Tacitus, from whom we derive our earliest information, supplies us with many details, which not only show the existence of a system, but tend also to prove its long prevalence. He tells us not only of nobles, but also of kings, princes and inherited authority[[197]], more or less fully developed: and the unbiassed judgment of the statesman who witnessed the operation of institutions strange to himself, warns us against theoretical appeals to the fancied customs of ages not contemporaneous with our own. The history of Europe knows nothing of a period in which there were not freemen, nobles and serfs; and the institutions of Europe, in proportion as we pursue them to their earliest principles, furnish only the stronger confirmation of history. We may, no doubt, theorize upon this subject, and suggest elementary forms, as the necessary conditions of a later system: but this process is and must be merely hypothetical, nor can such forms be shown to have had at any time a true historical existence. That every German was, in the beginning, Kaiser and Pope in his own house[[198]] may be perfectly true in one sense; just as true is it that every Englishman’s house is his castle. Nevertheless, the German lived under some government, civil or religious, or both: and—to the great advantage of society—the process of law surmounts without the slightest difficulty the imaginary battlements of the imaginary fortress.
The whole subject must be considered in one of two ways: with reference, namely, to a man living alone with his family, or to the same man and family, in a bond of union with others, that is in the state.
Could we conceive a permanent condition of society, such that each particular family lived apart, without connection or communion with others, we must admit the inevitable growth of a patriarchal system, of which the eldest member of the family would be the head; a system similar to that which we do find described as prevailing in the wandering family of Abraham. But such a condition could only exist at a period of time, and in a state of the earth, which admitted of frequent migration, and while the population bore a small proportion to the means of support, perhaps even in countries where water is of greater value than land. Thus the moment the family of Abraham became too numerous, and his herdsmen found it necessary to defend their wells and pastures against the herdsmen of Lot, a separation took place and the Scheiks parted, according to the provisions of a solemn compact, that there might not be strife between them[[199]]. But, setting aside the mysterious purposes for which the race of Abraham were made wanderers, and which impress an exceptional character upon their whole history, it is clear that even they were surrounded by a society, whose conditions were totally different from any that could have existed in Germany. They fled from the face of a depraved cultivation, prevalent in the cities, and they were sojourners only from place to place, till the fulness of time, when they were to found the normal theocracy of the world.
To a certain degree they resembled the squatters in the backwoods of America; like them, they established a law for themselves, and acted upon it:—with the nature of that law, divine or human, we have nothing to do, for the purposes of this inquiry:—in this sense, indeed, they could be kings and priests in their own house; but so are, or were, the North American Regulators, who, in their own families and among all over whom they could establish their power, acted as judges, and both promulgated and executed a law which was necessary to their very existence in the wilderness[wilderness].
But I find it impossible to admit that the origin of our Germanic nations is to be found in any such solitary households or families; were it true, as Möser appears to argue[[200]], of some parts of Westphalia, it would not be so of other districts in southern Germany, as he indeed admits[[201]], and, particularly, it would not be true of England. In these two cases there can be no doubt that some kind of military organization preceded the peaceful settlement, and in many respects determined its mode and character[[202]]. But, even if we admit to the fullest extent, the doctrine of solitary settlements, we must still contend that these are, in their very nature, temporary; that they contain no possible provision for stability, in short that they are excluded by the very idea itself of a state; yet it is as a member of a state that man exists, that he is intended to exist[[203]], and unless as a member of a state, he is incapable of existing as a man. He can as little create a language as create a state: he is born to both, for both, and without both he cannot exist at all.
Each single family then is a state: two, three or four families are a state, under larger conditions. How are these last to be settled?
Where a number of independent households are thinly dispersed over a portion of the country, their reciprocal relations and position will probably be more or less of the following kind.
Some arrangement will exist for the regulation of the terms on which the use of the woods, waters and common uncultivated land may be enjoyed by all the settlers: it is even possible that they may have some common religious ceremonies as the basis of this arrangement[[204]]. But further than this there need be no union or mutual dependence; each solitary homestead is a state by itself, possessing the jus belli; in no federal relation to, and consequently in a state of war with, every other household, even though this right of war should not be in active operation at any given moment[[205]].
In his own household every man may bear rule, either following his own arbitrary will, or in accordance with certain general principles, which he probably recognizes in common with his neighbours. He may have a family worship of his own, of which he will be the chief priest[[206]], and which worship may or may not be consistent with that of his neighbours. If he is troublesome to them, they may root him out, slay or enslave him, do with him what seems good in their eyes, or whatsoever they have power to do. If he thrives and accumulates wealth, they may despoil him, or he oppress them,—all, however, jure belli, for there can be no jus imperii in such a case.
This, however, cannot be the normal state of man. The anxious desire, it might almost be called instinctive yearning, to form a part of a civilized society, forbids its continuance, not less than the obvious advantage of entering into a mutual guarantee of peace and security. The production of food and other necessaries of life is the first business of men: the attempt to take forcible possession of, or to defend, accumulated property, presupposes the accumulation. While the land and water are more than sufficient for the support of the population, the institutions proper to peace will prevail. It is inconceivable, and repugnant to the very nature of man, that such institutions should not be established the moment that two or more separate families become conscious of each other’s existence[[207]]: and in respect to our Germanic forefathers, we find such in full vigour from their very first appearance in history.