“The General bowed and applauded her devotion to her government. She then bade him good-by and left for Nashua, refusing an escort.
“Gen. Rosenfelt sent for his corps commanders that evening, and explained the situation as he understood it. After examining the map and showing his officers the manner he desired an assault to be made, should he determine to attack, all agreed that there was no cause for delay.
“The troops were in fine condition and 'eager for the fray.' The General commanding told them to be ready to move at 'o'clock in the morning. He would send them written instructions in the meantime. So he prepared his orders and sent them out. First, his headquarters would be with those of Gen. Papson's corps; that the army would march by three different roads, leading from Nashua in a southerly direction. Gen. McCabe, with his command, would march on the Franktown road; Gen. Papson, with his command, being the center, on the Nolton and Shell-town Road; Critsinger on the Murphy's Hill road. McCabe was to assail Harding's forces on his road; but if Harding should fall back on the main rebel line, in that event McCabe and Papson were both to bear to the left, so as to present an unbroken front or line at or near Stone Run, opposite Murphy's Hill. The movement commenced the next morning, but not so early as directed. During the march McCabe ran against Harding's pickets, when a skirmish began. The rebel forces fell back on their main line. Gen. McCabe was delayed for some reason and did not reach Harding's main position that day, but on the next. And when he did arrive, Harding had left and was far away on his road to join Bigg's main force. The rain was now falling in torrents, and Papson and Critsinger were troubled to get their trains through the mud over very poor roads. When Gen. Rosenfelt's forces were finally concentrated he was compelled to rest one day, he thought, in order not to engage the enemy with his army in a tired and worn-out condition.
“The enemy had to march about the same distance, however, in order to make their concentration of forces. The ground over which the battle must be fought lies between Stone Run and Overman's Creek; it is slightly rolling ground, with sticky, clayish soil, in which the roads are tortuous and easily worked up by teams so as to become almost impassable. There were clearings on this ground, but they alternated with a chaparral that was almost impenetrable. There are three roads through this valley, between the two streams, which converge on Murphy's Hill.
“Rosenfelt, after resting, formed his line with McCabe on the right, Papson in the center, and Critsinger on the left, leaving Stone Run between the enemy and himself. One or the other must cross this stream sometime and somewhere during the engagement, in order to attack his opponent. There is much in the first assault if made with decision. In the evening, just before dark, one of McCabe's brigades struck one of Wittington's (rebel) brigades. The contest was a severe one, in which our forces were damaged very much. This ought to have proven that the enemy were intending to cross the run and strike our right flank. But it did not seem to disturb our commander in the least. That night Rosenfelt laid before his corps commanders his plan of attack, which was to throw his left across the run and attack and drive the rebel forces from Murphy's Hill, and get between the hill and the enemy, and use the high ground for artillery on the line and flank of the enemy; at the same time strike him in the center with Papson, leaving McCabe to merely hold his line to resist and not to attack.
“This being understood, all were to be ready the next morning to carry out the plan of the battle laid down by the General commanding. During the day Mrs. Lotty Houghton heard directly from one of the rebel officers that they were to move that night all their available forces to our right and attack us on our flank in the morning. So she concluded to leave that day, in order to be out of the way of the battle, and started south. After traveling several miles outside of the enemy's lines, she cut across to the west and took the road leading from Nashua to Pulaston. Traveling on that for some distance she struck across to the road from Nashua to Murphy's Hill, following that until she came to our pickets, and there asked to be shown to Army headquarters. She got in very late, and the Sergeant made a mistake and took her to Gen. Papson. He did not know her and was rather suspicious. She told him of the movement of the enemy. He took her into his headquarters and sent out to find Gen. Rosenfelt. But he could not be found. He was out somewhere looking after his lines. This caused delay. He was not found until morning, and then not until after the movement had commenced on his left. Critsinger was crossing the run in front of Murphy's Hill. When Gen. Rosenfelt was informed that Mrs. Houghton was in our lines, and of her statement made about the enemy, he said:
“'It cannot be so. Biggs cannot suspect our movement. But even so, I will crush his right, which he has left exposed, and carry out my plan before he can do anything.' Gen. Rosenfelt superintended the crossing of the run in person. He saw the moment approaching when he could throw himself with a vastly superior force upon the isolated division that Gen. Biggs had left at the hill—the rest of Biggs's command having crossed the run to his left. At this juncture skirmish firing was heard, and in a very short time sharp musketry burst forth on our extreme right.
“At once Rosenfelt questioned in his mind, could Biggs have guessed the movement by which he was menaced? Was he endeavoring to forestall it, or was this one of those encounters between pickets? Or had Mrs. Houghton brought to him the correct information? He at once sent to have her brought to him. But she had left for Nashua on the turnpike road, so as to be out of the way, as well as out of danger. Very soon the facts were revealed to him, when too late, however, to retrace his steps. There was nothing left but to attack the isolated force at once, as McCabe had stated that he could hold his position against any force that might attack him. The battle had commenced on his right, and the rebels were pressing forward and gaining very great advantage. Our forces were taken completely by surprise on our right—the soldiers were in their tents, the officers scattered; the Chief of Artillery was at the headquarters of Gen. McCabe; the artillery horses had been taken to water, and in the great haste to get under arms each regiment formed in front of their tents. On came the rebel division, pouring a terrific fire into our ranks, advancing at every discharge, and loading as they came. Our artillery was mixed up and the portion of it that could be got into position was operated in vain. The two forces came together and fought hand to hand amid a musketry fire that struck friend and foe alike. Gen. John's brigade held their ground manfully, but could not long withstand the impetuosity of the attack and the superiority of numbers. Their line broke in several places, and the batteries, deprived of horses, fell into the hands of the enemy. Gen. Willis's brigade was totally routed and he made a prisoner. Kirkham's brigade was broken to pieces and routed. The first assault did not last long, but was extremely damaging to our forces. Thus attacked, our lines were falling back in the direction of Overman's Creek, when Lawting's rebel cavalry fell upon their flank, capturing many prisoners, guns, and much camp equipage. Polkhorn now assaulted Gen. Davies' division with two fresh divisions. Davies repulsed the first assault, but was struck in flank by Clayber, which forced him back. Potter's brigade was by Clayber entirely dispersed. By this time our right flank had been broken and driven back on Hospital Hill, and finally from there.
“The rebel cavalry then came charging down, capturing many prisoners. Our wagon trains, ammunition and rations were only saved by the action of one regiment of our cavalry charging the rebel flank and forcing them back. News reached Rosenfelt that his right was completely routed. He at once countermanded his order to attack with his left, and moved to the right in order to save a great disaster and perhaps his army.
“In the meantime Biggs was preparing to attack the center, and on came one of his divisions in double column and struck the troops of a general who was in waiting to receive them (Gen. Sherlin). The attack was quick and terrible, but they were rolled back, attacked in turn, and the rebel loss in one brigade was one-third of its force. Gen. Sull, one of our brave officers, here lost his life while leading a charge. Rosenfelt and Gen. Papson now commenced forming a new line, which had to be done under a heavy fire, as the battle had extended down to and on the center. Sherlin had fallen back to form on the new line. Rosen felt had become excited, and was riding over the field with his hat off, ordering everything he came to—batteries, regiments and companies. Papson, who was always cool and calm in battle as on dress parade, had his corps well in hand, and ordered Gen. Anderson, who was on his right and adjoining Sherlin, to receive the enemy and give him the bayonet. There had been a cessation of fighting for an hour, and the broken troops had commenced to re-organize and get into line. Biggs, seeing that postponement would not do, ordered up the division from Murphy's Hill, and again the battle commenced with renewed vigor. Sherlin was assailed first by Polkhorn. Gen. Anderson now seeing his chance, moved quickly to Sherlin's support, and with a dash struck one of Polkhorn's divisions in flank, and almost annihilated it. One of his brigades, Stephen Lyon commanding, was ordered to charge against another division. This was handsomely done, and the rebels fell back rapidly. At this time Biggs came into the fray, and led back his broken brigades in person, but they fared the same as before. In this assault Sherlin lost his other two brigade commanders, and had his troops somewhat demoralized for a time; but they soon recovered and the attacking commenced on our side. Our lines were moved forward and the battle was furious; first an advantage was gained on the one side and then on the other. At last our men became encouraged and were fighting with a firm conviction that we were gaining ground and driving the enemy back. During an hour of hard stand-up hand-to-hand fighting, officers and men fell like the leaves of Autumn after a bitter frost. Night then closed in, leaving the two armies facing each other.