“At the time the General was mortally wounded, I was not near him, as he had given me an order to bring the command of Gen. Crawford to the front. It was halted somewhat to the rear and our left. When I returned I found that the General was being removed to the rear, but by the men of what regiment I do not know. I remained with him until he died, which must have been about 1 o’clock P. M., 17th. * * Where the General fell was a little to our left of the woods—a cornfield was directly in front. I am very sure that the General was not killed by the men of the [Confederate] command in front of the 10th Maine. I am positive as to this.”
Here is another instance how impossible it is to see everything as it is in battle. Apparently Maj. Dyer did not see the General hurrying the 10th Maine across the brigade front.
GEN. MANSFIELD’S MISTAKE.
The next question that arises is, why did Gen. Mansfield suppose the 10th Maine was firing into Union troops?
While the corps was waiting in the vicinity of Joe Poffenberger’s, (marked 6:20 on the map) from about 6:20 to 7:20 A. M., Gen. Mansfield was seen frequently by almost every soldier of the corps. In hundreds of letters, from the various regiments and batteries, there is a common agreement that the General was moving around the field continually. He seemed to be everywhere. Although he appeared like a calm and dignified old gentleman when he took command of the corps two days before, on this fatal morning he was the personification of vigor, dash and enthusiasm. As before stated, he remained some minutes at the northwest corner of East Woods (W on the map), observing the battle. One gets a fine view of the field from there and he must have got a good insight into the way Hooker’s corps was fighting. Presumably the tide was turning against Hooker, and as likely Mansfield had been called upon by him for reinforcements, but when Mansfield left the northwest corner to set his corps in motion, the East Woods, if I have rightly interpreted the reports and correspondence, was still in possession of Union troops. Probably, almost at the same time that Mansfield quitted his lookout, the Confederate brigade of Law (Hood’s division) came charging out of West Woods, the 4th Alabama on the right running up the Smoketown road, as before stated, and entering the woods at the south-west corner where the Georgia battalion joined on its right. The movements of all of Hood’s troops were exceedingly rapid.
How much time elapsed from Mansfield’s leaving his lookout to his being wounded, I can only roughly estimate at from fifteen to twenty minutes, but it was time enough to change the condition of affairs very materially, and I cannot help thinking the time passed very quickly to him, and that he did not realize the fact that the remnants of Rickett’s division had been driven out of the woods and cornfield, nor even did he suppose it was possible. Wise or unwise, it was entirely in keeping with everything else the General did during the three days he was with us, for him to come himself and see what we were doing; and like everything else, he did it with the utmost promptness. It was this habit of personal attention to details, and his other characteristic of rapid flying here and there, that make it so difficult for many of the soldiers of the 12th corps to believe he was wounded when and where he was.
A WORD IN CLOSING.
In this narrative it has been impossible to avoid frequent reference to myself and to my regiment, but there is nothing in the Mansfield incident of special credit to any of us. We were there and saw it; we live and can prove it; this is the whole story in a nut shell.
I have always regretted that I left the regiment even on so important a mission. At the time, I supposed it was only to be for a moment, and that with three field officers on duty I could be spared. As for the regiment, we succeeded so very much better later in the war, that we have not been in the habit of making great claims for the part we took in Antietam. Many other Union regiments fought longer, struggled harder, did more effective service and lost more men than we.
The Confederates opposed to us appeared to be equal to us in numbers and they were superior in experience and all that experience gives. On all other fields, from the beginning to the end of our long service, we never had to face their equals. Everybody knows that troops fighting under the eye of Stonewall Jackson, and directed by Hood, were a terrible foe. Our particular opponents were all good marksmen, and the constant call of their officers, “Aim low,” appeared to us entirely unnecessary.