had hated Rains from Old Army days, and despised him and his Missourians since the Dug Springs affair, remarked contemptuously, "O, it's only one of Rains's scares," and turned to his meal.

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But the matter instantly became more pressing than breakfast. Gen. Lyon had returned to Springfield Monday, Aug. 5, to meet an intense disappointment. Not a thing had been sent to meet his desperate needs. Fremont had ordered one regiment from Kansas and from the Missouri River to go forward to him, but they could hardly reach him in less than a fortnight. There were at that time some 44 regiments in Missouri—regiments commanded by men whose names afterward shine in history—U. S. Grant, John Pope, S. A. Hurlbut, John M. Palmer, John B. Turchin, S. B. Curtis, Morgan L. Smith, O. E. Salomon, John McNeil, etc.,—but they were kept garrisoning posts, chasing guerrillas, and at almost everything else than hurrying forward toward him, as they should have been.

Two of his regiments—the 3d and 4th Mo.—took their discharge and started for St. Louis. The 1st Iowa's time was out, but Lyon asked the men to stay with him a few days longer, and they did to a man.

Aside from the military reasons for holding Springfield there were others which appealed to Lyon's mind with equal power. His heart had bled over the outrages committed by the Secessionists upon the Union people in that section of the State. The presence of his army was the only security that the loyal people had that their farms would not be robbed and themselves murdered. Hundreds of them had gone into Springfield to be under his protection. How they could be ever gotten back to a place of safety in retreat was the gravest of problems. Gen. Schofield, at that time his Adjutant-General, and who disapproved of fighting the battle of Wilson's Creek, thinks that this consideration had more weight with him than the military reasons, and induced him to fight where the judgment of the soldier was against it.