In order to understand clearly our actions and our fate, you
will allow me to state the following facts:
1st. According to orders, it was the duty of this brigade to
attack the enemy in the rear and to cut off his retreat,
which order I tried to execute, whatever the consequences
might be.
2d. The time of service of the 6th Regiment Mo. Volunteers
had expired before the battle. I had induced them, company
by company, not to leave us in the most critical and
dangerous moment, and had engaged them for the time of eight
days, this term ending on Friday, the 9th, the day before
the battle.
3d. The 3d Regiment, of which 400 three-months men had been
dismissed, was composed for the greatest part of recruits,
who had not seen the enemy before and were only
insufficiently drilled.
4th. The men serving the pieces and the drivers consisted of
infantry taken from the 3d Regiment and were mostly
recruits, who had had only a few days' instruction.
5th. About two-thirds of our officers had left us. Some
companies had no officers at all; a great pity, but a
consequence of the system of the three months' service.
Later, when Gen. Sigel was seeking promotion, Maj. Schofield, then a Brigadier-General, sent the following communication to Gen. Halleck:
St Louis, Mo.. Feb. 18, 1862. Maj.-Gen. Halleck,
Commanding Department of the Missouri.
General: The question of the merits of Brig.-Gen. Franz
Slgel as a commander having assumed such shape as to deeply
involve the interests of the service, I deem it my duty to
make a statement of facts which came to my knowledge during
the campaign of last Summer in the Southwest, ending in the
death of Gen. Lyon and the retreat of his army from
Springfield.
Soon after the capture of Camp Jackson, in May, Gen. Lyon
sent Col. Slgel, with his two regiments of infantry and two
batteries of artillery, to the southwestern part of the
State, by way of Rolla, to cut off the retreat of Price's
force which he (Lyon) was about to drive from Boonville. Col.
Sigel passed beyond Springfield, reaching a point not far
from the Kansas line, and on the main road used by Price's
men in their movement south to join him. Here he left a
single company of infantry in a small town, with no apparent
object, unless that It might fall in the hands of the enemy,
which it did the next day (6th of July). Sigel met Price the
next day, and fought the celebrated "battle of Carthage."
Sigel had about two regiments of infantry, well armed and
equipped, most of the men old German soldiers, and two good
batteries of artillery. Price had about twice Sigel's number
of men, but most of them mounted, armed with shotguns and
common rifles, and entirely without organization and
discipline, and a few pieces of almost worthless artillery.
Sigel retreated all day before this miserable rabble,
contenting himself with repelling their irregular attacks,
which he did with perfect ease whenever they ventured to make
them. The loss on either side was quite insignificant. Price
and McCulloch were thus permitted to join each other
absolutely without opposition; Sigel, who had been sent
there to prevent their Junction, making a "masterly
retreat."
Several days before the battle of Wilson's Creek it was
ascertained beyond a doubt that the enemy's strength was
about 22,000 men, with at least 20 pieces of artillery,
while our force was only about 5,000. About the 7th of
August the main body of the enemy reached Wilson's Creek,
and Gen. Lyon decided to attack him. The plan of attack was
freely discussed between Gen. Lyon, the members of his
staff, CoL Sigel, and several officers of the Regular Army.
Col. Sigel, apparently anxious for a separate command,
advocated the plan of a divided attack. All others, I
believe, opposed it.
On the 8th of August the plan of a single attack was
adopted, to be carried out on the 9th. This had to be
postponed on account of the exhaustion of part of our
troops. During the morning of the 9th Col. Sigel had a long
interview with Gen. Lyon, and prevailed upon him to adopt
his plan, which led to the mixture of glory, disgrace and
disaster of the ever-memorable 10th of August Slgel, in
attempting to perform the part assigned to himself, lost his
artillery, lost his infantry, and fled alone, or nearly so,
to Springfield, arriving there long before the battle was
ended. Yet he had almost nobody killed or wounded. One piece
of his artillery and 500 or 600 infantry were picked up and
brought in by a company of Regular cavalry. No effort was
made by Sigel or any of his officers to rally their men and
join Lyon's Division, altho the battle raged furiously for
hours after Sigel's rout; and most of his men in their
retreat passed in rear of Lyon's line of battle.
On our return to Springfield, at about 5 o'clock p. m., Maj.
Sturgis yielded the command to Col. Sigel, and the latter,
after consultation with many of the officers of the army,
decided to retreat toward Rolla; starting at 2 o'clock a. m.
in order that the column might be in favorable position for
defense before daylight. At the hour appointed for the
troops to move I found Col. Sigel asleep in bed, and his own
brigade, which was to be the advance guard, making
preparations to cook their breakfast It was 4 o'clock before
I could get them started. Sigel remained in command three
days, kept his two regiments in front all the time, made
little more than ordinary day's marches, but yet did not get
in camp until 10, and on one occasion 12 o'clock at night.
On the second day he kept the main column waiting, exposed
to the sun on a dry prairie, while his own men killed beef
and cooked their breakfast. They finished their breakfast at
about noon, and then began their day's march.
The fatigue and annoyance to the troops soon became so
intolerable that discipline was impossible. The officers,
therefore, almost unanimously demanded a change. Maj.
Sturgis, in compliance with the demand, assumed the command.
My position as Gen. Lyon's principal staff officer gave mo
very favorable opportunities for judging of Gen. Sigel's
merits as an officer, and hence I appreciate his good as
well as his bad qualities more accurately than most of those
who presume to judge him. Gen. Sigel, in point of
theoretical education, is far above the average of
commanders in this country. He has studied with great care
the science of strategy, and seems thoroly conversant with
the campaigns of all the great captains, so far as covers
their main strategic features, and also seems familiar with
the duties of the staff; but in tactics, great and small
logistics, and discipline he is greatly deficient. These
defects are so apparent as to make it absolutely impossible
for him to gain the confidence of American officers and men,
and entirely unfit him for a high command in our army. While
I do not condemn Gen. Sigel in the unmeasured terms so
common among many, but on the contrary see in him many fine
qualities, I would do less than my duty did I not enter my
protest against the appointment to a high command in the
army of a man who, whatever may be his merits, I know cannot
have the confidence of the troops he is to command.
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. SCHOFIELD, Brigadier-General. U. S. Volunteers.
This was accompanied by a statement embodying the same facts and signed by substantially all the higher officers who had been with Lyon.
At the first halt of the army, about two miles from the battlefield, while the dead and wounded were being gathered up, it was discovered that Gen. Lyon's body had been left behind. The Surgeon and another officer volunteered to take an ambulance and return to the battlefield for it They were received graciously by Gen. McCulloch; the body was delivered to them and they reached Springfield with it shortly after dark. The Surgeon made an attempt to embalm it by injecting arsenic into the veins, but decomposition, owing to exposure to the hot sun, had progressed too far to render it practicable, and they were compelled to leave it when the army moved off.
Mrs. Phelps, wife of the member of Congress from that District, and a true Union woman, obtained it and had it placed in a wooden coffin, which was hermetically sealed in another one of zinc. Fearing that it might be molested by the Confederate troops when they entered the city, Mrs. Phelps had the coffin placed in an out-door cellar and covered with straw. Later she took an opportunity of having it secretly buried at night.