While this brought to their ranks a great many of the more pliant neutrals, it drove away from them a great number, and put into the ranks of the Union many who had been more or less inclined to the pro-slavery element.
The soreness between Price and McCulloch which had been filmed over before the battle by Price subordinating himself and his troops to McCulloch, became more inflamed during the stay at Springfield. In spite of the fact that the Missouri troops had done much better fighting, and suffered severer losses in the battle than McCulloch, he persisted in denouncing them as cowards, stragglers and mobites, without soldierly qualities.
The following extracts from a report to J. P. Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of War, will show the temper which pervaded all his correspondence, and was probably still more manifest in his personal relations with the Missourians:
It was at this point that I first saw the total inefficiency
of the Missouri mounted men under Brig.-Gen. Rains. A
thousand, more or less, of them composed the advance guard,
and whilst reconnoiterlng the enemy's position, some eight
miles distant from our camp, were put to flight by a single
cannon-shot, running in the greatest confusion, without the
loss of a single man except one who died of overheat or
sunstroke, and bringing no reliable information as to the
position or fore of the enemy; nor were they of the
slightest service as scouts or spies afterwards.
As evidence of this I will mention here the fact of the
enemy being allowed to leave his position, six miles distant
from us, 20 hours before we knew it; thus causing us to make
a night march to surprise the enemy, who was at that time
entirely out of our reach. A day or two previous to this
march the Generals of the Missouri forces, by common consent
on their part and unasked on mine, tendered me the command
of their troops, which I at first declined, saying to them
it was done to throw the responsibility of ordering a
retreat upon me if one had to be ordered for the want of
supplies, their breadstuffs giving out about this time; and,
in truth, we would have been in a starving condition had it
not been for the young corn, which was just in condition to
be used. * * *
The battle over, it was ascertained that the camp followers,
whose presence I had so strongly objected to, had robbed our
dead and wounded on the battlefield of their arms, and at
the same time had taken those left by the enemy. I tried to
recover the arms thus lost by my men, and also a portion of
those taken from the enemy, but in vain. Gen. Pearce made an
effort to get back those muskets loaned to Gen. Price before
we entered Missouri the first time. I was informed he
recovered only 10 out of 615. I then asked that the battery
be given me, which was one taken by the Louisiana regiment
at the point of the bayonet. The guns were turned over by
the order of Gen. Price, minus the horses and most of the
harness. I would not have demanded these guns had Gen. Price
done the Louisiana regiment justice in his official report
The language used by him was calculated to make the
impression that the battery was captured by his men Instead
of that regiment * * *
McCulloch was a voluminous writer, both to the Confederate War Department and to personal and official friends, and few of these communications are without some complaint about the Missouri troops. Everything that he had failed to do was due to their inefficiency, their lack of soldierly perceptions, and conduct. They would give him no information, would not scout nor reconnoiter, and he was continually left in the dark as to the movements of the enemy. When they were attacked he claimed that they would run away in a shameful manner. His dislike of Gen. Rains seemed to grow more bitter continually.
